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ABSTRACT: Economic Statecraft: United States Antidumping and Countervailing 
Duty Policy. Ph.D submitted by Karen Philippa Malmgren in the Department of 
International Relations, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
The Antidumping and Countervailing Duty laws are competition policy instru­
ments with which the United States ostensibly seeks to promote the role of market forces, 
enhance competition and thereby uphold the post-war international economic order. 
However, through a combination of administrative pragmatism and statutory emendation, 
these trade laws have evolved into instruments with which the United States impedes 
market forces and insulates its domestic economy from the very competition these laws 
supposedly aim to encourage. This is a paradox.
Important political issues arise from this paradox which are obscured by the 
traditional methods of examining trade policy. This dissertation demonstrates that the 
political aspects can be made apparent if the laws are thought of as instruments of 
economic statecraft. Through an original application of the theoretical framework David 
Baldwin has developed in Economic Statecraft, it is argued that the trade remedy laws 
utilize state power for the purpose of changing the behaviour, beliefs, policies and 
propensities to act of foreign governments or firms.
By examining the detail inherent in the two statutes it is demonstrated that far 
from compelling foreigners to abide by market forces and undertake competitive trade 
practices, the US penalizes them for doing so. On the pretext that foreigners' trade 
practices are "unfair", the US is compelling them to engage in genuinely anticompetitive 
practices. Competition is the central mechanism of the post-war international trade system. 
Therefore, the United States is undermining that order with its use of these instruments 
of statecraft. Further, remedy policy is generating political conflict between the US and 
its major trading partners because there is fundamental disagreement as to the normal and 
appropriate role for governments and firms to play in a modern market economy. 
Differences of opinion about what is "unfair" in this context arise, as is demonstrated, on 
political grounds rather than economic ones.
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CHAPTER ONE — TRADE REMEDY POLICY: ECONOMIC STATECRAFT
THE PROBLEM
It is common knowledge that the United States has played an active part supporting 
the post-War (WWII) international trade system. In this system, competition, rather than 
colonial claims, for example, is the central mechanism by which the gains from 
international trade are distributed internationally. In addition to enforcing and abiding by 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),the international agreement which 
sets out the rules that support competition, the United States government employs its own 
trade measures to enforce competition policy internationally. Two of these competition 
policy measures, the antidumping law (AD) and the countervailing duty law (CVD) have 
been used by the United States increasingly aggressively since the 1960's. These 
competition policies supposedly aim to promote competition.^ They are ostensibly 
intended to increase the play of market forces in the international trade system and to 
reduce the distortions to trade caused by both foreign corporate dumping practices and 
foreign government subsidization of foreign firms. But, in practice, these policies are 
having the opposite effect. This raises fundamental questions about whether the United 
States is now supporting or undermining the post-war international economic order which 
it had been instrumental in building.
American political rhetoric repeatedly emphasizes the United States' commitment 
to promoting both competition and market forces in international trade, especially among 
the signatories to the GATT. But, a schism has emerged between this rhetoric of "free(r) 
trade'' and the trade-restrictive manner in which these two competition policy measures 
are effectively used.
How has this happened? The United States has "enhanced the enforceability" of 
these laws, especially since the late 1960's, through statutory emendation and pragmatic 
administration. This appears to have been done with the conviction that improved efforts
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to dissuade foreign firms or governments from engaging in "unfair” anticompetitive trade 
practices would serve to promote free(r) and fair(er) competition.
However, the process of "enhancing” the statutes has actually subverted them. 
Though perhaps well-meant, the statutory and administrative changes have blurred the 
distinction between fair and unfair trade practices. Increasingly the United States has 
labelled fair trade practices as "unfair" and anti-competitive. On that pretext the alleged 
perpetrator has been compelled to remedy the unfair trade practice by paying a tax on 
their exports to the United States, voluntarily restrain the level of their exports, adopt 
quotas, change their prices, or otherwise engage in genuinely anticompetitive behaviour.
In reality, the AD and CVD laws have evolved as instruments with which the 
United States reduces the play of market forces, undermines the role of competition, and 
insulates the American economy from the very forces these laws ostensibly serve to 
promote. The free trade rhetoric cloaks this reality. Further obscuring the subverted policy 
from public view is the dense technical detail inherent in the statutes. Combined, these 
factors have insulated them from scrutiny, especially by students of international relations, 
for whom these laws have appeared remote technicalities, distant from the political arena 
that is the focus of their attention.
That the United States is acting in this manner is a paradox. It has been the United 
States, even before the end of the Second World War*% that has long promoted the 
conception of economic order based on competition. It has been the United States that has 
consistently taken the lead in international negotiations to reduce barriers to trade. Now 
it is the United states which is leading a movement of policy administration which runs 
directly counter to the avowed goals of United States multilateral diplomacy.
The significance of this paradox extends far beyond the simple point which has 
been highlighted in recent years mainly by economists, namely that the United States is 
being protectionist. Rather, its significance begins to emerge if these competition policy 
measures are seen not as "technical" trade measures but as instruments of economic 
statecraft.^
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As developed by David Baldwin, economic statecraft is a framework for 
conceptualizing about how economic policy instruments, such as trade policy, are actually 
employed in the exercise of state power. With the AD and CVD laws the United States 
compels foreign firms and foreign governments to change their behaviour in commercial 
affairs. That is to say that these laws involve the use of power; state power is used to get 
foreigner actors to do that which they otherwise would not, to change their actual or 
potential behaviour in compliance with the demands of the United States. Here power 
meets politics.
An attempt by one state or government to change a foreign actor's behaviour is a 
political act. The so-called unfair trade laws, then, mark a point at which policy, power 
and politics come together. Starting from this point questions relevant to international 
political relations become apparent. What is the United States compelling foreign actors 
to do and on what grounds are they compelled to comply?
For those who come from a background of liberal economics the insinuation that 
trade policy is a political phenomenon involving the use of power may at first seem 
controversial. After all, according to liberal economic thought, politics is what interferes 
with the market's ability to function efficiently. It may be argued that traditional well- 
accepted free market conceptual frameworks already exist and have served their purpose: 
to distinguish free trade versus protection, and non-intervention versus intervention (by 
governments in markets and economic affairs). Some traditionalists may say that it is 
simply a question of identifying who is being protectionist and who is encouraging free 
trade. Or, it is simply a question of identifying which governments are "intervening" 
unfairly in economic affairs and which are not.
The problem with the traditional frameworks is that they are misleading. They 
obfuscate the central political issues that are at the heart of the modern controversies 
about competition policy.
The main purpose of this study is to illuminate the political issues arising from the 
way in which the United States uses these laws. This can be done by examining these laws
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as instruments of economic statecraft. These political issues give rise to controversy, 
contention, and conflict in international relations. It is the profound differences of 
perception and opinion among the peoples and governments of the world's market 
economies over the appropriate role of government and the appropriate behaviour of firms 
that is at issue.
Although the subject matter appears to be economics, the essential aims of policy 
are political. With the AD and CVD laws the United States aims to change the actions, 
opinions, beliefs, policies and even propensities to act of a foreign firm or government. 
As such, this is a study not of the links between economics and politics but of the 
inseparability of economics and politics.
Further, economic statecraft emanates from domestic politics. Through statutory 
and administrative change the United States sets the terms by which foreign actors, 
whether firms or governments, must abide in order to avoid penalties. These modifications 
result from the interaction of domestic political forces. They are a consequence of 
domestic political processes. This study does not seek to explain the history of the 
procedures by which the laws came to be changed. That would entail an exhaustive history 
of the domestic influences which come to bear on trade policy, ranging from the origins 
of minute bits of statutory language to the reasons why those officials administering the 
law exercised the discretion available to them in a particular manner at a particular time. 
The domestic sources of trade policy are extremely important. But, there has been a 
tendency in studies of domestic and international politics to focus on the policy-making 
process to the exclusion of the final product. Here we seek to understand: what is the 
policy? In the end, the policy is to compel foreigners to do what?
PURPOSE
The purpose of this study is threefold. First, it will be demonstrated that the 
economic statecraft framework is a more useful and accurate way of unravelling and
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resolving the problems posed by developments in United States antidumping and 
countervailing duty law and policy than the traditional "free trade versus protection" and 
"non-intervention versus intervention" frameworks.
Second, using the economic statecraft framework the study examines the content 
and administration of these laws, focusing on the years 1968-1988, with a view to 
confirming the divergence and subsequent contradiction between the rhetoric of free trade 
and actual trade policy. Equally important, the laws' role as instruments of economic 
statecraft can be substantiated by examining the laws' technical details.
Third, this study seeks to demonstrate that developments in the antidumping and 
countervailing duty laws mean that the United States is actually undermining the post-war 
international economic order with the very instruments that were designed to uphold it. 
This necessitates a full discussion of what is generally meant by the "post-war 
international economic order".
In addition, this study seeks to fulfill four broader tasks. First, it is a response to 
the academic calling of Professor David Baldwin, who developed the notion of economic 
statecraft that is employed in this study:
"Indeed, it is precisely the routine day-to-day uses of trade as a technique of
economic statecraft which are least well understood and most in need of
illumination."^
Second, Professor Baldwin explains that his research on economic statecraft 
emphasizes "how rather than what to think about such matters",® opening the way for 
new analysis. Hopefully, by applying his framework to a specific problem, this study will 
carry his approach much further, by illuminating what to think about United States trade
e
remedy0 policy.
Third, this study seeks to provide an analysis of the trade remedy laws in which 
the political issues and questions predominate over economic ones.
Finally, one of the most important objectives is to illuminate and clarify what is 
known about the American enforcement of competition policy through utilization of the 
antidumping and countervailing duty laws. Analysts of international relations have
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neglected these trade laws since they are highly technical and do not appear to be 
particularly relevant to the realm of world politics. Even for those who accept that trade 
policy is a political element in international relations, these laws undoubtedly seem obscure 
in comparison with many other more visible, timely phenomena in the world of politics. 
Antidumping and countervailing duty cases have moved in recent years from the small 
columns of the business pages to the front pages in the international press, and 
controversies between governments and corporations over "unfair” trade practices have 
become increasingly contentious. It is no longer possible for analysts to ignore these laws 
and policies. Nor can traditional conceptions any longer adequately explain the political 
forces set in motion
internationally by these seemingly technical areas of law and policy. The trouble is not 
only what people don't know it is also that what they do know ain't so7
METHODOLOGY
This study is written in the classical tradition of international relations. The central 
and subordinate theses are argued rather than tested. The classical approach, as defined 
by Hedley Bull,
" ... is characterized above all by explicit reliance upon the exercise of judgement 
and by the assumption that if we confine ourselves to standards of verifications 
and proof there is little of significance which can be said about international 
relations."®
The economic statecraft framework requires a classical approach. It allows the 
anticompetitive aspects of AD and CVD policy to be demonstrated through analysis and 
argument. It's advantage is that it allows us to focus on the non-quantifiable, political 
aspects of competition policy, which are obscured or ignored under the traditional 
frameworks. There is nothing in the thesis to test. Rather, the power and propriety of the 
central and subordinate theses are dependent wholly on evidence and logic, judgement and 
persuasion.
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This study examines only the United States. It is not the only country which has
an antidumping or a countervailing duty law, nor is it the only place where policy and
rhetoric have gone in opposite directions. But, as Raymond Aron has said,
" ... the structure of the international system is always oligolopolistic. In each 
period [of history] the principal actors have determined the system more than they 
have been determined by it."^
The United States has been the leading multilateralist and arguably the most 
ideological nation in its pursuit of enhanced market forces. Whether intentional or not, 
if the United States has changed that position, it is bound to have profound effects on the 
structure of the international trade system.
In addition, more often than not, United States trade law and practice have formed 
the basis for the concepts and language employed in international trade agreements, and 
in the laws of other nations. In recent years many trading nations, most notably the 
European Community, but also newly industrializing countries such as Brazil, have 
adopted the emerging American ideas and practices in this area. Thus, the significance of 
this analysis goes beyond the United States. This dissertation serves as an introduction to 
the kind of economic statecraft increasingly being pursued by the major trading nations 
of the world. By studying the United States we can learn much about the structure of the 
international trade system. If the American trade policy concepts and language are at odds 
with the internationally agreed-upon trade rules then, again, this poses important problems 
within the international trade system.
Only the United States1 side of the story is examined here. Economists regularly 
attempt to determine whether or not foreign firms are in fact dumping and whether or not 
foreign governments are in fact subsidizing their industries. However, attempts to 
determine such "facts” are elusive since it is the unilateral judgement of United States 
authorities which is used to invoke and administer the remedy measures. This judgement 
is based on national interpretation and application of extremely vague and highly 
ambiguous international agreements. So, whether or not a violation is "in fact" taking place 
is not as important as whether or not the United States authorities say that it is. For this
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reason the changes which have been made to the definitions in these statutes and changes 
concerning the methodology employed in administering these statutes will be examined 
in detail with care.
Thus, the study seeks to establish: What is dumping? What constitutes a subsidy? 
When are such practices actionable under United States trade law? In addition the study 
examines the significant changes which have been made in the methodology which is used 
to determine whether (and by how much) dumping or subsidization is occurring.
Finally, the remedies available under these laws have changed. The study seeks to 
ask what are foreigners being compelled to do under these laws? What remedies are they 
compelled to adopt?
This study also examines the administrative history of these statutes. Through 
pragmatism, official discretion and creative interpretation, administrative practice is a 
powerful influence on the applied content of these statutes. An examination of the 
administrative history will help demonstrate how the laws are applied to induce changes 
in the behaviour of foreign actors.
The materials employed in the argument are various. The discussion in Chapters 
One to Three (Section One) mainly rely on the original intellectual and scholarly work 
others have done. By building on the useful concepts, terms and definitions, others have 
developed, it is possible to understand and address the problem in the realm of 
international relations. The bulk of the thesis, however, makes use of both primary and 
secondary sources. The primary resources are mostly legal citations because the 
dissertation is about American trade law. In the United States, law review articles, which 
serve to interpret and define the meaning of developments in American law, are 
considered primary sources. They are employed as such here. Similarly, because the 
perception of what the law means is usually more important than what the law actually 
says, references are made to the secondary materials comprised of writings by scholarly, 
professional and journalist observers in the field.
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STRUCTURE
The dissertation is divided into four sections. Section One (Chapters One, Two and 
Three) argues why the economic statecraft framework is a better way of addressing the 
central paradox than the traditional frameworks. Section Two (Chapters Four, Five and 
Six) examines developments in the antidumping law, carrying on with the central thesis: 
By "strengthening” the law United States trade remedy policy has diverged from, and 
ultimately has come to contradict the statutes1 intended aims. As such, the United States 
is undermining the GATTsystem, and indeed the post-war international economic order, 
with its use of the antidumping law. Section Three (Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine) 
argues the same for the countervailing duty law. Because these two statutes are similar in 
their structure and content, the chapters on subsidies will not repeat the technical features 
presented in Chapters Four, Five and Six. Instead, it will explore the more complex 
theoretical issues posed by the countervailing duty law. Section Four (Chapter Ten) 
provides the conclusion. There the argument will be reexamined in light of the analyses 
provided in earlier chapters. In addition, the final section will examine some of the 
broader implications of the study's thesis.
The dissertation falls within the prescribed 100,000 word limit which is inclusive 
of endnotes and appendices but exclusive of the bibliography.^®
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1. Laws are different from but related to policy. As Robert Pastor notes, '"'Policy" has 
come to mean administrative discretion more than laws". Congress and the Politics of US 
Foreign Economic Policy: 1929-1976. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980) 
page 31. This dissertation examines both AD and CVD law and policy.
2. For the best description of the United States' role in the creation of the post-war 
international economic order see Richard Gardner. Sterling Dollar Diplomacy; The Origins 
and the Prospects of Our International Economic Order (New York: MacGraw-Hill Book 
Company, second expanded edition 1969).
3. The economic statecraft concept is developed by David Baldwin in his prize-winning 
study of power, politics and economics, Economic Statecraft (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1985).
4. David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, page 60.
5. ibid., page 5.
6. The AD and CVD laws are only two of many trade remedy laws. They are called 
remedy laws because each serves to "remedy", to fix, to correct, the distortions to 
international and domestic trade caused by a foreign government's or foreign firm's 
anticompetitive trade practices such as dumping and subsidization.
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they do know ain't so." It is, no doubt, apocryphal, but, Kenneth Boulding attributes this 
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1965, The American Economic Review Vol. LVI, No. 2, May 1966, page 1. In contrast, 
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Politics. XVIII. April 1966, page 361.
9. Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (New York: 
Doubleday, 1966) page 95.
10. The London School of Economics Calendar 1990-1991, page 374.
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CHAPTER TWO — TRADE REMEDY POLICY
WHAT IS TRADE REMEDY POLICY?
I export. He dumps. This common expression vividly reveals the misconceptions 
surrounding "unfair” trade practices. They are so pervasive, and so little-examined by 
analysts of international relations that it is essential to clarify what constitutes an unfair 
trade practice, and what are deemed to be appropriate remedial actions in trade remedy 
policy.
The liberal free market economic theory of international trade posits that 
international competition is the most efficient means of distributing resources and creating 
wealth. Traditional international trade theory assumes that trade is generated by 
comparative national advantages in the production of goodsJ
Actions by governments and firms to alter the comparative advantage distort 
competition and thereby degrade economic performance. In early theory comparative 
advantage was thought to be a relatively static condition based on factor endowments of 
a nation, especially land, labour and resources. Most liberal trade theorists acknowledge 
that comparative advantage is a dynamic condition which can be affected, and even 
altered in the long run -- for better and for worse - -b y  "unfair” trade practices, namely
o
the presence of monopoly power and government assistance to industry. Acceptance of 
the notion of dynamic comparative advantage has led to increased attacks on "unfair" 
trade. Stephen Magee and his co-authors clearly sum up the connection between anti­
competitive trade practices and "unfairness".
"Wealth comes from two sources: production and predation. Production increases 
wealth whereas predation transfers wealth. Production is a cooperative effort in 
which direct actors may gain; predation is a noncooperative effort in which the 
economic prey lose. Production is cooperative; predatory behaviour is selfish."'*
Two principal "unfair" means of altering the effects of competition and free
market forces are "dumping" and official government subsidization. Originally the term
dumping described the act of price discrimination, that is, selling a product to one buyer
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at a different price than to another -- internationally, selling in a foreign market at a 
different, lower price than in the home market. The idea is that high domestic prices 
generate profits which allow the seller to "subsidize" low-priced exports. This "unfair" 
advantage allows the company to undercut foreign competitors and gain a greater global 
market shared Ultimately the competitors are driven out of business. As a result, the 
level of competition is reduced, and the dumper is then able to exploit world markets 
through monopolistic behaviour. Hence, dumping is predatory and anticompetitive.
The working definition of dumping, that is, the definition of the level of price 
discrimination is actionable under the law, has changed dramatically since the first 
antidumping statute was enacted in 1894. It has, for example, at various times been 
defined as sales (at prices which are) "below normal value", "sales below home market 
value", "sales at less than fair value" and "sales below costs".®
Subsidization by governments poses another form of economic distortion. There has 
never been any agreement among governments nor, frankly, among economists, as to what 
exactly constitutes a subsidy. Broadly, the term subsidy is used to describe the artificial 
aids governments provide to their domestic industries in the production, manufacture or 
export of products. It is unclear what constitutes an "aid". Price discrimination has never 
been the central issue in these cases. Rather, subsidies reduce the recipient firm's costs. 
Reductions in costs may result in reduced prices or enlarged profit or operating margins 
instead. The law recognizes that the domestic price may be subsidized as well as the export 
price. A subsidy is actionable because it effectively allows firms to lower their costs 
unfairly.
Subsidies appear in an almost infinite number of forms. For example, a subsidy 
can come in the form of payments which are made directly by governments to firms, or 
in the form of state ownership of firms. But, subsidies can also include "non-actions" such 
as exempting a firm from taxation to which others are subjected. The common feature is 
that all subsidies are believed to create artificial cost advantages. Again, as with dumping,
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the working definitions of what constitutes a subsidy has changed since the countervailing 
duty statute was enacted in 1890.
The important point to keep in mind is that differences in prices and costs are
c
what give rise to international trade0. If an imported good is less expensive than a 
domestically produced good it is not necessarily dumped or subsidized. An imported good 
may be much more expensive than any domestically produced good and still have 
benefited from a subsidy. Only unfair trade practices should be penalized.
THE PURPOSE OF REMEDY POLICY
The AD law serves to "remedy” foreign firms1 dumping practices, that is to repair 
the ill effects of dumping. The CVD law serves to repair the ill effects of foreign 
governments' subsidy practices. What is meant by remedy, in practice, as we shall see, can 
be very different from the ostensible meaning of "remedy".
It is now widely agreed that the original and intended or, at least, the appropriate 
purpose of the AD and CVD laws is to extend domestic competition policy to foreign 
actors. This "competition policy" interpretation is somewhat dependent on revisionist 
history. Both laws, though the CVD law in particular, contained a "tariff policy" 
approach, which was essentially protectionist in character. Both laws contain elements of 
these two competing philosophies, one of encouraging competition and the other of 
building protection against foreign competition.
Before 1916, when a federal income tax was created, the vast majority of the 
federal income came from tariffs on traded When Congress originally legislated against 
foreign unfair trade practices it was motivated partly by the desire to increase federal 
revenue generated by tariffs, or at least prevent its diminution.® Thus, from the 
beginning a tariff philosophy was inherent in the AD and CVD laws. In other words, the 
purpose of these laws was to protect American industry from import competition and to 
generate revenue for the federal coffer.
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However, the economic rationale for such protectionist policies was subject to 
increasing attacks in the 1880‘s and 1890's. The rise of domestic antitrust legislation 
generated concern regarding impediments to competition - - namely the creation and abuse 
of monopoly power. Subsidies and dumping encourage the creation of monopoly power. 
The competition policy philosophy carried over from domestic competition policy laws to 
international trade policy. According to this interpretation the remedy laws are 
competition policy measures which aim to prevent the creation and abuse of monopoly 
power. Thus, those who subscribe to the antitrust interpretation, claim that the only 
economic rationale for the AD and CVD laws is the protection of domestic competition, 
not domestic competitors, from anticompetitive foreign trade practices.
The United States lacks the legal jurisdiction to criminally prosecute foreign 
companies or foreign governments for violating American competition law. It was 
necessary to create separate AD and CVD statutes to overcome this lack of jurisdiction. 
Rather than attacking the actions or intent of the foreign actor, as is done under domestic 
competition law, the remedy laws allow American authorities to offset the anticompetitive 
effects of targeted trade practices (dumping and subsidization). This is achieved by the 
application of a tax (called a duty) to the “unfairly” priced or "unfairly" produced import 
at the border. In theory the amount of the duty should be exactly equal to the unfairly 
achieved price advantage caused by the practice. This procedure allows authorities in the 
United States to protect competition -- that is, the domestic competitive environment -- 
from anticompetitive trade practices.
The two conflicting philosophies, the competition policy and tariff approach, 
continue to give rise to differing interpretations about the purpose of these laws. Domestic 
industries which believe they are being damaged by "excess" import competition -- fair 
or unfair --  tend to subscribe to the tariff policy origins of the law. They believe that the 
remedy provisions exist to provide them with "relief". For them the laws should serve to 
protect competitors and not competition. Harvey Applebaum explains.
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"Domestic industries do not view the problem as one of fitting injurious practices 
into the import relief laws. That is the Government's orientation". Instead, they 
want the "best possibility for victory, and thereby relief.
The inherent conflict between these two standards, the protection of competition
and the protection of competitors is extremely important. Domestic competition law and
policy has adopted the first standard while trade policy has adopted the second. The
conflict between the domestic and international enforcement of competition policy is a
continuing theme in this study. The two sets of laws are supposed to serve the same
purpose. Their divergence provides an important perspective on understanding how trade
rhetoric and trade policy have come to contradict each other.
There are many trade remedy lawsJ® This dissertation examines only two.
However, it is important to note that there is another trade remedy law which is designed
to protect American industry from fair but "excess" import competition; it is called Section
201 (of United States trade law). It corresponds to Article 19 of the GATT, which is
entitled "Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products", and commonly referred
to as the "escape clause" by Americans. Article 19 allows any member country to take
emergency action against
"products which are being imported in such increased quantities and under such 
conditions that thev cause or threaten to cause serious injury to competing 
domestic producers.
In such cases, if a government wants to protect the home market for a specified 
period of time, to facilitate modernization or restructuring of it industry, the government 
is permitted by the GATTprovision to do so. On the other hand, other governments which 
might feel adversely affected have the right, under the same GATT provision, to take 
remedial action. Such governments may request compensation in the form of tariff relief 
in other economic sectors, or if adequate compensation is denied, such governments are 
permitted to retaliate. Thus, the price for taking a section 201 action is either paying 
compensation to other member countries whose benefits under the Agreement are 
"nullified or impaired" by the action, or, accepting retaliation from them.
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The United States, has, in the past, used Section 201 more often than many other 
countries, but there is always a sting in having to pay compensation. Retaliation is also 
unpleasant. A Section 201 action tends to imply that the United States is being 
protectionist since it is acting against fairly priced or produced goods. In recent years the 
US has declined to use Section 201, preferring to threaten action, or take action under the 
AD and CVD laws.
There is no compensation or retaliation requirement under the AD and CVD laws. 
If the imports are "unfair” then the United States can act against them with impunity.
The concept of what constitutes an "unfair" trade practice under the American AD
and CVD laws has been substantially broadened over the last twenty years. This has
happened for two main reasons. First, by using the AD and CVD laws, rather than 201,
the United States ensures that the implication of "unfairness" and protection falls on
foreigners, not on Americans. This is why Senator Danforth reputedly has said, "201 is for 
12suckers". Second, it is a politically attractive option. It costs nothing. Foreigners do 
not vote.
However, it would be wrong to imply that there has been a conspiracy to subvert 
the statutes. Certainly some involved in the policy-making process have wanted to protect 
American firms from imports, fair or unfair. They have encouraged back-door protection. 
But, it appears that Congress has amended the remedy laws in the hopes of making them 
more "effective" because there was a genuine belief that "unfair" imports were, and are, 
a real problem. There seems little doubt that political representatives have modified the 
laws and allowed the officials who administer the laws wide discretion in applying the 
broadened notion of unfairness because they thought this would promote freer and fairer 
trade.
The common perception of the problem helps to explain the actions that have been 
taken. Rising concern among domestic companies about successful imports, the 
appearance of a large trade deficit and structural change in the international econom y,^ 
have led many Americans to one conclusion. If America is not as competitive as it once
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was it is because foreigners are engaging in unfair play. Robert Baldwin sums up this 
view.
"The view that gradually gained the support of the major public and private 
interests concerned with trade matters was that much of the increased competitive 
pressure on the United States was due to unfair foreign policies such as 
government subsidization, dumping by private and public firms, preferential 
government purchasing procedures, and discriminatory foreign administrative 
rules and practices relating to importation." He goes on to say: "By placing the 
blame for their decline in competitiveness on unfair foreign actions, U.S. managers 
and workers could avoid the implications that this decline might be due to lack of 
efficiency on their part. Finally government officials could maintain that the 
United States was still supporting the rules of the liberal international trade regime 
that the country had done so much to fashion."^
It is not the competitive system which is at fault. It is the unfair abuse of the system.
Therefore the AD and CVD laws must be strengthened so that further unfair foreign trade
practices can be prevented and punished.
THE ARGUMENTS
Why should we use the economic statecraft framework when thinking about these 
developments in trade remedy policy? Isn’t it simply a question of identifying who is 
damaging free trade through unfair or protectionist trade practices? Or, in the case of 
subsidies, isn’t it just a matter of identifying which governments are intervening in 
economic affairs? The central contention of this study is that the problems posed by 
remedy policy cannot be fully understood within the context of "free trade versus 
protection" nor of "non-intervention versus intervention".
The nature of the relationship between states and markets remains unclear, even 
after several centuries of debate. The appropriate role of government in the economy 
remains a contentious issue even among the GATT signatories. In addition, one's view of 
the proper behaviour of a private firm in a market economy is a highly subjective matter. 
However, the desire by analysts for a world in which economic forces can function unfet­
tered by the actions of government, and undisturbed by monopoly power and other
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manifestations of imperfect competition, a situation which would simplify analysis 
immensely, is not the same as the existence or even possibility of such a condition.
FREE TRADE VERSUS PROTECTION
Little appears to have changed since EH Carr observed in 1939,
"even today some "classical economists" insist on regarding free trade - - a n  
imaginary condition which has never existed - - a s  the normal postulate of 
economic science, and all reality as a deviation from this utopian prototype."16
Going further back in history we find that even Adam Smith, the doyen of all
"free traders" said,
'To expect, indeed that the freedom of trade should ever be entirely restored in 
GreatBritain is as absurd as to expect that an Oceana or Utopia ever be established 
in it."16
Yet, a recent cover story the Economist proclaimed: "More than at any time since 
the second world war, the maiden of free trade is in mortal danger."1^  President Bush 
should, according to the article, "tell his officials to just say no to protectionism." The free 
trade paradigm continues to dominate popular opinion. Free trade is "good" and protection 
is "bad".
It is not the intention here to sway opinions in the long-standing debate between 
the free trade camp and the mercantilists, between the liberals and the protectionists, 
between the choice of individual economic freedom versus state control, but rather it is 
to argue that the traditional "free trade versus protection" framework, which posits these 
options, is easy to comprehend, but fails to accurately portray the problems posed by trade 
remedy policy.
One of the consequences of rhetoric is that it establishes the assumptions upon 
which we base our analysis and it sets the parameters of discussion.16 If we 
conceptualize in terms of free trade versus protection then we inherently limit our inquiry 
to economic issues. Free trade is a term describing an extreme economic condition which 
is marred by the existence of barriers to trade and distortions in international competition.
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Therefore, to use such a framework is to focus on the problem of barriers and distortions. 
The central assumption is that free trade is preferable to protection. 9 This is why most 
economic analysts have focused on the problem of barriers to trade.
Tariffs are barriers to trade which have been successfully reduced, by nearly 90% 
on average, among GATT signatories through successive negotiations since the 1940's. As 
tariffs have been reduced it has been widely noted that non-tariff barriers have become 
a more pressing problem. It remains debatable whether this is because tariff reduction has 
exposed already existing NTB's (the falling water level hypothesis) or whether they have 
been created to replace tariffs as instruments of protection (the rising reef 
hypothesis).^
Barriers are not the only problem. Increasingly it has been recognized that certain 
corporate and government practices cause distortions to trade although they cannot be 
classified as barriers. Consider the example offered earlier in the study of a decision by 
government riot to tax a firm. Such a policy is not a barrier but it can cause a distortion. 
Similarly, when a firm sells its wares below the cost of production, the practice cannot 
easily be described as a barrier to trade. It is better described as a trade-distorting 
practice.
Robert Baldwin has developed the most widely adopted modern definition of non-
tariff distortion (NTD's):
"any measure (public or private) that causes internationally traded goods and 
services, or resources devoted to the production of goods and services, to be 
allocated in such a way as to reduce potential or real world income.
Having said that, it is necessary to ask what is meant by a "reduction" in potential or world
real income? It is not clear. Professor Baldwin recognizes this definition is "not
manageable" and comments that only those NTD's which "significantly distort international
trade" should be redressed. But, the key term, "significantly", is left undefined.
Dumping and subsidies are NTD's. The desire to eliminate these NTD's has been
the primary force behind the increased use of these trade remedy laws. NTD's are
commonly referred to as a manifestation of the "new protectionism". Old protection took
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the form of tariffs. However, the new protectionism, consisting of non-tariff protection, 
is an old problem.
Looking back in history we find that non-tariff distortions caused by dumping and 
subsidization did not preoccupy international trade negotiators nearly as much as the non- 
tariff protection which was provided by government anti-dumping and anti-subsidy 
measures! Writing in 1936 EM Winslow explained that international experts had then 
already found that non-tariff protection posed "one of the most baffling questions that has
op
ever appeared in commercial policy". It remains so.
As early as 1923 there was an international attempt to attack the problem. 
Economic "experts began in earnest about 1927 to define and formulate the problem in 
relations to other types of trade barriers and to commercial policy in general.' °  The 
heading of "non-Tariff Questions" appeared for the first time on the League of Nations 
Commercial Policy Talks in 1929/30. At first the experts addressing this problem stressed 
the purpose of the measures, which was to "evade international obligations" and "render 
what otherwise appears to be a liberal policy in reality highly protectionist"*^. But 
proving intent to protect or discriminate was impossible.
Non-tariff protection was then defined in terms of its origins in administrative systems. 
Finally, non-tariff protection was defined it in terms of its discriminatory nature. None 
of these definitions proved workable. The definitional net was cast too widely and too 
clumsily. Certain practices were labelled under its terms which should not have been and 
those which should have been included were left outside its scope. "Thus" Winslow
O C
explained "the problem of definition trailed off into one of classification 0 No 
progress had been made on this problem by 1969, when the GATT drew up its first 
comprehensive list of NTB's, as determined by the member governments in complaints 
about practices of other governments. The initial list reputedly numbered in the thousands 
of complaints before it's compression into coherent categories. To this day there is no 
internationally agreed method of determining what constitutes a non-tariff distortion. 
Instead governments continue to draw up lists of objectionable practices. On these lists
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are predatory trade practices (dumping and subsidization) as well as administrative NTB's
(including the abuse of AD and CVD law).
The earliest treatment of administered protection, considered the standard
treatment in the pre-World War II years, is Economic Protectionism, a commentary by
Josef Grunzel written in 1916. He explained that;
"means have been sought for by which to place in the hands of the administrative 
authority such control over the applications of laws regulating economic activity 
that an actual, though of course not a formal, protection might be afforded to 
domestic production against foreign competition. °
The use of administrative mechanisms, including trade remedy policy, has long 
been seen as an NTD. Jagdish Bhagwhati has drawn attention to the problem of 
administrative protectionism most recently. He says that the remedy laws have been 
"captured" by protectionists and are used for the purpose of import protection and not for 
promoting competition.^ As such, the remedy provisions are themselves NTD's. Finger, 
Hall and Nelson explain that such administrative protection arises from,
"the creation of quasi-judicial bureaucratic structures which hear requests for 
protection and, on the basis of previously established administrative mechanisms 
determine the appropriate level of additional protection".^®
The administrative remedy itself can be seen as a form of non-tariff protection.
The problem with the free trade versus protection framework is that it leads us to this
dead end. Dumping and subsidies NTD's which must be eliminated by remedies. Yet
those very remedies can themselves be NTD's. A report on competition and trade policy
from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development made this point
succinctly:
"Although designed to redress competitive disequilibria, laws relating to unfair 
trade practices, if improperly used, can act as barriers to trade and restrain 
competition on domestic markets."^®
The NTB/NTD debate has understandably divided observers of remedy policy into 
two camps. If it is not possible to distinguish non-arbitrarily between a significant and an 
insignificant distortion then almost anything can become a target. The United States has 
been suggesting in recent years, for example, that the Japanese language is a non-tariff 
barrier to trade and that the Japanese distribution system constitutes one huge non-tariff
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distortion. The European Community has suggested that the homogeneous nature of the 
United States market may also be a non-tariff barrier to trade. By relying on a framework 
of free trade versus protection there is a tendency for the term unfair to become so 
broadened that it becomes meaningless.
One camp perceives trade remedy measures as means of eliminating non-tariff 
distortions. The other camp sees trade remedy measures themselves as important non-tariff 
distortions.
Yet, the two camps ostensibly aim for the same goal. They are both in pursuit of 
"free trade”. The cause of free trade has been, as a former Chief Canadian trade negotiator
O ft
has noted, "harnessed in the attack on "unfair" trade". It has been the desire to 
eliminate NTB'sand NTD's in the name of free trade which has led to changes being made 
to the trade remedy statutes. It is these changes, undertaken in the interest of free trade, 
that have rendered the statutes more trade-distortive than the practices they were meant 
to counter. '
NON-INTERVENTION VERSUS INTERVENTION
Conceptualizing about the problem in terms of intervention versus non­
intervention creates a similar confusion. The notion that perfect competition is an optimal 
condition has created the widely-held assumption that markets create order and 
intervention by governments in markets creates disorder. This notion leads many observers 
to comment that many of the ills in the international trade system are due to governments 
interfering in economic affairs. Dumping is practised, as we have seen, by firms, over 
whose actions governments have little control, and therefore is not relevant here. Al­
though, think of how commonplace it is to hear, for example, accusations that "Japan 
dumps" or the "Europeans dump". Here are just a few examples of the non-intervention 
framework which demonstrate how commonly it is used.
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Robert Keohane, "... the increasing involvement of governments in the operation 
of modern capitalists economies have created more points of potential 
friction."3^
oo
Paul Krugman, "The best government policy is non-intervention."00
Richard Gardner,"... the cause of peace is assisted by the reduction of government 
interference in economic life."3^
William Cline, "An underlying cause of trade conflict is the (probably growing) 
tendency of government intervention in economic activity".
Robert Gilpin, "Which will prevail --  national economic interventionism or the 
rules of the international market economy?"36
This way of thinking causes us to focus on the problem of intervention by 
governments. By conceptualizing in this way we assume that any government role in 
economic affairs, though it may be unavoidable, is not an optimal economic condition. 
This biases us against any government activity in economic affairs from the outset.
Such a conception is ridiculous. Trade remedy policy itself is an intervention by 
government. How can the problem be intervention by states in the economy when that 
is the very basis of organizing freer trade? Karl Polanyi articulated this point in 1937. 
'The road to the free market was opened and kept open by an enormous increase in 
continuous, centrally organized and controlled interventionism.'10' Not only are states 
and markets not opposed, but, he explains, "For as long as that system (the market system) 
is not established, economic liberals must and will unhesitatingly call for the intervention 
of the state in order to establish it, and once established, to maintain it"33 Peter 
Drucker echoes this point. "Not only was it (the market) not opposed to a rule of the
O Q
market; it required the development of such a rule."00 William Corden explains: "The 
link between laissez-faire and free trade has been broken by this process."^3 Free trade 
requires intervention.
This is not a new idea. Even Adam Smith made clear that for market forces to 
function optimally governments had various roles to play.^ Jagdish Bhagwhati points 
out that "any sensible economist will point out the need to distinguish between those state 
interventions that correct market failure and those that create it ." ^  However, making
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this distinction has been a source of great aggravation to many earnest economists. It is 
notoriously difficult to distinguish between interventions which are undertaken for purely 
domestic reasons and those which have a distorting effect on international competition. 
An intervention to "correct" market failure can be (and usually is) perceived by others as 
a distortion.
DEAD ENDS
Neither of these traditional ways of conceptualizing about remedy policy are
capable of resolving our paradox. The United States uses remedy policy, itself potentially
an NTB or NTD, to eliminate the NTB's/NTD's of unfair trade practices. Because all
governments pursue some protection and all governments intervene, these frameworks
only exacerbate what Susan Strange calls the "politics of blame"4'*. Everybody accuses
everybody else, and all are "guilty" of protection and government intervention.
These frameworks do help us to identify that protection is occurring in various
forms in the international trade system. But is this all we can say? Protectionism tends to
be seen as the sickness rather than the symptom. Prolific calls are made to strengthen the
international rules to prevent governments from engaging in protectionist practices. Since
the remedy laws are perceived as competition policy measures similar calls are made to
strengthen them too. But here our problem surfaces again. The problem is that by
strengthening the remedy provisions the United States is undermining the international
rule system. President Reagan struggled with this thin edge when he said;
"There's a fundamental difference between positive support of legitimate 
American interests and rights on world trade and the negative actions of 
protectionists. Free trade can only survive if all parties play by the same rules. " 
He went on, "Defending workers in industries from unfair and predatory trade 
practices is not protectionism. It's legitimate action under US and international 
law."44
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AN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK: ECONOMIC STATECRAFT
Let us try instead the economic statecraft way of thinking. What are trade remedy 
laws actually used for? Remedy laws are instruments which are used to get others to 
change their behaviour. They are employed to get foreign actors to stop dumping and to 
stop subsidizing.
Trade remedy laws and policies are instruments of statecraft; they are means of
conducting the affairs of state. David Baldwin developed the definition of statecraft
employed here. He draws from the definitions a few other thinkers have produced in the
field of international relations. According to Harold and Margaret Sprout,
"statecraft embraces all the activities by which statesmen strive to attain desired 
objectives vis-a-vis other nations, and/or international organizations".^
KJ Holsti further refines this definition to,
"organized actions governments take to change the external environment in general 
or the policies and actions of other state in particular to achieve the objectives that 
have been set by policy makers".
David Baldwin enlarges upon these definitions. He includes non-state actors as "possible
targets of influence attempts"^ and he broadens changes in behaviour to include
"beliefs, attitudes, opinions, expectations, and/or propensities to act."^®
This concept of statecraft depends on a traditional understanding of power
relations. The notion of power used here was developed by Robert Dahl in his work on
domestic politics.^ It is one of the simplest and most widely adopted usages. He argues
that power is the ability of A to get B to do something B would not otherwise d o .^
There are three elements in this notion of power. First, A, a state, uses a certain
kind of policy instrument to commit the act of statecraft. Like Professor Baldwin we will
rely on the fairly standard classification of foreign policy instruments Harold Lasswell
created to distinguish between economic and non-economic. Baldwin points out that most
activities by governments, indeed the organization of governments, correspond to this
taxonomy. In World Politics Faces Economics^ Lasswell devised a taxonomy which
includes propaganda, diplomacy, economic statecraft, and military statecraft.
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First, we must ask, A uses the economic policy instrument to do what? In this 
study we are interested in how A uses the policy tool to affect the flow of trade in goods 
and services. This accurately describes the purpose of trade policy. But, how is the flow 
affected? It is affected by changing B's behaviour.
Second, who is B? B is a foreign actor such as a state, a firm, etc. That is, the act 
is directed at some domain. Influence or power is exercised over that domain. Third, why 
is A influencing B? A attempts to get B to do something. Changing, or even maintaining, 
some dimension of B's actual or potential behaviour is what A attempts to achieve. A is 
able to change the trade flow in some way by changing B's behaviour.
This concept of economic statecraft implies that trade policy is, as Richard Cooper 
has argued, foreign policy.®^ Economic statecraft requires the use of economic, as 
opposed to military, policy tools. As such, it is foreign economic policy.
This term, foreign economic policy, is so widely used and so little defined that it 
is necessary to explain what is generally meant by it here - - especially since the economic 
statecraft definition differs from traditional definitions.
Robert Pastor has best described the different attempts to define foreign economic 
53policy. He cites (publishing in 1980) the lack of any "guide or conceptual framew­
o rk "^  which allows us to understand its "political process". Benjamin J. Cohen provides 
the "only attempt at definition" Pastor could find. Cohen defines it as "the sum of actions 
by the nation state intended to affect the economic environment beyond the national 
jurisdiction."'^ IM Destler, however, defines it as "government actions with important 
impact on US relations with other governments and on the production and distribution of 
goods and services at home and abroad."^® Stephen D Cohen uses the term 
"international economic policy" instead of foreign economic policy because such policy 
"defies simple classification as "domestic" or "foreign".^ It is what governments use to 
"to modify what would otherwise be the ways that goods, services and capital would flow 
across national boundaries if a completely free market situation prevailed."^
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All of these define foreign economic policy in terms of its impact - - its economic
impact. Baldwin contends that such definitions are simply useless, if not (one infers)
actually silly. He wryly explains:
"Thus, a nuclear war could be labelled as "foreign economic policy" if it had any 
important side effects on foreign economic matters. Any conception of foreign 
economic policy which cannot differentiate between nuclear attack and trade 
restrictions is hopelessly at odds with common usage. Any conception of "policy" 
which ignores both means and ends is unlikely to be of much use in assessing the 
rationality of a given policy."®^
Economic statecraft describes a method or means of conducting foreign economic
policy. In this study we are looking at trade policy as an instrument of economic statecraft.
"In each case" of economic statecraft, Professor Baldwin makes clear, "a political
act is taking place insofar as a state is attempting to affect the actual or potential
• f i Obehaviour of another international actor. w This idea of international politics is similar
to the standard definitions of international politics offered in by specialists in international
relations. For example, KJ Holsti explains that,
"the international political process commences when any state seeks through 
various acts or signals to change or sustain the behaviour of other states."®^
AO Hirschman was, of course, the first to establish that this link between trade policy and
politics holds true regardless of the structure of the trade system. He wrote,
"We have now reached the result that international trade remains a political act 
whether it takes place under a system of free trade or protection, of state trading 
or private enterprise, the most favoured nation clause, or of discriminating 
treatments.1®
By thinking about remedy policy as an instrument of power, the use of which 
represents a political act, we are in immediate conflict not only with the traditional ways 
of conceptualizing about trade issues but also with standard treatments of remedy policy.
Let us take this second issue first since it can be dealt with more quickly. Trade 
remedy policy, if it is practised in accordance with theory, allows United States authorities 
to penalize the imported good, not the producer. The lack of legal jurisdiction forces the 
United States to offset the effect of the unfair trade practice, rather than to challenge the 
motives or actions of the perpetrator. To correct the trade distortion the duty should equal 
the degree of dumping or the amount of the subsidy. In this way the United States does
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not challenge the actions or motives of foreign actors. But who bears the cost of the
go
remedial action? The foreign actor bears the financial burden. If nothing else the 
remedy allows the United States to create a pecuniary penalty.
Tariffs, duties and financial penalties are forms of economic statecraft. Although, 
they are always portrayed as being neutral as regards foreigners. It is usually emphasized 
that they are imposed for domestic reasons, to protect domestic interests. Klaus Knorr, for 
example, says:
"...protective tariffs may be introduced to the benefit of" domestic "interests". "Any 
effects on other states is purely coincidental; there is no intent to wield power 
internationally."®^
However, it is difficult to identify any foreign policy undertaking which is not ultimately
undertaken "for domestic reasons". It is worth quoting Baldwin at length on this point.
"American foreign policy makers do not -- generally speaking -- threaten the 
Soviet Union with nuclear attack solely, or even primarily, because of some 
sadistic desire to instill fear in foreigners. They do it because they believe -- 
rightly or wrongly -- that such threats make the domestic populace safer. 'In short 
they do it for domestic reasons.1 Thus the logic of denying that protective tariffs 
are attempts to influence foreigners would require similar treatment of most other 
foreign policy undertakings. Almost everything would become a 'domestic matter1 
and precious little would be left of 'foreign policy'.
In addition, the effect of the duty is to neutralize the practice. By eliminating the 
unfair advantage (through the application of a duty) the United States dissuades the 
foreign actor from continuing with the practice. Making the actor pay is a way of 
changing its behaviour. Dissuasion is an attempt to change behaviour. If the duty is 
larger, even much larger than the degree of dumping or the amount of the subsidy, then 
the dissuasion is even more powerful. So, the traditional treatments of remedy policy are 
not accurate insofar as they deny that the United States exercises power over others with 
remedy policy.
Now, to return to the first point. The first objection by most readers is probably
going to be that "normal" trade relations between contracting parties to the GATT (this
study focuses on these) ought not to be characterized in terms of statecraft or power.
Keeping in mind that "the term normal is one of the vaguest and most equivocal we have 
t f i f iin political economy"00, there is still no doubt that it is unorthodox to suggest that
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international trade relations, particularly those among signatories to the GATT, can or
should be viewed in terms of power. Charles Kindleberger sums up the traditional view.
'The glory of free trade is that it decentralizes decisions about trade to non- 
political levels."6 "Intervention is inescapable in this view; the task is to keep 
it optimal and as free as possible of puerile political nonsense, such as the 
mercantilism which most of us harbour in our intuition".6®
For those who subscribe to the traditional view, the argument that trade policy is
a political act involving the use of power reminds of the days before the GATTrules were
established. Albert O Hirschman said of that time, "the extensive use of international
economic relations as an instrument of national power has been, together with a "war of
nerves" one of the main characteristics of the period preceding the outbreak of the current
war (World War Two)".6® Economic destruction was wrought not just by military
aggression during the first half of the 20th century but also because "all the weapons of
commercial warfare were brought into play."76
It has long been believed that if states ceased to exercise power in international
economic relations then unfettered market forces could bring prosperity. Klaus Knorr
made this point most succinctly by claiming:
"It must be understood that after World War Two the world's leading trading 
countries, which are also the premier capitalist societies, agreed to disarm 
themselves regarding the power uses of trade .. between themselves".7^
In his view free trade is disarmament. But, is it?
Power can be defined in a mind-boggling number of ways. It has been the subject
of more scholarly work than any other theoretical concept for students of international
relations. John Kenneth Galbraith comments on the futility of trying to discuss all the
relevant literature on the subject in one study. Like him, this author does not pretend even
to have read all of it; he remarked from his study of the subject that, "no life is that
long."72
It is important to note, however, that until recent years the role of power within 
the realm of international economic relations has been relatively neglected by scholars, 
particularly by economists. Melville J Ulmer went as far as saying,
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"Perhaps no subject in the entire range of the social sciences is more important , 
and at the same time, so seriously neglected as the role of power in economic 
life."73
Various attempts have been made to address this problem. Quincy Wright argued,
not only do "the fields of politics and economics overlap" but "economics can be used as
an instrument of politics".7* Bertrand Russell was convinced that "Economics as a
separate science is unrealistic, and misleading if taken as a guide in practice. It is one
element - - a  very important element -- in a wider study, the science of power".73 EH
Carr emphasized that "the science of economics presupposes a given political order and
7f5cannot be profitably studied in isolation from politics". AO Hirschman demonstrated
that "foreign trade can be used as an instrument of national power".77 EH Carr
concluded that "Power, which is an element of all political action, is one and indivisible.
It uses military and economic weapons for the same ends." "In the long run one is helpless
without the other."73
There has to date been no general acceptance among students of international
relations of any framework which fully takes account of the role of power and politics in
trade relations. Randall Bartlett, in his study of economics and power finds that
economists too have attempted to address the role of power in economic affairs. "Yet they
do so," he says "with no commonly accepted definition or understanding".73 The
application of the economic statecraft framework must thus be seen as an important
innovation. It provides us with a way to think about trade relations that incorporates the
role of power in economic affairs.
Even if the economic statecraft framework is accepted, the notion of power in
economic affairs, even in the simple form of A exercising power over B, is nearly
universally regarded as necessarily predatory rather than productive. Is this true? From
his studies of the phenomena of power in economic life in 1944 J.B. Condliffe concluded,
"There seems no valid reason to regard power as necessarily malevolent rather than 
beneficent. Not the fact of power, but the use made of it, is significant for good 
or evil."80
37
Trade policy can be used to induce changes in foreign behaviour which engender
order and prosperity. In contrast to Klaus Knorr, David Baldwin concludes,
" ... rather than disarming itself, the United States used its policy of free trade to 
shape the postwar international political and economic order."®'
He continues,
" ... trade policy — at least from 1944 to 1962 --  was the principle economic 
technique of statecraft employed by American policy makers.
Professor Baldwin argues "that it is wrong to depict threats, coercion, punishment, conflict
and power as peculiar to politics while viewing promises, rewards, cooperation and
oo
exchange as the special province of economics”.
Studies of trade remedy policy often rely on the distinction John Jackson makes 
between two "basic philosophies of methodology of international (trade) diplomacy". He 
says "rule diplomacy" in international trade is distinct from "power diplomacy". "Rule 
diplomacy is the technique of establishing international rules for the behaviour of 
governments and institutions that will ensure a certain measure of compliance with the 
rules." Power diplomacy, on the other hand, is diplomacy which occurs in the absence of 
rules (or effective rules) and is based more on the relative power position of the 
participants (national or other entities).®^ Such a distinction denies the possibility that 
power can be used to establish rules and to enforce them. For this reason it must be 
abandoned.
This point is crucial to this study. It is one thing if the United States is using power 
to compel foreign actors to abide by the internationally agreed-upon rules for 
international trade. Study of this use of power is worthy of students in the field of 
international relations if only to see how rules and order are maintained within the trade 
system. It is another thing altogether, however, if the United States is using power to 
compel those who are perpetrating unfair trade practices to engage in further anti­
competitive behaviour, as in the case of unwarranted duties, especially excessive ones, or, 
orderly marketing arrangements, which, while not technically illegal according to the 
international rules, are fundamentally at odds with the competitive process. It is yet
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something else if the United States uses remedy policy to label legitimate and normal 
foreign business practices "unfair" and on this pretext force foreigners to engage in anti­
competitive behaviour. This last use of power is particularly of note since it is absolutely 
at odds with the foundation of the post-war international economic order -- competition. 
Clearly, power can be used to sustain or undermine the post-war international economic 
order.
Of course, there is no guarantee that the foreign actor will capitulate to the United 
States' demands in any given instance of economic statecraft. But, any firm or state that 
wishes to maintain access to the lucrative United States market will be susceptible to the 
United States' economic statecraft. Certainly a foreign firm or government must either 
comply with the finding made in any given Ad or CVD investigation or its goods will be 
denied access. Firms and governments must avoid transgressing the laws if they do not 
wish to become entangled in an AD or CVD investigation. Therefore, they modify their 
behaviour to comply with the legal framework, even if there is no specific petition or 
investigation.
RETURN TO NON-TARIFF BARRIERS AND NON-TARIFF DISTORTIONS
Remedy policy as an instrument of power and politics takes on great significance 
when we reexamine the NTB/NTD problem. The term non-tariff barrier to trade connotes 
a purely economic phenomenon, one which according to the traditional arguments ought 
to be minimized if not eliminated. But, is the economic description accurate or the only 
description possible? Working experience in NTB negotiations led a former United States 
Deputy Trade Ambassador, Harald Malmgren, to conclude;
"The NTB problem is essentially one of conflicting national economic and social
policies".
This, he says, is why NTB's cannot be reciprocally negotiated like tariffs. Efforts to 
eliminate foreign NTB's, therefore, are efforts to exercise power over the economic and
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social policies of foreign states and over the production and pricing strategies of foreign 
firms.
The political implications of the American use of remedy policy can no longer be
ignored because remedy policy has shifted, or been transformed. Avinash Dixit has
"argued that a broader interpretation is necessary to encompass precautionary actions
undertaken in anticipation of others' policies and strategic moves like threats and promises
intended to alter their future choices."®® This broader interpretation has already
occurred. Remedy policy is often used to preempt foreign behaviour and to change it.
Matthew Marks and Harald Malmgren together sketched out the political issue.
'The central substantive problem will be in defining which domestic economic 
measures are legitimate, in view of their international trade repercussions and 
those which are not. How far into these questions can one penetrate without 
overstepping the bounds of national sovereignty?"®^
Richard Cooper too made this point clearly when he said:
" ... the central problem of international economic cooperation is how to keep
the manifold benefits of extensive international economic intercourse free of 
crippling restrictions while at the same time preserving a maximum degree of 
freedom for each nation to pursue its legitimate economic objectives"****
The traditional methods of conceptualizing, as noted earlier, lead us into a
classification exercise. This task has substantially widened the list of NTB's, which is now
so broad as to include practices which are normal and legitimate in the country in which
they occur. In taking action against foreign actors the United States challenges the
legitimacy of their actions. The danger is that United States remedy policy increasingly
O Q
oversteps the bounds of foreign autonomy and sovereignty. For example, in a recent 
study two Canadians, Smith and Lipsey, explain that "...the target of US countervailing 
duties is shifting from specific, clearly trade-distorting subsidies to policies that are more
Q Q
general.,K7U They continue, "In this broadening of the scope of countervail, many 
Canadians see the current US approach as a direct attack on their sovereignty". So we see 
that the NTB problem is a political problem, not just an economic one. But, the traditional 
arguments obscure this from view.
40
More important, the traditional arguments lead us in the direction of one obvious
but dangerous conclusion. Is the answer to "harmonize1’ domestic institutions? This option
requires broadening of the reach of remedy policy on foreign sovereignty and autonomy,
perhaps a dangerous course to pursue in the post-war international trade system. For
example, another international economic order, the 19th century gold standard, owed its
downfall in major part, according to Karl Polanyi, to this problem of autonomy and
sovereignty in economic affairs. Under the gold standard states had no powers in trade
or monetary affairs as they were "bound" by the gold standard. The "anarchistic
sovereignty" which occurred through the "enforced uniformity of domestic systems
hovered as a permanent threat over the freedom of national development..." ^  He
believed that with the disappearance of the gold standard it would:
" ... become possible to tolerate willingly that other nations shape their domestic 
institutions according to their inclinations, thus transcending the pernicious 
nineteenth century dogma of the necessary uniformity of domestic regimes within 
the orbit of the world economy"^ Through this process two "cornerstones of 
the New World can be seen to emerge: economic collaboration of governments and 
the liberty to organize national life at w ill".^
Perhaps the developments in American trade remedy policy being addressed here 
are symptomatic of a much bigger problem. The United States may no longer be willing 
to tolerate the ways in which foreign governments and firms behave in their domestic 
environment.
States may choose to alter their domestic structures in order to collaborate with 
other states. The member countries of the European Community, for example, have all 
chosen to limit their sovereignty and autonomy to some degree. In contrast, the use of 
remedy policy by the United States challenges this liberty of choice. With remedy policy 
the United State unilaterally forces changes in behaviour. Thus AD and CVD policy poses 
a threat to sovereignty and autonomy if used to compel foreigners to do things which they 
do not want to do. Such infringement is warranted, even necessary, in order to maintain 
the post-war international economic order if the US is compelling others to abide by the 
internationally agreed-upon rules of the international trade system. But, such
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infringement is dangerous if the US is requiring that foreigners behave in a manner which 
undermines the rules of the international trade system.
If harmonization of domestic structures and ideology is a prerequisite for 
international diplomacy then the international trade system is in even more trouble than 
is commonly thought. After all, the world consists of a variety of states9^. The ideologi­
cal and practical differences among the GATTsignatories about the appropriate role of 
government in economic affairs, the "best" methods of regulating the economy, the ’’best" 
economic outcome vary profoundly.
When states conflict over trade issues, particularly over what constitutes an "unfair" 
trade practice, the conflict arises from their differing views about what is economically 
normal, legitimate and desirable. The United States and the European Community, for 
example have profound differences over the legitimacy and desirability of the Airbus 
project, standards for pollution control, of inflationary economic policies. Henry 
Kissinger's comments on diplomacy seem hauntingly relevant even though he was 
referring to the East-West conflict during the cold war.
"When domestic structures -- and the concept of legitimacy on which they are 
based -- differ widely, statesmen still meet, but their ability to persuade has been 
reduced as they no longer speak the same language"96 "Ideological conflict 
compounds these instabilities.... A similar outlook about aims and methods eases the 
tasks of diplomacy - - i t  may even be a necessary pre-condition for it. In the 
absence of such a consensus diplomats can still meet, but they lose the ability to 
persuade. More time is spent on defining contending positions than in resolving 
them. What seems reasonable to one side will appear most problematical to the 
other."96
This is an accurate description of non-tariff barrier negotiations. The acrimony 
which arises from allegations of unfair trade practices is symptomatic of these differences 
of opinion, perception, and ideology. What seems to be a legitimate and non-negotiable 
domestic structure to one state often appears problematic and negotiable to the other.
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ELUSIVE SOLUTIONS
Faced with such an intractable problem -- after all, how is it possible to "harmonize" 
policies, priorities, institutions and economic structures of many different states - - i t  
seems that the only available solution is, in response to prolific calls, to strengthen the 
international rules. But, international rules and international organizations are only as 
powerful as the member states allow them to be. Though an unpopular view this has long 
been acknowledged by those closest to trade policy in practice and by more pragmatic 
observers. Even Richard Gardner,one of the earliest commentators on the post-war trade 
system, whose book Sterling Dollar Diplomacy traces the origins of international attempts 
to regulate trade after the Second World War, was convinced of the correctness of this 
view. Confidence that legal structures could and would bind states with legal chains, a 
phenomenon which he called "legalism", was an "error which underlay wartime and post­
war economic diplomacy".®^
Even if the rules could be made more binding would the post-war trade system be 
based on free trade or on a philosophy of no intervention? A careful examination of the 
post-war international economic order, how the rules work, the underlying philosophy, 
further strengthens the case for the economic statecraft argument.
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CHAPTER THREE — THE POST-WAR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER
The central problem this study addresses centres on order within the post-war
trade system. America's paradoxical use of the AD and CVD laws stands as a threat to the
post-war international economic order. So, it is necessary to explain what is meant by
order, to describe its role and form. Certain terms need to be defined, working
assumptions about the nature of the international trade system made clear. This exercise
%
will help clarify the limitations and strengths of the three frameworks: free trade versus 
protection, intervention versus non-intervention and economic statecraft.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE SYSTEM
What do we mean by international trade relations? Essentially relations occur 
among two actors: private parties (firms and individuals) and governments.
Adam Smith said "The propensity to truck, barter and exchange one thing for 
another ... is common to all menO Such transactions between private parties occurring 
across national borders constitute international trade. International relations at this level 
occur, on the whole, between non-state actors. Joe Bloggs in Chicago sell his widgets to 
Ralph Schmidt in Bavaria. Or, General Electric Co. of the United States sell refrigerators 
to the French public. Governments, on the whole, do not engage in commercial 
transactions.^ This is especially true of GATTsignatories.^
Governments do, however, attempt to control or influence private transactions by 
using (among other mechanisms) national trade laws and trade policies. At this level 
governments interact with private persons. Firms are considered persons under US law. 
Private international trade law is the term used to describe those nationally legislated laws 
which regulate the actions of private persons in international commercial transactions. The 
"essential object of private international law" Clive Schmitthoff, a leading scholar of
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international trade law, makes clear, is "a body of rules applicable to private persons in
their international relations."*
For the United States Governmentthe trade laws provide the statutory foundation
upon which trade policy is made. Trade policy is generally defined broadly, as is done by
IM Destlen "all actions of the US government directly affecting the movement of goods
between nations."® Benjamin Cohen adds to this definition state actions "intended to
affect the extent, composition and direction of its imports and exports of goods and
services."® These definitions are so broad that, for example, the United States' attempt
to reduce its bilateral trade deficit with Japan by manipulating the Yen Dollar exchange
rate in 1983 is an example of trade policy. This, however, is a borderline case. Our
concern is with two traditional trade policy instruments -- antidumping and
countervailing duty measures. Trade remedy policy serves to affect the movement of
goods (in some cases also services), and the terms of their movement.
International relations in commercial affairs also occur between governments.
William Linglebach said in 1930;
'The political consequences of economic policies are not always easy to determine 
or estimate. Nevertheless, it has been fairly generally accepted by historians that 
commercial policies and the control of imports and exports through tariffs and 
other devices have been a fruitful source of international friction and even of 
war."^
That is to say when statesmen use trade policy to achieve incompatible goals 
conflict can arise. Equally, harmony can be produced when statesmen seek mutually 
beneficial goals and they coordinate their trade policies. To this end states have attempted
o
to reach agreement about how states can regulate trade. Internationally negotiated 
agreements serve this purpose.
Together, these three variables combined create the international trade system: 
private international trade transactions, state attempts to influence these transactions 
(private international trade law and foreign economic policy) and the international 
attempts to regulate national trade policies (international trade law and diplomatic 
arrangements).
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Systems, in international relations, are characterized by the fact that some
q
relationship exists between the variables . But, a mere relationship is not sufficient to
create or sustain order in a system. Students of international relations, for this reason, have
traditionally been concerned with rules, laws, and norms, as well as the causes and
management of conflict and cooperation in international systems.^®
Order, in international relations, depends largely on agreement about methods and
objectives. It is well known that law alone cannot create order.^  The international
community creates laws and rules to uphold what Henry Kissinger describes as a
’’legitimacy". He defines this as;
"no more than an international agreement about nature of workable arrangements 
and about the permissible aims and methods of foreign policy."^
That the system of rules in this instance addresses economic aspects of foreign
policy does not render this usage less valid. Legitimacy, rests on consensus about the goals
states seek to achieve. Hedley Bull, a lifelong student of order in international relations,
in a similar fashion emphasized that order is:
"a pattern of activity that sustains the elemental or primary goals of states."^ 
However, "common interests in achieving the elementary goals of social life may 
be vague and inchoate, and does not in itself provide any precise guidance as to 
what behaviour is consistent with these goals and what behaviour is not." "Order 
in any society is maintained not merely by a sense of common interests in creating 
order or avoiding disorder, but by rules which spell out the kind of behaviour that 
is orderly"^
Order, orderly relations is, ultimately, what a legitimacy for commercial affairs 
is established to engender. International trade can flourish, it is supposed, in a stable and 
predictable environment in which private parties can do business. States want to 
encourage the creation of wealth for their nationals and, at the same time, presumably, 
hope to avoid conflict with other states over the methods they have chosen to encourage 
the creation of wealth. Sterling-dollar diplomacy, for example, was "a shorthand desig­
nation for the struggle to build a viable world economic order."^ Place the emphasis 
on the word "viable". There are some "orders" that are not viable.
A primary goal of economic order is that it ought to result in the generation of 
wealth and prosperity and a rising standard of living. Sometimes we forget that
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historically there have been different conceptions about how to achieve these goals. For 
example, when post-war planning began10 Winston Churchill argued that the Imperial 
Preference system should be maintained, although the Americans wanted an open trade 
system based on non-discrimination. He felt an economic order which gave Britain 
preferential access to trade was better for Britain than one that did not. Remember also 
that fascist economic nationalism was "paraded by German economists as more stable, 
efficient, and rational in its operation than the anarchy of competing private enterprise 
and the non-regulated international economics of free multilateral trading."^ J B 
Condliffe called the battle between differing conceptions of economic order "the real 
economic war."^®
To be "viable" the choice of an economic order must sustain the desired political 
order. The question of who has access to rising standards of living and the gains from 
trade must be addressed in the construction of economic order. Peter Drucker pointed out 
in the late 1930's that the Germans and Soviets challenged the interwar economic order 
partly because they believed their access to the gains from trade was limited by then 
existing colonial preferential trading systems.
A good description of the order that was adopted in the post-war period, the one 
we live under now, was offered by The Economist in 1942. It described the United States 
proposals as,
"a genuinely new conception of world order. It is an inspiring attempt to restate 
democracy in terms of the twentieth century situation, and to extend its meaning 
in the economic and social sphere."^®
It is based on the dynamic of free and fair competition which is itself predicated on the
21
efficacy of market forces. Market forces are freed by reducing barriers to trade. The 
gains from trade made possible by this are open to all nations as long as they adhere to 
certain rules of competition. The political foundation of this concept of order is that all 
states have an equal opportunity to reap the gains from trade. They do not all have the 
same ability, but they have similar opportunities.
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Standard descriptions of the post-war international economic order echo these
points. For example Gottfried Haberler describes it as follows.
"By liberal order we mean the order of the market or capitalist economy, of the 
modern mixed variety, relying predominantly on private enterprise and 
competition..." He continues: "More specifically, the liberal international economic 
order is the largely American-inspired post-World War Two system of freer trade, 
of low, nondiscriminatory tariffs (most-favoured nation clause and the absence of 
quantitative restraints), and of currencies freely convertible into each other in the 
exchange market at either fixed or variable exchange rates (absence of exchange 
control) --  the system symbolized and institutionalized by the GATT and the 
International Monetary Fund."^
When we speak of the "rules" of international trade we refer to the complex of 
internationally negotiated agreements centred on the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade but also including treaties, protocols, codes and letters of understanding and 
interpretation (both formal and informal) which together provide the framework for 
national regulation of international trade. This serves as a guide for governments in their 
choice and use of trade policy. These rules set out the legitimate aims and methods of 
national trade policy.
The GATT, the Antidumping C ode^ and the Subsidies Countervail C ode^ 
are the international agreements (relevant to this inquiry) which set out which policy tools 
can be used, and how governments can use them.
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE
For those countries which are party to it the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade is the central element of the complex of international trade law. It is the 
cornerstone upon which the "architects", as the post-war planners were called, attempted 
to build a viable post-war economic order.
Though, as a cornerstone, the GATTis only a rather whittled down leftover from 
the Havana Charter^®. The Charter was intended to be the foundation for the 
International Trade Organization. But, the Charter was never realized.^® It was so dense 
with obligations and constraints that the United States Congress failed to ratify i t .^
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Parts of it were salvaged, namely the chapter on commercial policy. This provided the 
anchor for the GATT. The General Agreement itself emerged from a bilateral reciprocal
oo
tariff cutting exercise which had begun in 1947 . Together these two ingredients were
forced together by necessity and by the absence of an alternative to create the Provisional 
Protocol of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. It entered into force in January 
1948. The protocol is genuinely provisional. This is why the signatories to it are 
called contracting parties. This is also why contracting parties are not fully bound by the 
text on every occasion.
The GATTis a diplomatic arrangement. As such, the GATTdoes not deprive states of 
policy instruments but rather sanctions the use of tools and principles and procedures 
which utilize the market mechanism. It discourages the use of those instruments which 
undermine the market mechanism, such as quotas. Thus, the GATT represents an 
accumulation of attempts to regulate the ways in which national trade policy is used rather 
than proscribe the use of national trade policy. Protectionism is not prohibited, nor is free 
trade required under its terms. Rather it distinguishes between pro-market and anti- 
market tools.
It was agreed that certain policy tools, namely tariffs, were legitimate even though, 
technically, they constitute protection. Recent publicity from the GATT Secretariat 
explicitly states;
'Where protection is to be given to a domestic industry, it should be extended 
essentially through a customs tariff, and not through other commercial measures 
(emphasis added). Among other things the aim of the rule is to make the extent 
of protection clear."'^
The GATTneither intends a free trade system nor one which denies government 
a role in the regulation of commerce. Rather, it is a diplomatic arrangement which sets out 
the legitimate aims and methods of national trade policy. That is to say that the GATT 
does not eliminate power or politics from the international trade system. Economic 
statecraft is merely limited to legitimate activities. Legitimacy is accorded to those aims 
and methods which employ and enhance the market mechanism and which apply the 
principle of non-discrimination, national treatment, most-favoured nation treatment and
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which do not violate national sovereignty. Influence and power are an integral part of the 
trade system in that some states may need to be persuaded to behave in a manner 
conducive to market forces and to be dissuaded from behaving in ways which undermine 
market forces.
We see that the GATT is not a free trade agreement, as it is often portrayed, but 
rather a diplomatic agreement about how states may legitimately regulate trade affairs. 
This interpretation is supported by the fact that certain principles are endorsed under the 
Agreement to allow all parties like access to the benefits of competition. The GATT is 
designed, John Ruggie tells us, to promote "non-discrimination and multilateralism rather 
than the complete abandonment of national controls over trade barriers . The most- 
favoured nation principle, in unconditional form under the GATT, allows all states to 
benefit from reductions of tariff barriers by any single state. The principle of non­
discrimination holds that a state may not discriminate among nations in taking action 
against imports. National treatment means that once goods have entered the domestic 
market they are treated similarly to domestic goods. In the same vein, the GATTseeks the 
gradual reduction of tariffs but not their elimination. This would deprive states of one 
of the most important legitimate tools they have for regulating trade.
So, legitimate protectionism is allowed. Illegitimate protection is discouraged. John 
Ruggie, for this reason, correctly describes the GATT system as one of "embedded 
liberalism."^
Finally and most importantly, state sovereignty is protected under the GATT 
system. Harry Hawkins, the principle United States trade negotiator and post-war planner 
made clear that no state would join if a promise to give up sovereignty was necessary. The 
"escape clauses" were included into the GATT for this reason. These effectively allow 
contracting parties to escape their international obligations if domestic circumstances 
require it.
The pragmatic conception of the trade system that has been sketched out above renders 
one of the great "puzzles"^ about the GATT more understandable. Even if the
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international rules could be strengthened this would not necessarily strengthen order in 
the international trade system. This is because the rules are often not enforced as they are 
written. Some observers of the GATThave never been able to understand why this is so. 
If we view the GATTas a diplomatic arrangement it makes more sense. The procedures 
for enforcing the obligations are deliberately "fraught with ambiguity".®® 'The point", 
according to the GATT scholar Robert Hudec, is "that these legal obligations were not
oe
meant to be enforced to the letter."00 "The key to understanding the GATTlegal system 
is to recognize that GATT's law has been designed and operated as an instrument of 
diplomacy."®^ Therefore it is wrong to believe that the GATT or other international 
arrangements describe the actual nature of the international trade system. Instead, we 
must consider international arrangements as they are applied, not as they are written. As 
an example, the GATTdefines dumping, but it is the United States' interpretation of that 
definition which is used to enforce the rule.
It is useful to know that there is no requirement that the United States abide by 
the Antidumping Code, the agreement negotiated in 1967 and 1979 which elaborates on 
the GATT and most explicitly sets out what has been agreed internationally on dumping 
and the use of antidumping measures. Under United States law the administering agencies 
are directed to:
"resolve any conflict between the International Antidumping Code and the 
Antidumping Act, 1921, in favour of the Act as applied by the agency 
administering the Act." (emphasis added)'*®
"Nothing contained in the International Antidumping Code ... shall be construed 
to restrict the discretion of the ... Tariff Commission in performing its duties and 
functions under the Antidumping Act."(emphasis added)
Administering agencies are directed to,
"take into account the provisions of the International Antidumping Code", but 
"only insofar as [Code provisions] are consistent with the Antidumping Act 
1921."(emphasis added)^®
John Barcelo points out that the real issue is not a conflict of differing language, 
the words in the Code and domestic AD law are the same, but of interpretation.^
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SAFEGUARDS
The safeguard clauses are a perfect example of the flexibility inherent in 
economic diplomacy. As we have seen, the GATT system was constructed so as to avoid 
infringements upon states' sovereignty. Clearly membership in the GATT system implies 
a certain degree of acceptance of market principles; one can assume a certain harmony of 
interests among the members. But, actions taken by a state which are not in conformity 
with the rules are treated under the GATT but not necessarily challenged or eliminated. 
Hence, the "offsetting" procedure which trade remedy policy incorporates is consistent 
with the principle of sovereign freedom the GATT recognizes. Trade remedies allow a 
state to offset the margin of dumping or subsidization of an import at the border, thus 
neutralizing the unfair trade practice without directly challenging the actor who 
perpetrated it.
It was clear to the architects of the GATT agreement that if keeping GATT 
obligations meant a country's domestic industry might sustain injury, then governments 
must be allowed to deal with the problem through some action, even if only temporarily. 
Otherwise further tariff liberalization becomes politically unsustainable. Similarly, 
without a means of reneging on obligations at least temporarily, states would be reluctant 
to commit to any agreement. Article XIX, entitled "Emergency Action on Imports of 
Particular Products" allows states to "impose import restrictions or suspend tariff conces­
sions on products which are being imported in such increased quantities and under such 
conditions that they cause or threaten to cause serious injury to competing domestic 
producers".^ There is a trade remedy law in the United States which corresponds to 
the escape clause. It is called section 201. It allows the United States to take action against 
fair imports under these circumstances.
Of course there is a price to be paid for taking such action. That price is the 
payment of compensation to those countries whose benefits under the Agreement are
58
"nullified or impaired" by it. If there is no agreement about compensation then countries 
affected can retaliate.
While the United States has invoked this clause more often than most contracting 
parties it has also pioneered the development of "surrogates" for the Article XIX actions. 
Instead of applying an across-the-board tariff to the import in question or withdrawing 
a tariff concession, the United States often negotiates an orderly marketing arrangement 
with the principal supplier countries. The importers agree under such an arrangement, for 
example, to change their price (usually to raise it) or limit the amount of their exports. 
Surrogates are often referred to as gray area measures because they do not explicitly 
violate the GATT Agreement but they are discriminatory and often take the form of a 
quantitative restrictions. Surrogates are of particular interest to us because the 
antidumping, countervailing duty and market opening provisions are often used to 
implement such gray area measures.
Alan Wolff, a former United States Trade Negotiator, explains why surrogates 
developed.^ Firstly, the United States does not want to have to pay compensation or 
accept retaliation for limiting imports. Second, it does not want to appear to be 
protectionist and reneging on obligations gives that impression. The foreign policy "cost" 
of admitting inability to cope with an import problem is often very high. But more 
significantly, escape clause actions do not allow discrimination. While it is possible to 
target a select group of imports, such as milk coming only from cows which graze above 
one altitude and not below another, it is not acceptable to discriminate between countries 
of origin, such as between Belgian and Canadian milk. For these reasons United States 
negotiators have creatively taken advantage of the safeguard loophole to achieve policy 
that circumvents the rules.
Where article XIX describes a situation involving import problems generally (fair 
imports which cause injury) the antidumping and subsidy article (Article VI) spells out 
how states may deal with the problem of "unfair" imports. The loopholes inherent in this 
article are even more flexible than in Article XIX.
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Article VI of the General Agreement allows states to impose antidumping duties 
(a tax) on certain imports if dumping is found and if the dumped imports injure or 
threaten to injure the domestic industry or "retard materially the establishment of a 
domestic in jury"^ or if the dumping "causes or threatens to cause material injury to an 
industry in the territory of another contracting party exporting the product concerned to 
the territory of the importing contracting party."
The grandfather clause of the GATTallows all previously existing domestic trade 
legislation to remain intact (indeed the agreement would never have been accepted by 
many states had not this provision been included). This is why in the United States the 
antidumping and countervailing duty laws are always amended and never rewritten. 
However, the problem of defining dumping and subsidization are effectively left to 
national discretion.
As in the case of escape clause actions, there are surrogates for Article VI actions. 
The resolution of an antidumping case, for example, may be something other than the 
imposition of a non-discriminatory tax on all of the targeted imports. The AD 
investigation may be terminated (or suspended) by an agreement which is deemed by the 
United States authorities to stop the problem. Hence it may be agreed that a voluntary 
export restraint among only the key suppliers will stop the problem. Or, it may be that 
if the dumpers agree (undertake) to raise the price of the targeted export to a level deemed 
acceptable by the United States then the antidumping action will be terminated.
We can see from these examples that the loopholes in the GATT Agreement, as 
Hudec explains, "open the door to creative jurisprudence which can reach well beyond the 
written rules."^®
As an institution, the GATT provides the machinery for the resolution of trade 
disputes. One must ask why the United States usually resolves dumping problems through 
its own administrative procedures instead of submitting them to international 
arbitration.^ Again, most of the same constraints which dissuade it from taking Article 
XIX actions hold true. The risk of having to pay compensation or accept retaliation is too
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high. And, the possibility of taking discriminatory action is reduced. Robert Hudec has 
observed that the United States and the European Community use the GATT dispute 
resolution process far more often than any other countries . But he demonstrates that 
they use it as a "soft" option through which the threat of hostile action placates domestic
j J Q
interests while the process itself is a "good way to buy time. ^ since the complaints are 
usually drafted so that they "self-destruct". The dispute resolution mechanism can only 
work if the United States submits cases to it. Most trade remedy cases are resolved by 
national procedures.
It was well-recognized that states would continue to use national trade remedy 
procedures when the Antidumping and the Subsidies Countervail Code was negotiated in 
1968. These Codes were intended to further elaborate on Article VI of the General 
Agreement. The scope for protection and harassment through Article VI procedures had 
been found to be large. The purpose of these Codes was to harmonize certain procedures 
and definitions so as to limit the possibilities for abuse.
But, the Codes failed to provide any legally or administratively workable definition 
of key terms such as what constitutes dumping, injury, a subsidy, etc.. In any case, the 
United States has required, through legislation, that the relevant administering agencies 
must, when faced with a contradiction between the domestic statute and these internation­
al agreements, that the domestic statute takes precedence.^ In practice it has been left 
to national discretion to define these basic terms.
Under the GATTsystem the administration of trade policy remains national. The 
international legal framework is interpreted and applied at the national level in a 
discretionary fashion. Even the choice of whether to submit a problem to international 
arbitration is a matter of discretion.
Where discretion was not intended to come into play was in the area of 
sovereignty. The GATT envisaged a relatively simple world in which trade problems 
occurred, and could be resolved, at the border. By using remedy policy to change or 
preempt policies or behaviour which occur within other states the United States is
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extending an area of discretion which the GATTplanners never anticipated. This con­
stitutes a new problem in international relations.
DOMESTIC POLICYMAKING
If the rules exist in international commercial affairs not as they are written but as
governments interpret and apply them then we must look at domestic policy-making. For
to interpret and to apply the international arrangements is to exercise economic statecraft
as David Baldwin makes clear;
"Attempts by statesmen to influence the pattern of international trade through 
manipulating this legal and political framework in which trade takes place can be 
regarded as acts of economic statecraft."^
Who in the Unites States, then, is practising economic statecraft? Who is 
responsible for making the actual, the applied, rules?
The United States Constitution divides the authority to regulate foreign trade 
between two branches of the government. Under Article One Section 3 the Congress is 
explicitly given the authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations and under section 
10 to lay and collect duties or consent to states doing so. Article Two provides the 
Executive branch with the authority to manage foreign relations by virtue of its sole 
ability to receive ambassadors, and other public ministers, to negotiate executive 
agreements with foreign nations without the consent of the Congress and to negotiate 
treaties with the consent of the Congress. The problem of the "separation of powers" 
refers to the ambiguity as to where the authority of one branch leaves off and the other 
begins, and source of authority for one branch of government to challenge the actions of 
another. It remains one of the most contentious problem areas for students of the 
American political and legal system. In trade policy matters the Congress is generally 
responsible for providing the statutory basis for the Executive to administer trade policy.
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Through Congressional legislation and delegation " ... the United States, has, over the 
years, created extensive legal and administrative machinery for the control of foreign 
trade."
"Unfortunately," Frederich Davis so clearly observed, "this machinery has not been 
assembled in a systematic or logical way: like a classical cathedral, the structure 
is composed of bits and pieces originating in different eras and representing 
different reactions to problems or concerns which often are of no immediate 
significance in today's world.
It is not the aim of this Chapter to describe the entire machinery of American trade 
regulation but rather to emphasize that attempts by both the Congress and the Executive 
to influence the pattern of international trade by manipulating the legal and political 
framework in which trade takes place are acts of economic statecraft. This does not imply 
that economic statecraft is the product of focused deliberation and consensus between the 
Executive and the Congress. Even within the Congress, between the relevant Executive 
Agencies and among the independent agencies there are substantial differences of opinion 
about the methods and objectives policy should achieve. Conflicting and competing 
statecraft is a problem.
It would be exaggerating to say that the economic statecraft of remedy policy 
emerges as the end product of deliberation and compromise. Compromises do occur, 
particularly among those who are actively involved in the process of emending and 
interpreting the legislation. But many of the changes made to the statute, either in 
emendation or interpretation, have been designed with reference to a specific issue or 
interest. As a result the law's broad shape and aim have been altered by the simple 
accumulation of narrowly defined and small alterations.
Many others have written about the process of making trade policy. That task is 
not undertaken here. But, it is important to understand the haphazardness of the process. 
Trade bills are often more than 1000 pages long. Those pages are awash with technical 
details. Not only is difficult to get through 1000 pages of proposed trade law. There is a 
tendency for people to believe that technical changes are not political. Therefore the 
changes are not very important. But, as this study will demonstrate, this is wrong. All of
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the politics is in the technical detail. All of the technical detail is politics. That is why the 
bulk of this dissertation is devoted to exploring the technical details of the two statutes in 
question.
This haphazardness of the policy-making process raises an important question. 
How can we apply the term "statecraft" to the policy outcome of this process if there is no 
"rational" actor creating it? Statecraft tends to imply that statesmen or someone is 
deliberately pursuing a particular policy. But, most policy emerges out of complex set of 
influences and desires. The domestic and even international actors who influence the 
policy-making process may have no clear picture of the overall policy. Nonetheless, in the 
end, there is a policy. Whatever that policy is, whatever the legislation actually says, that 
is what foreigners must abide by. Therefore, in answering the question posed in this 
dissertation, "What is the United States actually asking foreigners to do under the AD and 
CVD laws" it is important to understand that this is a different question from ’What does 
the United States think it is asking foreigners to do under these laws?" One of the main 
purposes of this study is to demonstrate that the ostensible and the actual purpose of these 
laws have become contradictory. Because this is a study of international relations and 
international politics, it seems appropriate to focus on the policy outcome and examine 
how that policy, intended or not, compels foreigners to change their behaviour.
THE CONGRESS
Before a substantial income tax was introduced in 1913 income from tariffs accounted 
for 50% to 90% of all federal revenue and Congress was the preeminent branch involved 
in trade regulation. Trade policy was tariff policy. Since then, revenue from tariffs has 
declined to about 1% of federal income and the Congress has gradually delegated authority 
and responsibility for the administration of trade matters to the Executive and indepen­
dent agencies. The first step in this process was the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements
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Act which delegated authority to the President to negotiate the reduction of tariffs by up 
to 50% in return for reciprocal tariff cuts by foreign states.
As the emphasis has shifted from the setting of tariff rates to the internationally 
negotiation of trade matters, the Congress has faced a dilemma. A former United States 
Trade Ambassador explains, T heir dilemma is that they are not organized to handle all 
trade policy and to deal with it in a way that makes sense in negotiations, and yet they 
have the constitutional authority."^ Hence, they have delegated administrative respon­
sibilities for remedy policy to the Executive and independent agencies.
The main role of the Congress in trade remedy policy is that it makes the trade remedy 
laws - - it provides the statutory basis for policy. It defines the terms of the laws, the 
reach, the scope. Also, it sets the procedures for administering the law, it designates the 
agencies which will administer the law, the level of discretion available to those agencies, 
the criteria and procedures the agencies must use in their application of the law, etc. In 
that the Congress sets the terms of what behaviour is actionable and how every element 
related to remedy policy of each trade bill constitutes an exercise in economic statecraft.
One might say that these capabilities do not give Congress direct control over foreign 
behaviour but rather set the terms for the Executive and the independent agencies to do 
so. It should be said that many legal commentators have noted that the remedy provisions 
are effective not only when they are actually applied but they also have an immeasurable 
but real prophylactic effect. Peter Ehrenhaft says: T h e  laws may have a prophylactic 
effect, however, by encouraging by encouraging foreign producers to price goods shipped 
here at "fair" value and dissuading governments from providing "bounties and grants” that 
is a proposition difficult to prove or disprove."^ Would the Congress bother to amend 
the remedy laws unless they were making them more effective? By altering the statutes 
Congress hopes to improve its ability to manipulate foreign actors and check behaviour 
it finds objectionable.
Most of those who have attempted to describe or explain the process of producing 
trade legislation have commented on its haphazardness and complexity. EE Schatt-
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schneider captured this aspect better than any other. In reference to trade legislation he 
noted, "Congress writes bills which no one intended."^ Robert Pastor points out that 
there are no theories about Congressional foreign policy-making generally nor foreign 
economic policy though narratives and descriptions of the process abound.
Trade policy, as anyone who has ever been closely involved in the process will 
confirm, is about detail. It is difficult to discern, leaving aside describing, the significance 
or effective meaning of developments in trade law. Trade lawyers are paid a great deal to 
do exactly this. The potential for the abuse of trade policy is inherent in the morass of 
detail which make up its substance.
There is a tendency for most commentators to describe any given trade bill as either 
"free trade" or "protectionist". There is a well-accepted assumption that the Congress is 
inherently protectionist, although Robert Pastor has found that there has been no "bias" 
on the part of Congress toward protection from 1929 to 1976.^ Each time a trade bill 
is formed speculation that it will be "protectionist" grows until the final conference 
proceeding when, generally, the "blatantly protectionist" elements are removed. That they 
were put in specifically to be removed for public relations reasons is unknown by most of 
those outside the legislative process. The final bill is so long and complicated that very few 
bother to read it, or its fine print. Instead there is a tendency to rely on the Executive 
branch's appraisal of the bill.^® Hence, every trade bill from the 1974 Trade and Tariff 
Act to the 1988 Trade and Competitiveness Act has been hailed as an affirmation of the 
American commitment to free trade.
Indeed, every attempt to pass "protectionist" trade bills, from the Burke-Hartke 
bill in 1971 to the Gephardt Amendment in 1987 have failed. Since it has not been 
possible to gain a large enough coalition for legislated protection, those who wanted 
protection turned their efforts to the trade remedy provisions. They greet efforts to 
"tighten up" the remedy provisions with enthusiasm.
But what is meant by "blatant protectionism"? No one seems able to say. It is a 
subjective question. We can ask, however, what does the law consider actionable, how does
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the law allow actionable behaviour to be penalized, how is the law invoked in trade policy 
to achieve the goal, what are the goals the administrators are seeking to achieve with 
remedy policy?
For example, what is considered "unfair" trade under United States law has been
substantially broadened. The ad hoc process of altering the laws has transformed and
subverted them. This development has been neglected not only because of the complexity
of the detail but also because the process of producing trade legislation is generally
portrayed as a "technical" rather than "political". For example Michael Finger explains:
"Low- or technical-track decisions are those defined by "rules". Cases here are 
"determined" not "decided" according to criteria established by law, administrative 
regulations, precedent and tradition. Higher track decisions are less circumscribed 
by rules and regulations and require considerable attention by government officials 
entrusted with discretionary authority and subject to political accountability. The 
antidumping and countervailing duty mechanisms in the United States, for 
example, are technical procedures."^®
Such faith in the inflexibility of law, not to mention the impartiality of the 
bureaucrats, reveals misunderstanding of how these provisions work. There has been 
controversy, for example, about the way Congress has limited the discretion available to 
the Executive on remedy policy. While the Executive may have less discretion about the 
application of the law -- ever since the 1974 trade act the machinery for commencing a 
complaint has become increasingly automatic - - but few have acknowledged the high level 
of discretion available to the Executive branch bureaucrats in the calculation of injury and 
the determination of the causal link between an unfair trade practice and injury. Great 
discretion is also available to the Executive branch as to the means of settling a case. They 
can apply an across-the-board tariff, or force the supplier to change their prices (at home 
or for exportation) or force the foreign industry to agree to buy more goods from the 
United States or to limit their exports, etc.
The belief that remedy policy is "technical" a direct result of the free trade 
framework which assumes there some distinction can be made between "technical" and 
"political". In a introductory reader on international relations the authors, Dougherty and 
Pfaltzgraff, confirms this attitude.
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'To move from a political to a technical framework is to limit drastically, or even 
eliminate the potential for conflict."60
The desire to relegate trade policy matters to technical procedures has a long history in the
United States. It dates from the days when the Tariff Commission (now the International
Trade Commission) was created to take "the tariff out of politics"0 The term technical
is applied to minimize the existence of power or of a conflict on interests in the making
of United States trade remedy policy. EH Carr explained that the distinction between the
two terms is necessary for political reasons. Economics is technical.
"But as soon as an issue arises which involves, or is thought to involve, the power 
of one state in relation to another, the matter at once becomes "political".
The "technical" details of United States trade remedy law and policy is where both
the power and the politics rest.
THE EXECUTIVE
Administration of these technical details is in the hands of three agencies: the 
Commerce Department, which is part of the Executive and the International Trade 
Commission (ITC) which is an independent agency.
Once a complaint that a foreign government is unfairly subsidizing exports or a 
foreign firm is dumping exports has been lodged with the government an investigation 
ensues. The complaint takes the form of a petition. It can be submitted by a domestic 
industry or, in recent years, by the government itself (meaning the Commerce Department 
or the United States Trade Representative).
The Commerce Department has been given responsibility for conducting 
investigations in order to substantiate that dumping is actually occurring. Its staff must 
also determine the amount of the dumping and the amount of the subsidization. From that 
determination Commerce arrives at a duty which the respondent will be required to pay 
if there is a positive finding rendered against it.
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The ITC is responsible for determining that injury has been not only incurred by 
the domestic injury but also that the injury is caused by the dumping or the subsidization. 
The ITC Commissioners are appointed by the President and approved by Congress. There 
are six of them, three being Republicans and three being Democrats. In the event of a tie 
vote the vote automatically turns against the foreign respondent.
If dumping or a subsidy is substantiated and ITC confirms that it was the cause of 
injury to the domestic industry then a positive determination is rendered against the 
respondent. The foreign firm or government must then comply with what the United 
States requires. Usually, it must pay a duty equivalent to the dumping or the subsidy.
THE JUDICIARY
The United States Courts have not played a major role in the formation or 
administration of trade policy precisely because of the political content of the statutes and 
the role of power involved in their application. Historically, the judiciary has been
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extremely reluctant to render review over the administration of trade policy.
Consistently this branch of government has claimed that questions pertaining to
international trade matters are non-justiciable;
"involving as it almost always must economic, military and foreign policy 
considerations of the type which tradition has assigned to other branches of the 
govemment."(emphasis added)
More importantly to our argument, the judicial branch has, accordingly, held that the Act
of State Doctrine precludes domestic courts from having the jurisdiction to review actions
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taken by foreigners abroad . Therefore such issues are not meet for Supreme Court 
review.
The judicial branch has tacitly recognized the political nature of trade policy. For this 
reason it refuses to be directly involved in the trade policy process. This is why Judicial 
review has not generally been available in policy proceedings. This is in marked contrast 
to the exercise of power by government on other issues which are subject to judicial
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scrutiny. Abuses of remedy policy have, therefore, mostly gone unremarked.
All of the Federal Court cases that are cited in the following chapters occurred 
because questions about the administration of the law by an Agency were at issue. In none 
of these cases are questions about the original allegation of an unfair trade practice at 
issue.
If a petitioner or a respondent wished to challenge the finding made by the 
administering agency it could appeal to the Customs Court. The Customs Court is part of 
the Customs Service which, we recall, originally had the authority to administer the AD 
and CVD laws. But, there was no genuine judicial reveiw until the Congress made judicial 
reveiw available in the early 1980's. Congress established the Court for International 
Trade. This new Court has the same powers as a Federal District Court (under article 3 of 
the Constitution) under 1980 Trade Act. The CIT has functioned only since 1981. Many 
observers have commented that the Court has been very conservative so far, tending to 
confirm the judgement of the Customs Court. A further agency, the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit Court (CAFC) was made available for appeals from the CIT in 1982. 
The Supreme Court, being the highest Court in the land, may hear appeals from the 
CAFC. But, the Supreme Court, being reluctant to become involved in trade cases for the 
reasons cited above (in note 65) has never yet accepted a trade case.
Most studies of American trade policy make little if any reference to the Judicial 
Branch, but not just for the reasons outlined above. It is also that, at bottom, the law is 
not very supportive of trade policy, particularly trade remedy policy. The concept of trade 
remedy policy is based on the implicit assumption that American producers have a right 
to a marketplace that is untainted by unfair trade practices. This concept works well 
enough when applied to domestic competition policy which is aimed at domestic 
competitors who are wholly subject to domestic laws. It does not apply very well to 
international competition. After all, the primary canon of United States trade law is that 
no individual has a Constitutionally-given right to engage trade with other nations. The 
Supreme court has held:
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"No individual has a vested right to trade with foreign nations."00 
The Constitution does not grant the right to import or export. What the Constitution does 
not prohibit, however, is permissable.
Because there is no right a firm or individual can invoke, the United States
government must act on behalf of its citizens with regard to international trade matters.
R7The trade remedy provisions allow private citizens0 to invoke a "right" to be protected 
from certain actions by foreign actors.®® But the right being protected is the nation's 
right not the industry's, the firms' or the individual's. Two interesting factors arise from 
this. First, once the complainant's cause has been taken up by the government the 
complainant no longer has any control over the process, and its interests are entirely 
subordinate to the interests of the parties in government pursuing action. Even if the 
complainant seeks to terminate the action the government may carry on with it if it is 
deemed to be in the national interest. Second, it is not even necessary for there to be a 
complaint from the private sector. The Executive can initiate an action itself.
FIRMS AND SPECIAL INTERESTS
Firms and industry play a part in the economic statecraft of remedy policy 
primarily in three ways. First, they can invoke the laws by filing petitions against foreign 
respondents. Second, domestic industry often provides the draft language which is adopted 
in the statutes. Often technical changes in the language are submitted by companies to 
their political representatives. The politicians then submit the proposed change into the 
pending legislation. The third part played by industry is more general. Private industry can 
generate political response to their special interests. They can attempt to influence the 
content of the statutes, the administrative regulations or even the course of an individual 
investigation by lobbying the relevant politicians, the administering officials, and general 
public opinion.
This is probably the time to briefly take note of the sources of the "heat", the
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political pressure, which has prompted the changes to the content and administration of 
these statutes. The sources of pressure on United States trade authorities to apply the 
remedy provisions emanate from developments from within the United States and from 
abroad.
United States trade (the value of imports and exports combined) now constitutes 
about 18% of total world trade. This would appear to be a precipitous drop from the 1955 
figure of 37%; and that is how it is most often portrayed and perceived. However we must 
remember that the United States found that it could not survive as an island of prosperity 
in a sea of poverty. It's huge share of world trade, of wealth, was artificially magnified 
by the decline of the European economies and all other countries which had been affected 
by the second world war. So the United States embarked on an ambitious program to 
enrich the rest of the world. Those policies worked.
It is no coincidence that the trade remedy laws were not substantially amended 
between the time of their inception at the turn of this century and the 1974 Trade and 
Tariff Act. It is widely acknowledged that there was little need even to employ them 
before the 1960's because nobody was in a position to compete with the United States -- 
there was little possibility of foreign monopoly power abuse.
However, the dramatic growth of various foreign economies since the 1960's, the 
creation of productive capacity abroad and foreign competition with American trade is 
now perceived to reflect the relative decline of the United States. Why this development 
is never portrayed as the relative rise of foreign economies remains unclear. Certainly, 
though, the perception has grown that the United States may not be better off as an island 
of prosperity in a sea of prosperity.
The willingness in the United States to forge a link between increased 
competitiveness abroad and the use of "unfair" trade practices is pervasive. That link is 
tenuous but politically attractive.®^
It is this political attractiveness which has led Congress to amend the remedy laws 
in the attempt to make them more effective - - a  process which will be examined in detail
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for both of the provisions under review. Similarly it is at least partly responsible for the 
pressure from domestic industry to not only amend the law but also to administer it in a 
pragmatic way.
Little distinction appears to be, or have been, made between the ill effects of
domestic economic policy^®, rapidly changing technology^, poor management, an
increased willingness to use bilateral relationships which are statistically incapable of 
72reaching a balance and a variety of other factors which have contributed to economic 
stagnation and the huge growth of the United States trade deficit since the late 1960's. 
Instead, there has been a tendency for the United States to blame foreigners for pursuing 
unfair trade practices. On the basis of such allegations, it has been able to force foreigners 
to readjust, to use the remedies as a means of limiting foreigners' exports or profit 
margins, rather than asking Americans to readjust.
When we think of all those people who are involved in drafting the details in trade 
law and those who are involved in administering the statutes we must remember that if 
the end result of all that activity is to compel some foreign government or company to 
alter, or even to maintain, its behaviour -- whether in a particular instance or through the 
manipulation of the general legal and political framework in which the must operate - - 
then economic statecraft is at play. It is actually hard to think of what else all those 
officials, bureaucrats and statesmen involved in trade policy could possibly be doing if not 
attempting to get others to do what the United States wants them to do.
THE UNITED STATES: THE PARADOX
Whatever the cause, there is no denying that pressures build up over import
"problems" and eventually something must be "done" about them. But, what to do? Jacob
Dreyer neatly summarized the potential danger.
"It ought to be recognized, however, that policies designed to countervail foreign 
use of monopoly power may result in departures from the free trade arrangement 
and may be the source of further distortions in the national economy concerned 
and in the world economy as a whole. Thus, a country espousing a liberal
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economic philosophy faces a philosophical and practical dilemma when confronted 
by the foreign use of monopoly power."^
Joseph Grunzel, who was mentioned earlier as the first to study the problem of
administered protection, was certain that philosophy would yield to pragmatism. "Though
strange at first sight" he found that it was in "those countries most committed to the
doctrine of free trade (emphasis added)." He cites England and a country which had the
doctrine of free trade imposed on it by Germany, Hungary, as states in which this
phenomenon reached "the greatest development".^ In those countries;
"the free trade doctrine had become so firmly established on account of its 
theoretical background and its tactical advantages, that in the course of time 
corrections which had become necessary could be carried out only in the 
application of the principle and not by modifying the principle itself 6
This "characteristic fact"^  of administered protection is the source of our
paradox. Remember our paradox. The United States is using trade remedy policy not to
uphold competition but to undermine it. Although committed to the doctrine of free trade
and the principle of competition, the United States has been compelled by circumstance
7ftto develop what Morkre calls "covert" as opposed to "overt" protection/0 Rodney Gray 
explains that the
"developing trade policy system ... is best understood as a system of highly detail­
ed, discriminatory legalistic intervention and that the literature of trade 
liberalization should best be viewed as part of the rhetoric of political 
presentation, rather than as an accurate description of trade policy in practice, or 
of the motives of the players."^
The traditional frameworks obscure from view many of the international relations 
issues posed by United States trade remedy policy. Although they are useful in 
identifying a general shift toward greater protection in the international trade system they 
do not allow us to see the broader political implications of this shift. The threat to 
national autonomy and indeed to the "legitimacy" of the post-war economic order are 
profound problems. The traditional paradigms simply do not acknowledge the role of 
power and politics which is central to an understanding of trade remedy policy. How one 
state compels another to behave differently, whether we regard the compelled behaviour 
as "bad" (as when trade-restrictive measures are implemented) or "good" (as when anti-
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competitive practices are eliminated) is a phenomenon central to the study of international 
relations.
The economic statecraft approach to international commercial relations is particularly 
rewarding since it allows us to understand the post-war economic order as it is, rather than 
as we would wish it to be. It allows us to address the "actual" as opposed to the "possible,
on
probable, or desirable'**' within this system in international relations. That system is
not, as is commonly accepted, an exercise in disarmament. It is more like an exercise in 
81arms control. The remainder of this study looks into the United States armoury 
containing trade policies and examines how the weapons have been upgraded and deployed 
since the 1960's.
Finally, the economic statecraft concept allows us a more sophisticated understanding 
of the threats to international economic order. We can leave aside the simplistic idea that 
the problems can be described or understood in terms of free trade versus protection or 
non-intervention versus intervention. Writing in 1936 EM Winslow took the first step in 
this direction,
"As a problem in commercial policy it (administrative protectionism) was entirely 
different from the old controversy over protection and free trade. Tariffs had 
come to appear relatively honest and liberal in comparison with the new 
protectionism; and if they were still quantitatively more important in their effect 
on trade, the latter had a far more serious qualitative effect on international 
relations because of its essential dishonesty. The problem in short, had become on 
of good versus bad protectionism, rather than a question of good versus bad 
commercial policy as understood in the old quarrel between the liberals and the 
protectionists."®
Where he concluded, this study begins;
"Administrative protectionism in short seems to be symptomatic of a transition in 
commercial policy not from free trade to protection but from orderly protection 
to complete autarchy."83
75
1. Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. RH 
Cam pell and AS Skinner ed.s., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976) Vol. 1, page 25.
2. The problem of public procurement is not addressed here as it constitutes only a 
fraction of trade among GATTsignatories.
3. Although, government procurement issues and state trading continue to raise important 
trade policy questions and controversies.
4. Chia-Jui Cheng, ed., Clive M Schmitthoff's Select Essavs on International Trade Law. 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhof, 1988) page 539.
5. IM Destler, Making Foreign Economic Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1980) 
page 129.
6. Benjamin J Cohen, American Foreign Economic Policy: Essavs and Comments (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1968) page 20.
7. William E. Lingelbach, "Commercial Policies as Causes of International Friction" The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Volume 150, July 1930, 
page 117.
8. There has never been any doubt on the part of most governments that the state should 
play a role in regulating trade.
9. JW Burton, Systems. States. Diplomacy and Rules (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1968). James E Dougherty "The Study of the GlobalSystem" James Rosenau et al.. 
ed.s., World Politics: An Introduction (New York: Free Press, 1976).
10. James E Dougherty and Robert L Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of 
International Relations: a Comprehensive Survey (New York: Harper and Row, second 
edition, 1981).
11. Witness the failure of the world peace through world law approach in the interwar 
years.
12. Henry Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich. Castlereagh and the Problems of 
Peace. 1812-1922 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964) page 1.
13. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: 
Macmillan, 1977) page 8.
14. ibid., page 54.
15. Richard Gardner, Sterling Dollar Diplomacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956) 
page xviii.
16. At the Atlantic Conference in August 1941.
17. JB Condliffe, "The Real Economic War" The American Economic Review Vol. 218, 
November, 1941, page 24.
18. ibid., page 20.
19. Peter Drucker, The End of Economic Man (London: William Heinemenn, 1943). See 
also E H Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939.
76
20. Economist 'The American Challenge”, cxliii (1942) page 67. As cited by R Gardener 
in Sterling Dollar Diplomacy page 1.
21. T h e  GATT system of trade liberalization was based on the idea of permitting the 
market to determine the international location of economic activity.” Robert Gilpin.The 
Political Economy of International Relations. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987) 
page 228.
22. Gottfried Haberler, T h e  Liberal International Economic Order in Historical 
Perspective” Challenges to a Liberal International Economic Order. Ryan Amacher, 
Gottfried Haberler and Thomas Willetts, ed.s., (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise 
Institute, 1979) page 43.
23. The Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (Geneva:GATT Secretariat, 1967).
24. The Agreement on the Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
25. The commercial policy chapter.
26. William Diebold, T h e  End of the ITO”, Essavs in International Finance (Princeton: 
Princeton University Department of Economics and Social Institutions, 1952).
27. See Richard Gardner.Sterling Dollar Diplomacy, for the best recounting of the failure 
of the Havana Charter.
28. Signed 30, October, 1947.
29. The Provisional Protocal allows legislation pre-existing the Agreement to remain 
intact.
30. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: What is and What it Does. (G ATTSecretariat, 
November 1984) page 3.
31. John Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism 
in the Post-War Order", International Organization 36, 1982, page 396.
32. See the prologue to the GATT.
33. John Ruggie, "International Regimes" page 196.
34. John H Jackson, T h e  Puzzle of the GATT:Legal Aspects of a Surprising Institution" 
Journal of World Trade Law. 1967, page 131.
35. Robert E. Hudec, T h e  GATT Legal System: A Diplomat's Jurisprudence" Journal of 
World Trade Law. Vol. 4, No. 5, Sept.: Oct. 1970, page 615.
36. ibid., page 619.
37. ibid., page 665.
38. Section 201 (a)(1), 82 Stat. .1347, 19 USC Section 160 note (1970).
39. Renegotiation Amendments Act of 1968. Pub. Law No. 90-634, Sect. 201(a), 82 Stat. 
1347, 19 USC Sect. 160 (1970).
77
40. John Barcelo, "Antidumping Laws as Barriers to Trade: The United States and the 
International Antidumping Code" Cornell Law Reveiw. Vol. 57, No. 4, April 1972, page 
536.
41. ibid., page 535.
42. Hudec, The GATTLeeal System: A Diplomats Jurisprudence. " ... the insistence that 
the law's coercive pressures be applied in a controlled fashion which allows room for 
manoeuvre at every stage of the process." page 665.
43. "General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: What it is and What it Does" GATT 
Secretariat, page 14.
44. Alan Wolff, 'The Need for New GATT Rules To Govern Safeguard Actions" Trade 
Policy in the 1980's (Washington. D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1983).
45. Article VI.
46. Robert Hudec, The GATTLeeal System and World Trade Diplomacy. (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1975. p. 185-186.
47. Dispute resolution machinery exists not only in the GATT forum but also in the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
48. Of the 80 GATTlawsuits filed from 1960 to 1985 one third were between the US and 
EC (26), 45 of the remaining 54 had either the US or the EC involved as one of the 
parties, only 9 involved neither. Robert Hudec,"Legal Issues in US-EC Trade Policy: 
GATTLitigation 1960-1985" Issues in US-EC Trade Relations RE Baldwin. CB Hamilton 
and Andre Sapir, ed.s., page 18.
49. Robert Hudec, "Legal Issues in US-EC Trade Policy" page 39.
50. See Chapter Three, page 57, notes 38-41 infra.
51. David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft page 46.
52. Frederich Davis, "The Regulation and Control of Foreign Trade", Columbia Law 
Review. Volume LXVI, 1966, p, 1428.
53. Hon. Amb. William D Eberle, "Trade Policy and the Trade Representative" Trade 
Policy and US Competitiveness Claude E Barfield and John H Makin, ed.s., (Washington: 
American Enterprise Institute, 1987) page 23.
54. Peter D Ehrenhaft's Review of Professor Lowenfeld's Public Controls on International 
Trade in Law and Policy in International Business No. 1, 1984.
55. EE Schattschneider, Politics. Pressures and the Tariff (New York: Prentice Hall, 1935) 
page 13.
56. Robert Pastor, Congress and the Politics of United States Foreign Trade Policy 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980) page 26.
57. ibid., page 3.
78
58. For a classic example of reliance on Executive review see S Lande and C Van Grasstek, 
The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984; Trade Policy in the Reagan Administration (Lexington, 
Massachussets: Lexington Books, 1986).
59. J Michael Finger, "Ideas Count, Words Inform" Issues in World Trade Policy RH 
Snape, ed., (London: Macmillan, 1986) page 264.
60. James E Dougherty and Robert L Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of 
International Relations: a Comprehensive Survey. (New York: Harper and Row, second 
edition,1981) page 419.
61. John Dobson, Two Centuries of Tariffs: The Background and Emergence of the United 
States International Trade Commission (Washington: US GovernmentPrinting Office, 1976) 
page 86
62. EH Carr, Twenty Years Crisis, page 102.
63. Frederich Davis, 'The Regulation and Control of Foreign Trade" page 1459.
64. ibid., page 1459. See the opinion of Justice Douglas in Panama Canal Co. v. GraceLine 
356 US 309 (1958).
65. Johnstone v. Pedlar. 1921, 2 A.C. 262.
66. Butterfield v. Strahan. 192 U.S., 470, 493 (1904).
67. Citizen includes companies and industries which are seen as corporate persons under 
the law.
68. According to Rodney Grey the trade remedy provisions therefore constitute an elabor­
ate system of private rights through which private parties can invoke government 
protection. Trade Policy and the System of Contingency Protection unpublished paper 
commissioned by the OECD, Paris 1986.
69. Robert Baldwin, "The New Protectionism" page 104.
70. The tax reforms implemented by the Reagan administration and the explosion in the 
trade deficit, etc..
71. "Materials for Economic Growth"Scientific American Vol. 255, No.4, October 1986.
72. Such as between the United States and Japan.
73. Jeffery Garten."GunboatEconomics" Foreign Affairs 1985.
74. Jacob S Dreyer, "Countervailing Foreign Use of Monopoly Power" Challenges to a 
Liberal International Economic Order Ryan C Amacher, Gottfried Haberler and Thomas 
D Willett, ed.s., (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1979) page 319.
75. Joseph Grunzel. Economic Protectionism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1916) page 179.
76. ibid., page 180.
77. ibid., page 179.
78. M Morkre, The New Protectionist Threat to World Welfare (New York: Elsevier, 1987).
79
79. Rodney Grey, "Contingency Protection" page 9.
80. Quincy Wright, A Study of International Relations (New York: Appleton, 1955) 
page 26.
81. The author is grateful to James Mayall for this idea.
82. EM Winslow, "Administrative Protectionism: a Problem in Commercial Policy" 
Explorations in Economics: Essavs in Honour of FW Taussie (NY:McGraw-HillBook Co., 
1936) page 183.
83. ibid., page 189.
80
SECTION TWO
CHAPTER FOUR — ANTIDUMPING POLICY: ECONOMIC STATECRAFT
The antidumping law is best understood as an instrument of economic statecraft. 
American policymakers use this economic policy tool to compel foreign firms, whether 
publicly or privately owned, to modify their behaviour in compliance with the United 
States's demands. Put simply, the law is designed to compel foreigners to stop dumping or 
not to start dumping. It is asserted that dumping distorts competition internationally and 
domestically. Official American rhetoric emphasises that the law is used not only to 
enhance competition in the domestic economy but also to enforce the international trade 
rules embodied in the GATT. Thus, when the United States applies the law, the actions 
are justified as creating free(r) and fair(er) trade and, in this way, contributing to the 
maintenance of the post-war international economic order.
With this sense of justification, United States policy-makers "strengthened" the 
antidumping law through a combination of emendation of the Antidumping Act and 
pragmatic administration of that Act. However, this process of change has subverted the 
statute. In effect, as we shall see, antidumping law and policy undermine competition, not 
enhance it. In practice the law is now more trade-restrictive than the dumping practices 
it is supposed to counter.^
The central issue, however, is not simply that the statute has been used to 
undermine competition, i.e. in a protectionist manner. Rather, we must ask, what are 
foreigners being compelled to do under the statute? To what end is power being exercised 
by the United States over the corporate citizens of foreign states? What kinds of behaviour 
have become actionable under the statute? The post-war international economic order 
rests upon the foundation of competition. The United States efforts to compel foreigners 
to undertake anticompetitive behaviour, pose serious political questions in international 
relations.
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Compliance is achieved through the exercise of power. American efforts to 
influence the actions, the range of options and the policy choices of foreign actors, 
infringe on foreign autonomy. Here the schism between American trade rhetoric and 
actual American policy becomes a significant issue in international politics. American 
trade policy rhetoric invokes the language of competition and free trade. The US 
emphasises that liberalized markets are universally in every state's best interest, not just 
in America's best interest. Foreigners should adopt market standards of behaviour because 
it is in their own best interest, not because it is America's best interest. Under this cover 
of legitimacy, however, the reality is that antidumping policy, as we shall see, is not used 
to compel foreigners to abide by pure market standards but rather to behave, as the United 
States thinks they "should". Students of international relations ought, therefore, to study 
how the antidumping law is used by one state to exercise power and influence on the 
autonomy and sovereignty of foreign actors, whether those actors are firms or 
governments.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine how the United States employs 
antidumping policy as a means of compelling foreign firms to do things they would not 
otherwise, such as changing their prices or policies, paying duties or in more extreme 
cases, restricting the volume of their exports. Ostensibly, only genuinely unfair trade 
practices are actionable under the statute. By examining the administrative and statutory 
changes in the law which have been made, it will become clear whether or not only 
genuinely unfair trade practices are actionable. It is necessary to examine what changes 
in behaviour are being demanded and on what grounds. What exactly is dumping? Given 
the existence of the antidumping provisions and the steady efforts to make them more 
"effective" since the 1960's, it is reasonable to ask exactly what are they used to achieve?^
Sinister and derogatory overtones have accompanied the term dumping from the 
beginning. One industrious writer found that the term originates from the Old Icelandic 
word "thumpa" ("d" and "th" being phonological reflexes) which means to thump or hit 
somebody. Perhaps, the fact that a "dump" has come to mean a temporary depot for
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munitions'* is linked to the way in which dumping as a commercial practice is commonly 
referred to as Ma species of international economic warfare".^ Such derogatory 
connotations make it important to be clear about what we mean by dumping.
The precise definition of dumping has changed rather dramatically under the 
antidumping law since the creation of an antidumping statute in 1894. Each change in the 
definition is an act of economic statecraft since with each innovation the United States 
changes the legal environment in which foreign companies must operate. For this reason, 
it is crucial to explore the details of these changes. As Brian Hindley recently noted, ’The
e
phrase "the devil in the detail" might have been invented for the anti-dumping law.
Allegations of dumping, whether levied in an official industry complaint or rather 
more loosely in the press, are often sufficient to imply culpability. Allegations alone can 
be enough to compel the foreign company to change its behaviour just to escape 
opprobrium and the prospect of an investigation. As early as 1958 Peter Eherenhaft 
argued,
"Indeed, it is said that the trade-restricting effect of the Antidumping Act should 
not be measured by the relatively few findings of actual dumping, but rather by 
the much larger number of investigations that have been undertaken pursuant to 
the act."7
Once a dumping investigation commences, the foreign respondent is subject to the 
United States' definition of dumping as well as the methodology it employs to determine 
whether dumping exists, and if so, by how much. The respondent cannot challenge the
Q
decision to initiate an investigation until after the final determination is made.
Therefore, three are two reasons why the applicable definition of dumping must 
be carefully examined. First, it is necessary to demonstrate that altering the definition of 
dumping and modifying the methodology by which dumping is calculated are acts of 
economic statecraft. These acts change the environment in which foreigners must function. 
Second, having demonstrated that ad policy is economic statecraft, it is necessary to 
determine whether American antidumping policy is used to compel foreigners to behave 
in a manner which enhances competition -- the basis of orderly international commercial
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relations - - o r  undermines it. In this way it is possible to distinguish between the 
legitimate and the illegitimate use of this instrument of economic statecraft.
WHAT IS DUMPING?
q
The term dumping describes certain pricing policies. Traditionally, dumping is the 
act of price discrimination. Price discrimination means selling the same good to different 
buyers at different prices. Dumping, as an international trade concept has usually referred 
to the practice of reducing the price of exported goods below the price offered for the 
same goods in the home market.
The GATT defines dumping as "sales below normal value". "Normal" was not 
defined until the Antidumping Code was negotiated in 1967, when "normal" was 
established as meaning sales occurring "in the ordinary course of trade". ^  It is 
effectively left to national discretion to define what is "ordinary".
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ANTIDUMPING STATUTE
It is necessary to review the statute's history for three reasons. First, its history 
reveals that it is intended to serve as a competition policy measure; it is supposed to be 
used to enhance market forces and competition. Second, the history shows that the law has 
evolved as an administrative measure. The United States judiciary has refused to allow 
dumping to be remedied through the domestic courts. In other words, there has been a 
tacit recognition by the judiciary that the law is an instrument of statecraft. For this 
reason, matters relating to it are non-justiciable.^ Therefore, an administrative system 
has been constructed to allow the United States to scrutinize, judge and remedy foreign 
firms' economic behaviour. Third, a historical review demonstrates how the statute has 
evolved into an essentially anti-competitive measure; fair, normal and legitimate trade
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practices have become actionable under it; market forces and competition are being 
reduced and not enhanced through its application.
There is some confusion as to whether the antidumping law was intended to be a 
competition policy measure or a tariff measure. Adams and Dirlam note that the law is 
comprised of an "unclear union of disparate elements drawn from tariff and antitrust 
law ".^ The tariff element reflects the desire to create a law that would prevent any 
underselling of the United States prices by imports. Seen this way the law was intended 
to preserve the "tariff wall" that the United States maintained and used to derive the 
substantial part of its federal revenue from the time the first antidumping law was created, 
in 1894.
But, the modern view is that the law arose as an extension of domestic competition 
policy (anti-monopoly and anti-trust policy). The American historian Samuel Elliot
h o
Morrison tells us that after the 1860's trusts and "gentlemens' agreements" °  to maintain 
prices and divide business became common in the United States. These arrangements were 
designed to eliminate if not all competitors at least the uncooperative ones. Those who 
engaged in such restrictive business practices hoped to gain monopoly power at the 
expense of competition.
Standard Oil used its monopoly power to practice the kind of price discrimination 
which is most commonly referred to as dum ping.^ The high profits which were 
obtained in regions where there were no competitors allowed them to "subsidize" price cuts 
in their competitors' selling territory. This was kept up sufficiently long to drive 
competitors out of business and thereby obtain "the lion's share of the business".^
In 1890 the Sherman Act made monopolies and business practices undertaken in 
restraint of trade unlawful -- namely price discrimination. The first antidumping 
statute targeted the same practices (monopoly power and price discrimination). It 
attempted to establish jurisdiction by requiring that the conspiracy (to restrain trade) be 
formed on United States territory and that it involve at least one United States citizen.^ 
Under this Act dumping was defined as the act of selling in the United States at "prices
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1ftsubstantially less than actual market value."10 United States industries took private 
actions through the United States District Courts. The same criminal penalties which were 
meted out to transgressors of the Sherman Act were available, plus up to one year of 
imprisonment.
It soon became frustratingly clear that it was legally impossible to criminally 
prosecute foreign nationals for committing such acts abroad if there were no American 
counterparts, i.e, through imports alone. The Supreme Court confirmed this in the 1909 
case American Banana Co. vs United Fruit Co.^  That ruling made clear that the Act 
was not applicable to foreigners if the named actions were not illegal in their home 
territory.
Lack of jurisdiction caused an important difference to emerge between the two
competition policy measures. Antitrust policy targets the existence of monopoly power.
Since there is no jurisdiction in antidumping legislation to target the existence of
monopoly power, the 1916 statute instead aims at the intent to use monopoly power to
destroy competition. Predation was the explicit target of the Antidumping Law of 1894
and the antidumping provisions of the Revenue Act of 1916.^
Predatory intent was, as far as economists of the day were concerned, the sole reason
21for providing a legislated remedy. Jacob Viner, widely considered the leading expert
on dumping, argued that dumping should be divided into three categories. His reasoning,
though not put into print until 1923 in his seminal work Dumping: A Problem in 
22International Trade . was the logic behind early antidumping legislation. He showed 
that not all price discrimination is harmful to competition.^
He describes three kinds. Sporadic dumping, Viner found, occurs when a foreign 
business has a surplus of goods which it releases onto the international market at any price 
the market will bear. Such dumping is without predatory intent. Persistent dumping, he 
explained, is when exports are sold at a price, though profitable, which is lower than the 
price offered in the home market. This situation arises from the existence of differing 
elasticities in the home and foreign markets and also does not constitute predatory
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behaviour. In contrast, he found, that only intermittent (also known as short-run) 
dumping is predatory and harmful. This occurs when foreign firms sell products abroad 
at prices which are not at all profitable. It is assumed that a firm cannot sustain a lack of 
profit for very long. Therefore, the only rationale for such sales is to destroy the existing 
competitors. The resulting reduction of competition potentially allows the firm to gain a 
greater market share. Having established control in the market it is assumed that the firm 
will raise prices to a profitable level, indeed much more profitable than would have been 
possible in the presence of other competitors.
Dumping under the 1916 Act, which was defined as "sales less than home market 
value", for this reason, was a "manifestation of illegal unfair competition" and it subjected 
violators to criminal penalties2^ fines and treble damages,26 if, and only if. it was 
done with the:
"Intent of destroying or injuring an industry in the United States or preventing the 
establishment of an industry in the United States, or of restraining or 
monopolizing any part of trade and commerce in such articles in the United 
States."26
Intent, however, is difficult to prove. The 1894 Act was never applied. Even 
though the 1916 Act strengthened the reach of the law, the government never brought an 
action under the statute. Actions brought by private companies in the United States never 
resulted in a judgement against the plaintiff.
A profound change occurred with the implementation of the antidumping 
provision in the Revenue Act of 1921. Predation, which alone had warranted the creation 
of legislation to remedy dumping2^, was no longer required. Instead, the 1921 Act, 
which remains the basic statute, targeted the effects of predatory dumping. It requires that 
price discrimination cause injury. Dumping had come to be defined not as any price
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discrimination^0 but as sales at prices which were "below fair value". This standard was 
codified in the 1921 Act as "sales at less than fair value" (LTFV). There is no precise 
statutory definition of LTFV. Instead the definition is established through administrative 
interpretation and practice.
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In practice, for the meantime, "less than fair value" had come to mean any price 
lower than the domestic price in the home market. Injury, which the statute requires for 
a positive finding, would occur "if an industry is hurt or likely to be or prevented from 
being established by imports which involve price discrimination".
Targeting the effects of predation is a complex and illusive task. After all, fair 
price competition can be injurious. Injury is considered a healthy side-effect of normal 
competition. Some price discrimination may be healthy even if it is injurious. Differences 
in supply and demand conditions between different national markets actually require price 
discrimination according to traditional economic theory. After all, prices are supposed to 
be determined by supply and demand conditions in market economies. These conditions 
vary from country to country. Therefore, a single firm's prices should vary too.
If normal price competition -- unsubsidized, undumped, imports -- can cause 
injury, and if not all dumping is injurious, then a question arises. How does one tell the 
difference between the effects of injurious dumping and the effects of injurious, but 
healthy competition? This question is crucial. If they are not distinguished then the law 
can be used to penalize healthy and normal price competition. Generally, this problem 
has been resolved by asking another question. Who is injured? Is there injury to 
competition or injury to competitors?
Domestic competition policy has adopted the injury to competition standard. 
Divergences from it have been vigorously condemned by the Courts. The central purpose 
of the 1936 Robinson-Patman Antitrust Act was to make this standard explicit. The report 
issued by President Johnson's White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy in 1968, 
confirmed,
"The reference to injury to competition with specific persons has focused the 
attention of courts and enforcement authorities on the plight of the individual 
competitors, and enforcement designed to preserve competitors is at odds with the 
workings of a competitive system. The proper focus is the effect on competition 
in the market as a whole.
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The judiciary has further confirmed the "competition, not competitors" standard, 
as Diane Wood notes'^, in Brown Shoe Co. v. US*^ and Cargill Inc. v. Monfort of 
Colorado Inc.®®.
Domestic competition policy requires that the injury be sustained by the 
customers.®^ Antidumping policy, in contrast, has adopted an injury to competitors 
standard. The impact on customers is mostly ignored. As a result, Klaus Stegemann argues, 
"Antidumping measures almost always adversely affect the interests of consumers."®® 
When measuring injury the investigator00 is statutorily required to examine the 
following:
" ... output, sales, market shares, profits, productivity, return on investments, 
utilization of capacity, cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, 
investment, existing production and development efforts including the ability to 
develop a derivative or more advanced version of the product and the ability to 
raise capital.
These indicators reveal little about the "disfavoured customers"®®, who are the
focal point of domestic competition policy. They reveal more about performance of
individual firms than the industry as a whole. In addition, many of these indicators, such
as return on investments, reflect the management decisions of domestic firms. Thus one
reaches the conclusion reached by Bart Fisher. Given that there is no requirement under
the AD or CVD law that the complainant's firm be managed efficiently, such criteria are
bound to reveal little about the reasons for changes in the indicators.®® The causal link
between dumped imports and, for example, return on investments seems tenuous at best.
The divergence between the two competition policy measures has generated
literature which cannot be fully addressed here.^® Harvey Applebaum most succinctly
confirms the judgement of most of this writing. The antidumping and antitrust laws, he
says, "cannot realistically be reconciled"^;
"the antitrust laws are designed to promote free and open competition .... " "In 
contrast the trade laws are designed to protect United States industries, companies, 
and workers from unfair import competition, or in one statute (Section 201 of the 
Trade Act of 1974) from fair import competition. In other words, they are, in 
general, designed to protect United States competitors without regard to the 
impact on competition or competitive markets" (emphasis added).^®
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Recognizing the importance of this divergence the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development produced a report on it in 1984. Diplomatically the purpose
of the report was described as follows.
"[T]o examine, in particular, possible long-term approaches to developing an 
improved international framework for dealing with problems arising at the 
frontier of competition and trade policies."^
The OECD did not explain why there should be a frontier between the international and
domestic policy tools. After all, their objective is supposed to be the same: the
enhancement of competition.
The contradiction between domestic and international competition policy
objectives is significant because it means the antidumping laws are no longer merely
"potential hatchets of rear guard protection"^ as former Trade Commissioner Peter
Ehrenhaft prophesied in 1958 they might be. It means that there is a long history to what
Jagdish Bhagwhati calls the "protectionist capture" of the AD law .^  Claims by the
United States that it uses antidumping policy to enforce a "market standard" of behaviour
and claims made by the general rhetoric of free trade and competition are plainly refuted
by the contradiction between antidumping policy objectives and domestic competition
policy objectives. If the United States is not asking others to abide by a market standard
then what is it asking them to do?
The shift from targeting the intent of dumping to targeting its effects is important
for another reason. This shift makes the distinction between fair trade, and unfair trade
less clear. The impact of anticompetitive behaviour is the focus, not the source. If the
United States is defining dumping so that fair and legitimate trade practices are actionable
under the law then it is acting to undermine competition.
Another profound change occurred with the passing of the 1921 antidumping
provision. Because jurisdiction had proved to be such a problem, the 1921 Act eliminated
the criminal remedy on which all former antidumping law had been based. Instead, it
provided an administrative remedy. That is, instead of punishing or deterring the foreign
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producer through a criminal procedure, the new law, and all subsequent antidumping law, 
targets and penalizes the actual imports.
In theory, the administrative procedure works as follows. When American 
industries allege that imports are dumped an official AD investigation is undertaken to 
substantiate that claim. If dumping has occurred then the amount of dumping must be 
determined -- that is, the difference between the dumped price and the home market 
price. The result is called the dumping margin. If injury caused by the dumped imports 
is also found, then the standard procedure is to issue a positive finding and levy a tax on 
the dumped imports. The tax (which is called a duty) is then applied to the goods at the 
border which should be equal to the dumping margin. In this way the United States 
authorities can equalize the terms on which the imports enter the market. The tax offsets 
the dumping. The imports are then available at a "fair" price and do not compete "unfairly" 
with domestically produced goods. Theoretically, all this can and should be done without 
questioning or passing judgment on the foreign firms' motives or pricing policies and 
without subjecting foreigners to the United States domestic legal system.
The administrative procedure removes culpability in the legal sense. It also 
eliminates the necessity of substantiating predatory behaviour. But, the application of the 
term "unfair" to dumping practices, John Barcelo explains, "has origin in tort law where 
they (references to unfairness) have been used by plaintiffs to obtain relief against various 
deceptive and unscrupulous business practices". The original subjection of foreigners 
to criminal proceedings has imbued dumping with a criminal quality which is legally and 
economically meaningless under the current administrative procedure. In practice, 
however, dumping is still popularly considered "unfair".
The belief that foreigners are being "unfair" fuels the broadening definition of 
dumping. It is ironic, but an increasing number transgressors has been seen as a good 
indicator of the law's effectiveness. "Protectionists", who are well aware that the law can 
be used to tax, limit or exclude both fair and unfair imports (that is, any injurious 
imports) have sought to strengthen the law. "Free traders", believing that they are serving
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the cause of free and fair competition, have pressed for the same goal. As a result, there 
has been a tendency to stretch the law to further increase both the number of actors and 
the kinds of activities which are actionable under it.
This tendency has been neither steady nor the result of concerted action. Rather 
it is the result of an accumulation of often unconnected but deliberate changes, which, in 
the tradition of common law, result in the ramshackle structure suggested by Frederich 
Davis' allusion to a cathedral.^ Nevertheless, the fairly constant direction of change in 
the law is easily discernible. One result is that the law allows the United States to pass 
judgement on foreign actions with greater ease and justification in spite of the 
administrative procedure. The increased authority to take action against foreigners who 
are perceived to be transgressing the law. In this next section we examine other statutory 
and administrative changes in the law which have broadened the scope and the reach of 
the antidumping law.
There is one particularly interesting feature of this process of change. As the law 
is made more "effective" it's original purpose, the enhancement of competition, is 
subverted. Yet, American politicians and diplomats have continued to claim that the law 
has been changed only to further the interests of "free trade". The rhetoric obscures the 
reality and justifies actions which are in opposition to the laws' supposed aims.
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CHAPTER FIVE — OPERATIVE TERMS
There are several terms with which it is crucial to be familiar if we are to 
understand AD policy. In addition to the term dumping, there are other operative notions 
in the antidumping statutes. For a positive finding the statute requires that an industry 
exist in the United States and that the industry as such is injured. Of course, injury can 
be caused by fair imports or domestic competition or recession or many other factors. 
Therefore, the statute requires that injury must be caused by dumped imports. The 
domestic industry qualifies for standing, that is the right to file an AD petition, only if 
the imports are "like" the product(s) made by the domestic industry. During the 
investigation injury only to the producers of "like” products can be examined. To reiterate, 
the main operative notions, as they are referred to by the legal community, in the AD law 
are "dumping”, "domestic industry", "injury", the causal link between imports and the 
injury incurred by the "domestic industry", "like" product. There are other operative terms 
as well which will be examined. The important point about these terms is, as John Barcelo 
makes clear,
"Each concept .... can be infused with a different meaning depending on the
objective in mind ...
The definition of the term dumping and these other terms (i.e., like product, 
domestic industry, injury, cause) is for this reason, extremely relevant to an understanding 
of the objectives sought with this technique of economic statecraft.
DUMPING AS SALES AT LESS THAN FAIR VALUE
Of the very different definitions of dumping which have been used in domestic 
law two are important. The first is "sales at less than fair value" (LTFV) which the statute 
has applied since 1921. The 1974 Trade Act added a new statutory standard: "sales below 
costs" (SBC). Both LTFV and SBC are consistent with the GATT"normal" standard since
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sales at prices which are below these standards are not considered (by the United States) 
to be "normal in the ordinary course of trade".
Dumping defined as sales at LTFV allows the United States authorities try to 
compel foreign to provide their merchandise at a "fair" price. But, what is a "fair" price?
Dumping by firms from non-market economies always poses a ridiculous problem. 
How can one determine the home market price, let alone a "fair" one, when there is no 
price mechanism? Why should a such a company be expected or required to have a 
particular pricing policy anyway? The absurdity of calculating dumping margins for non- 
market economies was finally recognized in the 1988 Trade and Competitiveness Act. Now 
imports need only exceed trigger levels to be considered dumped or subsidized. There will 
no longer be any need to fabricate non-existent prices since the presence of margins is not 
necessary to execute the law.
The problems of measuring "normal" and "fair" prices are inherent in market 
economy cases as well. William Taussig, one of the great trade experts, posed the same 
question that we now face as early as 1930. "In all such discussions," he explained, "we are 
confronted with the question, is there a "fair" profit or a "normal" price?"^ Is there a 
universal "normal" value or a "fair" price among the market economies? Differing 
shareholder expectations, differing inputs costs, differing management strategies among 
many other factors mean that a "fair" price for a foreign firm is bound to be less or more 
than for a United States firm. There is no inherent and universal "fair" price. Nor is there 
a single legitimate set of priorities firms must pursue when making pricing decisions. 
When investigators calculate the dumping margin they do not have a fixed point of 
comparison. Not only do corporate pricing policies vary. Costs vary -- this is supposed to 
be the reason why international trade occurs in the first place. And market elasticities 
vary. The supply and demand conditions, which determine prices, vary from one national 
market to another. For this reason, traditional economic theory posits that international 
competition actually requires price discrimination.
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By assuming that prices or all pricing policies should be the same, the law 
becomes a mechanism with which the United States imposes its own ideas on foreign firms 
about how those firm ought to price their goods. Antidumping policy is used to compel 
foreign firms to behave in the market the way the United States authorities think they 
"should”. Here politics confronts us as the major issue. Ideological differences are 
profound among states and diverse firms as to how firms "ought" to behave in commercial 
affairs. If foreign firms will not change their opinions about the "proper" way to do busi­
ness, anti-dumping policy is an effective means of compelling foreign firms to modify 
their behaviour in compliance with the United States' demands.
There is no express statutory definition of "fair value". That is left to 
administrative interpretation. "Fair value", at least from 1921 until 1955, was interpreted 
to mean "foreign market value"^, which was defined as the price available in the home 
market or, if there were no home market sales, then it was the price "freely offered ... to 
all purchasers" in a third market.®
In 1955, the interpretation changed when an amendment from the 1954 Act 
required that the volume of home market sales be "sufficient to form an adequate basis for 
comparison".® This opened the door for United States authorities to use sales in third 
countries as the benchmark and to "construct" the foreign market value. However, it was 
assumed that the prices in third markets might also be dumped prices. Not wanting to rely 
on foreign conceptions of a "fair" price, the United States began to mathematically define 
fair value. Peter Ehrenhaft explains that this was a "novel departure" from the previous 
practice. "But", he went on, "it is difficult to see how a mere exercise in arithmetic can 
suffice to determine whether dumping, in its predatory sense, exists."^
We know that predation was no longer technically necessary under the law. 
Ehrenhaft was objecting to the way in which all sales which were less than the home 
market price, whether predatory or not, whether they were less than the home market 
price for the long-run, the short-run or sporadically, regardless of differing market 
elasticities, would now be considered unfair and actionable. So we see that as early as 1955
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the concept of "unfair" trade had begun broadening to cover previously fair trade 
practices.
Pricing policy is a complex subject, although antidumping policy assumes that it
is not. In a market economy prices are supposed to be determined by supply and demand.
Under conditions of perfect competition, which have not often been found to occur in this
world, firms ought to offer a product at a price which is just high enough to cover
marginal costs (the cost of making the thing). Paul Samuelson states:
"Only when prices of goods are equal to marginal costs is the economy squeezing 
from its scarce resources and limited knowledge of technology the maximum of 
outputs.
Ostensibly competition keeps the price from rising above that level. However, 
firms engage in business for one major reason -- profit. Marginal cost pricing does not 
allow for a profit margin. Since competition is rarely perfect, i.e. sufficient to keep prices 
at the level of marginal costs, firms can raise the price to allow for a profit margin. Under 
these conditions cost-plus pricing is considered to be, theoretically, the most efficient way 
to price goods.
Cost-plus pricing means prices are determined by calculating the average cost of 
producing the good and then adding an allowance for profit. How much allowance for 
profit is "fair"? Turning to a layman's guide, we find that the Penguin Dictionary of 
Economics explains that the profit margin is "loosely determined by market conditions".^ 
Since there is no universal figure for the plus part of cost-plus pricing, nor is there any 
universal criteria for determining what a profit margin should be, the antidumping law 
is a means of holding foreign firms to a theoretical standard of behaviour which has little 
substance in reality .^  Very few American firms would escape legal action if they were 
legally compelled to adhere to strict cost-plus pricing.^
Under the LTFV standard the antidumping law the United States assumes that 
profit maximization is the sole or major goal for all firms. However, not all pricing 
theories assume this. Many firms put other priorities such as increasing the market share, 
new product development, and return on investments above profitability. The
100
"discrepancy"^ between theory and practice is very real. The problem is exacerbated
by the fact that conceptions of profitability depend upon the time frame applied.
American firms are often required to show profitability on a quarterly basis. Shareholders,
particularly institutional funds, demand dividends or capital gains which arise from these
quarterly profits. German and Japanese firms, in contrast, do not risk their capitalization
as long as profitability appears in the long run, such as over the course of one year. As
such, the law is a means by which the United States can put pressure on foreign firms to
behave as if profit maximization in the short run is the only normal and legitimate goal
13around which pricing policy should be shaped. °  But, there is absolutely no 
international consensus that profit is the only legitimate objective firms should aim to 
achieve.
AD policy raises a couple of profound questions. What is the appropriate function 
of firms in a market economy. In whose interest is a firm run? These questions stand at 
the centre of the current debate on industrial competitiveness. For example, in the 
American model of capitalism the firm serves the shareholders. These shareholders invest 
in the firm primarily for one reason. They wish to make a profit. This can be achieved 
either through dividend payments or by selling the shares. If the firm fails to increase its 
profit then shareholders tend to abandon the firm.
But, in the Japanese model the firm is run in the interests of the "stakeholders". 
These include shareholders but also "employees, suppliers, customers and neighbours" 
according to W. Carl Kester in his study of Japanese firm s.^  Dividends in these firms 
are often extremely low. The management of Japanese firms often emphasise growth and 
sustaining relationships between the firm and its suppliers and customers.
If we look at Germanywe see yet another model of capitalism at work, though in 
the following respects it is similar to the Japanese model. In Germanyownership of firms 
is often held by a variety of other firms and banks through strategic cross-holdings. 
Individual firms can afford to sacrifice short term profitability for other goals without 
fear of a hostile takeover or of losing their investors. As in Japan, German shareholders
101
are willing to let the firm retain its profits (instead of giving them out to shareholders as 
dividends as is done in the United States). Thus, firms are often able to build up large 
cash mountains. This cushion of capital allows them to sacrifice profitability during a 
downturn or in favour of growth or enhanced market share or other objectives.
We should now recall the quote by Henry Kissinger offered earlier in this 
dissertation. He referred to the fact that differences in domestic structures, and 
differences in the concept of legitimacy upon which those structures are based, can lead 
to antagonism when attempts are made to address the problems which arise from the very 
existence of those differences.^ Differences in opinions and perceptions about the 
appropriate role of firms in a market economy among the industrialized countries are 
increasingly giving rise to contention. Though it may seem controversial to put it this way, 
there are profound ideological differences among the market economies. John Zysman 
points out, the US has been "... slow to recognize that there was more than one form of 
capitalist market economy". "After the war (WWII) the United States tended to view 
deviations from its own form of capitalism as either only partial modernization or 
apostasy."^®
Nevertheless, there is more than one model of capitalism. Firms are bound to 
behave differently according to the model in which they operate. The nature of a given 
model of capitalism may vary, for example depending on the structure of the financial 
market. John Zysman tells us "... Japan and Germany, chose to emphasize investment in 
production over consumption." "Those differences in policy and institutional structure 
created distinct patterns of market logic, and thus certain types of firm strategies." ^
AD policy then, is an ideological instrument. It aims to convert foreigners to the 
American model of capitalism. The implicit message conveyed with AD policy is that 
firms ought to behave in conformity with the American model. There is bound to be 
increasing conflict among the capitalist countries over these issues. Not only is there no 
agreement as to which model is "best". Now that Japan and Germanyand other market
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economies have begun to rival the United States, which model is best is even more subject 
to question.
Now let us return to the methodology employed in AD investigations, keeping this 
ideological question in mind. Since "fairness" is mathematically defined, it is important to 
explore the calculation methodology carefully. It sounds simple enough; the Commerce 
Department (since 1974, before then Treasury had this responsibility) determines the 
margin of dumping by comparing the United States sales price to "fair value". But it is not 
simple. Fair value is generally taken to mean the home market value of "such or similar" 
merchandise. Value is too subjective a concept to be easily applied in AD investiagtions. 
Value actually refers to a specific price in AD cases. Although it is not required by law 
to do so, the Commerce Department usually takes individual sale prices in the foreign 
market to calculate a weighted average for each firm in the foreign nation which is 
allegedly dumping. Against this weighted average Commerce then compares the US price 
of the product in question. The US price is either the "purchase price", the price at which 
an unrelated buyer purchased the good before it entered the United States, or the 
"exporters sale price"(ESP)^®, meaning the ex-factory price, which is used when the 
seller and the importer are the same (in which case the sale of the good occurs after it 
enters the United States).^® Commerce "adjusts" the ex-factory price, the ESP, for direct 
and indirect costs so that differences in the circumstances of the sale can be balanced. This 
allows "apples" to be compared to "apples" and not to "oranges". Traditionally, counsel 
(both the petitioner's and the respondent's) devote the majority of their time to issues 
involved in the determination of injury, and these price and cost adjustments.
It is telling that this methodology differs from that employed in domestic 
competition policy cases. Until 1950, the Federal Trade Commission attempted to establish 
the difference between the actual invoice price and the delivered price. If customers in 
New York and California were both charged a $10.00 invoice price but the shipping cost 
to New York was only $1.00 while it cost $3.00 to ship it to California then the FTC held 
that the firm was using the New York sales to subsidize the California sales. This notion
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of price discrimination was abandoned in 1950. Since then, only the actual invoice 
21price has been used.
In contrast, the ESP is always adjusted for direct costs such as shipment costs, 
packaging, insurance and indirect costs such as overhead, advertising, salesmen's
op
salaries. When the Treasury was responsible for antidumping determinations it did not
bother to make adjustments. They did not compare apples to oranges. They simply issued
findings of no in ju ry .^  So the AD investiagtions resulted in negative findings. By 1958
the Congress became alarmed that too many cases were being dismissed in this way. That
year, the authority to determine injury (as opposed to dumping) was transferred to the
Tariff Commission and required that adjustments be undertaken so that a determination
could be made. But foreigners started claiming many expenses. Hendrick explains;
T h e  resultant home market price calculations were claimed by them to be reduced 
to a point where initial apparent disparities again and again would, if the claims 
were allowed, completely disappear. ^
In response, various administrative practices were implemented to allow a fair 
comparison to be made which, at the same time, would prevent the elimination or 
reduction of dumping margins by the administrative procedure. Clearly this objective 
implies that distortions to real prices will be entertained by United States officials when 
necessary. For example, in 1960 a Treasury regulation was implemented which required 
that expenses bear a "reasonably direct relationship to the sales". These include dif­
ferent credit terms, warranties, technical assistance etc., but not including differences in 
advertising costs. "Reasonably" is not statutorily defined. In effect, this ambiguity as to 
the term "reasonably" allowed indirect costs to be entirely excluded from the ESP. While 
this was done only for the sake of simplicity and administrative convenience, it was 
implemented "at the expense of fair price comparisons under the Act".^® As a result, 
the United States officials have been more likely to find a different "fair price" when the 
United States purchase price is used than when the ESP is used. But, the circumstances of 
the sale should not change the fairness of the home market price. Paul Victor and Thomas 
Ehrgood carefully argue;
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” ... the goal of making a fair comparison appears to have been compromised by, 
first, the Treasury Department and, subsequently, by the Commerce Department, 
arguably in the interest of administrative simplicity and convenience in light of 
the extensive claims which were being made. ^
Identifying which costs are going to be included (whether direct or indirect) and 
deciding how those costs will be calculated, constitutes a very large area of discretion. For 
example, Commerce assumes that direct selling expenses are very low because goods are 
sold in arms-length transactions to the domestic importer. Salaries for salesmen, which 
are usually accepted as a direct expense, is considered an indirect expense, and therefore 
not subtracted from the price to price comparison. Commerce "caps" the value of indirect 
expenses from the foreign price but full deductions from the United States price are 
allowed. Bart Fisher explained in 1973 that "carte blanche authority" was available to 
administrative authorities to preclude almost any circumstances of sale due to ambiguously
po
defined regulations. This means that comparisons are made between prices which
reflect very different conditions of sale. As a result, the ensuing dumping margins reflect
administrative discretion more than real price differences.
Paul Jameson condemns United States AD methodology for focusing on costs
altogether. He says,"... the ITC should recognize that producers do not generally set prices
with a view to a myriad of small costs - - prices are set more by the market than by the
cost of production."^
Robert Herzstein demonstrates most persuasively that administrative discretion
with regard to adjustments alone can create a dumping margin.
"The technical rules used in antidumping proceedings can, and often do, result in 
findings of dumping where there is no price discrimination between markets. For 
example, even if the prices and terms and conditions of the sale are identical in 
both markets, an administering authority might find dumping margins."'*® He 
elaborates in an attendant footnote, "Such a finding can result from the limitation 
on the adjustment for indirect selling expenses. Dumping margins might also be 
found, when prices and terms and conditions of the sale are identical in both 
markets, if the prices of transactions in the home market are averaged, but the 
price of export transactions are not averaged and are compared individually with 
the average home market price."®1
Where do the United States authorities get the information which allows them to 
make appropriate adjustments? The respondent firms are often unwilling to provide in­
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depth information since the petitioners, their American competitors, have access to a great
deal of the material submitted to both Commerce and the ITC. Commerce makes all of the
"non-sensitive" information available to all of the parties when an investigations
commences, primarily legal and economic counsel, if such counsel sign what is called an
Administrative Protective Order (APO).^ Under the terms of an APO, which are
"routinely issued",^ lawyers who divulge information gleaned from the proceedings can
be disbarred. However, how likely is it that the chief corporate counsel upon learning
about the opposition's costs and market structure, is not going to relay the information to
his firm? Who in his own firm would report him anyway? The ITC, in contrast, does not
allow access to the entire record for precisely this reason.
The terms of access to the information is very important, as Donald Cameron and
Susan Crawford highlight.
"Since the bulk of the material received by the ITC comes from US industry, while 
Commerce receives the majority of its data from foreign respondents, what has 
occurred since the enactment of the Tariff Act (of 1979) is a basic inequity in the 
treatment of confidential information."3^
Even if accurate information is provided by the respondent, are adjustments made 
to compensate for differing accounting standards and practices? Evidently, Commerce 
uses foreign information, when it can get a hold of it. But, it will use the foreign 
respondent's information only if the information corresponds to "Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles". But, differences in national accounting practices are substantial, 
to say the least. Instead, Commerce often relies on information about the respondent 
which the petitioner must supply when making the allegation.
Given the number of judgments which come into play in determining the ESP 
alone it seems safe to say that "adjustments" mark the entrance to a battleground of 
numbers. The discretion available to American officials to manipulate, to include or 
exclude, to verify or to not verify the figures is large. Where there is discretion there is 
susceptibility to political pressure. The more "technical" the procedure becomes the more 
political it is. This is truer still because the American judiciary has upheld the ad-
O C
ministrative authorities' freedom to change the calculation methodology not only
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from one case to another but during a single investigation. The United States courts have 
held that Commerce may use its discretion in calculating the margin. Indeed it has 
confirmed Commerce may even recalculate the margin immediately after final 
determination.®® As such, antidumping policy becomes a means of pressing upon 
foreign firms actions which the United States desires.
Once the ESP has been adjusted Commerce compares each individual US sale to 
the single weighted average foreign market value (FMV). The decision to use individual 
US sales or a weighted average determines the outcome. When the FMV is higher 
than the US price (this is absurdly called "negative dumping") Commerce does not balance 
these higher prices against the sales which are below the US price. Effectively this means 
that if there is a single instance when the US price is lower that the home market value 
a dumping margin will be found. The only way a margin can be avoided is if every single 
US sale price is equal to or higher than the weighted average. The prices which are below 
the home market value are converted into a percentage of the US price. After each single 
US price is compared in this manner a weighted average of the US prices is constructed. 
The weighted US average and the weighted foreign market value average are then 
compared to determine the final dumping margin.
Harvey Applebaum and David Grace have proved that this procedure is 
mathematically likely to result in a dumping margin even when the "average price charges 
by an importer in the US meets or even exceeds the average price charged abroad". They 
provide this telling example. The foreign market value for each unit (each widget) is 
$100. The single US prices (already adjusted) are found to be $75 for 10 units in one in­
stance, but $100 for 10 units in another instance and $125 for 10 other units in another. 
The $75 units are therefore found to be dumped by $25 per unit. The $100 units are not 
found to be dumped and there is no margin. The $125 units are priced $25 each over the 
foreign market value so there is no dumping margin. Only the $75 units are used in the 
final dumping calculation; the others are examples of "negative dumping" (such an 
unhappy phrase) since they are not below the foreign market value. Ten units dumped by
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$25 equals a value of $250. The total dollar average of US sales is ten units times $75 
($750) plus ten more units times $100 ($1000) plus ten more units times their value at $125 
($1250). Added together this equals a value of $3000. When the $250 dumping margin on 
the single sales is divided by $3000 (the value of all the US sales) the result is an overall 
dumping margin of 8.34%. In spite of the fact that two third of the imports were not 
dumped, and one third of the imports were above the home market price, it was still 
possible to find a margin of 8.34%.
Brian Hindley points out yet another bias towards a finding of dumping inherent 
in the methodology. He asks: What is "the" home-market price or "the" export price? 
Prices fluctuate over time. The Home Market price is the reference price, representing an 
average price. But, when choosing which prices to include in that average the United 
States does not include sales which, according to the US, are made below cost (as long as 
such sales do not exceed 10% of all sales). This is done because sales below cost are not 
considered "normal" "in the ordinary course of trade". Thus, reference price is composed 
of average of "normal" prices. In other words, the US cuts out the lowest priced of the 
home sales and in doing so raises the home market price. This procedure is bound to make 
the export prices look worse than they would otherwise. The procedure is, as far as he is
no
concerned, "absurd".
There is one more step which renders the calculation methodology flexible. The 
foreign market value must be converted into US dollars before the comparison with the 
US prices are made. In an era of floating exchange rates which exchange rate is used? 
Apparently only "actual exchange rates" are used. David Palmeter points out, however, that 
there are several exchange rates at any one time. For example, there is the exchange rate 
for interbank lending, there is the exchange rate which is recorded by the International 
Monetary Fund, there is the commercial exchange rate which is available to the firm when 
making the transactions in question. The choice of rate, Palmeter shows, can alone create
O Q
a dumping margin. In addition, spikes and lags in the rate are ignored; this raises a 
question about what is included in the rate. Actually, whether a single day's rate or an
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average of daily "actual" exchange rates is used is not the central issue. Firms do not 
adjust their prices to reflect daily or even monthly exchange rate fluctuations and it would 
be ridiculous to expect them to do so. But, the antidumping margin calculation 
methodology makes no exception. As such, margins can be created by fluctuations in the 
value of a national currency; and they often are.
Nowadays the policy is as follows. If major fluctuations eliminate a previous 
(allegedly) existing margin then the rate from the previous quarter is used to calculate the 
margin. Fluctuations which create a margin where none previously existed are acceptable. 
In the case Melamine Chemicals^ (1979) it was made clear that it is unclear as to how 
many quarters back US officials can go. The decision implied the US can go as far back 
as it likes within reason.^ What "within reason" means is, as usual, not defined.
The administrative agencies must comply with deadlines, which it is universally 
acknowledged are extremely short. Congress has attempted to make the law more 
"effective" particularly since 1974 by shortening these deadlines. Peter Ehrenhaft, a former 
ITC Commissioner confirms that the shortness of time in investigations means true FMV 
cannot be calculated.^ If the allegation is levied against many dumpers, either in one 
country or several, Commerce cannot possibly investigate all of the firms in the specified 
time period. The deadlines have been shortened partly to increase the possibility of higher 
margins and partly to encourage respondents to arrange a settlement before the 
investigation commences with a quantitative orderly marketing arrangement.1^  In other 
words, the shortened deadlines alone are a major contributing cause of anticompetitive 
solutions to allegedly dumped imports.
To the outsider, the mathematical procedure gives the appearance of precision. 
From the technicality of the procedure one tends to assume that it is equitable and 
impartial. But, the procedure is not only biased against the petitioner. The numbers are 
not "hard"; they are actually quite pliable. The calculation process is automatic in the sense 
that an investigation must ensue once a petition has been launched. And the investigation 
must be completed within certain fixed deadlines. But, in fact, the calculation process
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itself, once the investigation has commenced, is susceptible to various judgements. Having 
examined closely the technical procedure by which the numbers are manipulated, it is 
apparent that there is a clear political imperative which motivates the calculation process. 
Within the technical procedure a political desire to compel others to behave in a way that 
the United States finds "normal” is clear. The mathematical calculation procedure 
exemplifies the way in which the United States is, as GaryHorlick suggests, ” ... indulging 
in the fiction of measuring some degree of unfairness."^ David Palmeter rightly tried 
to draw attention to this when he said, "economically meaningless measures of fair value 
are often used".^
Let us now remember that home market value is only used if home market sales 
account for at least 5% of all exports during the period under review.^® If there are less 
than 5% then third market prices are used. This immediately raises a question. How can 
the firm possibly be subsidizing its exports from home sales which account for only 5% 
of sales? Presumably sales to the United States are subsidized by sales in third markets. 
However if there are also insufficient third market sales to form a basis of comparison 
then Commerce officials must "construct" the foreign price.
Since existing figures and information are malleable enough, the Commerce 
Department has generally tried to avoid having to construct FMV. However, in recent 
years United States petitioners have increasingly asserted that the home market prices used 
by Commerce are invalid either because they are fictitious or because they reflect sales 
at prices which are below the cost of production.
Ever since the definition of dumping was broadened to cover SBC in 1974, there 
have been more examples of constructed value. The next section of this chapter addresses 
the complex issues involved in determining costs, whether for SBC or constructed value 
determinations.
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DUMPING AS SALES BELOW COST
A sales below cost standard of dumping was first introduced in the 1921 Act. It 
was feared that foreigners would undervalue their exports in order to reduce the level of 
tariff duties payable upon entry into the US. To counter this possibility, the law provided 
that fair value, when it had to be constructed due to lack of sales in the home market, 
would be based on the foreign firm's fully allocated cost of production plus a minimum 
of 8% for profit and 10% for general expenses. This SBC standard was made available as 
a definition of dumping alongside the LTFV standard in the 1974 Trade Act, with surpris­
ingly little discussion, as a more stringent statutory standard.4^
Under the SBC standard, dumping occurs when the producers' home market price 
is below the cost of producing the good. For the first time, dumping need no longer entail 
price discrimination. The price offered in the United States is relevant only insofar as 
provides the petitioner with the grounds for making an allegation that the foreign firm is 
dumping. The sales in the United States do not need to be below cost, such sales can be 
at LTFV.48
The dumping margin in SBC cases is determined by finding the difference between 
the home market price and the cost of production. Investigations set out to establish the 
foreign firm(s)' "true" cost of production. Under the SBC standard the antidumping law 
is used to compel foreign firms not to sell below their costs of production - - a t  home or 
abroad.
When the United States constructs a foreign firm's costs it employs the following 
formula: the cost of materials and fabrication + 10% for general expenses + 8% of the sum 
of costs and expenses as profit + packaging costs for shipping to the United States. In 
effect, then, the officials are not trying to find the actual cost of foreign production. 
Rather they are trying to determine what foreign costs ought to be. Profits ought to be at 
least 8%. The fact that many American firms consistently make far less than an 8% profit 
is ignored.
I l l
Differences in costs are the basis for international trade. Therefore, the 
development of a SBC standard is extremely important. At first, the endeavour seems 
simple enough. Prices are compared to costs. But, the relationship between prices and 
costs of production is, as JM Clark put it, "quite complex", "obscure and varied".^ His 
opinion on this subject is important because he was the first person to systematically 
demonstrate, in 1923, in his work Studies in the Economics of Overhead Costs^  that 
it is impossible to determine the "true" cost of producing any one item in a multiproduct 
firm.^
Firms generally employ a financial accounting system and a (or several) cost 
accounting system(s). Financial accounts balance the amount of money paid out over some 
period of time, daily, yearly, with the amount of money earned. Financial accounts do 
not tell the business anything about the relationship of prices to costs or the allocation of 
costs among different departments or product lines. Cost accounting systems are employed
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to do this. Firms incur two kinds of costs -- direct and indirect. Direct costs include, 
for example, the cost of the leather from which a pair of shoes are made. Indirect costs 
are those which are "chargeable to his (the firm's) entire business but not chargeable to any 
particular sale".^
Clark makes clear that the direct costs can be accurately discerned only if 
allowance is made for differences in their allocation, volume and character. For example, 
the cost of the leather for the shoes, the labour and the necessary fuel can vary according 
to the level of ou tpu t.^  In addition, the cost of the leather varies depending on the 
suppliers pricing decisions or materials bought at different prices at different times.'*'* 
And, costs can rise or fall depending on the quality of the final product. Direct costs, if 
they are to have any hope of being accurate, must be adjusted for these fluctuations. This 
means having accurate information about overall output - - information which is generally 
beyond the purview of antidumping investigations.
Indirect costs are infinitely more complex. Their determination is completely a 
matter of discretion. They cannot be traced to any single unit of production yet, the
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burden of paying the cost remains independent of output. The interest on the capital
borrowed, the rent, the cost of the labour and the machinery etc. can be added up but, the
key question is how to allocate these cost to the whole business. Clark explains,
T h e  overhead costs must be levied on such parts of the business as will stand the 
burden, while other parts of the business, which cannot otherwise be had at all, 
are charged whatever they can pay, regardless of overhead costs."®^
The allocation question is critical to antidumping investigations since they usually
aim at only one single product made by a multiproduct firm. The question for the United
States officials is not whether the firm operates below its cost of production but rather
whether the particular item is sold below its cost of production. This is why very prof itble
firms can be found to be dumping.
To describe the question of allocation Clark uses the terms "estimate"®®,
"judgement"®®, "imagination"®®, "unconscious calculation"®^, and "ambiguous"®^.
As a question, he says, it "creates more problems than it solves."00
"Any selection that may be made is in the nature of a compromise..." particularly 
"since some (indirect) expenses vary more directly with labour time, others with 
direct expenses, others with machine hours and so on."®*
Overhead costs must include the cost of idleness. This is the cost of turning away
business which might not repay all costs. The cost of idleness can only be determined if
all the indirect costs could be isolated, which, Clark explains, they cannot.®® If
allowance is made for the "cost of idleness" then, it is at times necessary to sell at prices
that are below the cost of production.
Of course, the difficulties in ensuring that all the cost information is correct
assumes that it is possible to discern the costs in the first place. Even the foreign firm may
itself not be able to determine its costs of production with any precision. WF Taussig noted
this problem existed back in 1930.
T h e  striking thing is that those engaged in industry speak without hesitation about 
ascertainable cost and reasonable price." T h e  truth seems to be that they have in 
mind very much what the economist has in mind, not something which is 
ascertainable with strict accuracy, -- even the most refined system of cost 
accounting gives at best a basis for inferences,--but rough approximation.®®
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In reading Schattschneider it becomes clear that there is a long history of difficulty
in defining costs for the purpose of enforcing trade policy. Back in the 1920's and 1930's
many American industries and firms tried to convince Congress that tariffs should be
raised in order to offset foreigners' low cost advantages. Schattschneider explains,
"It is unnecessary to enter upon a discussion of the refinements and technical 
differences of determining these [foreign] costs [of production] because neither of 
the [Congressional] Committees at any time in the course of hearings made an 
attempt to define what was meant by costs, either domestic or foreign, or prescribe 
a formula for making the calculations. No effort was made to audit statements of 
costs, and the data were submitted in almost every conceivable form, more or less 
habitually violating every known rule of sound statistical and accounting practice. 
Under these circumstances statistics became the handmaiden of the unconscious 
process of wish fulfilment."67
He goes on to cite often hilarious language from 23 testimonies offered in the 
Congressional hearings. Most of the speakers asserted that these lower foreign costs were 
real. But, all were utterly unable to substantiate what the foreigners costs actually were, 
as is made evident by the most honest statement that Schattschneider records.
"I cannot tell you what their cost of production is. I wish I knew."6®
Viner addressed the problem of selling below cost very clearly. It is worth quoting 
him at length. He explained that the theoretical grounds for SBC are actually stronger than 
those for LTFV. But, the practical difficulties of administering a SBC standard are 
insurmountable.
"But the administrative problems which would be presented by a law requiring the 
determination of foreign costs on a comorehensive scale and with any degree of 
precision would be almost insuperable.'®^ Even in a simple case, he went on, 
with, "full access to all the books and records and all the information possessed by 
the owners of this industry, the determination of the cost of production is scarcely 
possible of accomplishment with the degree of precision and certainty which is 
desirable, if not essential, for the purpose of uniform and equitable assessment of 
duties."70
The problem of precision and certainty is further exacerbated by the fact that the 
foreign firm itself may not know exactly what its costs are, and if they did they might not 
want to reveal that information. Rodriguez highlighted this same point recently when he 
asked the central question. "Absent the disclosure of actual cost account data by the 
investigated firm (which may be unobtainable even by the firm itself), how does the
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Treasury determine whether the data is reliable?"7  ^ According to a leading trade 
lawyer;
"It (Commerce)" routinely accepts "claims of dumping (often with little more than 
US import statistics and petitioners’ own costs, and frequently ignoring the 
statutory requirement of all information be "reasonably availably." 19 USC Sect. 
1671a) as petitions sufficient for initiation of an investigation. 2
The information provided in the original petition or subsequently by the petitioners is
often the source from which foreign costs are determined. Even if the respondents have
a clear idea of their costs and they are willing to submit that information to the US, that
may not be enough. According to Vermuslt, the reporting procedure,
" ... places a heavy burden on foreign respondents: it essentially requires them to 
submit the information in exactly the form that Commerce desires it. Failure to 
comply will make Commerce equate their position to that of a party who did not 
respond at all."7'*
There are no external verification checks made on the information whether it is supplied
by the respondent(s) or the petitioner(s).
Viner thought it unlikely that United States officials could gain access to secret
corporate records. For this reason, he believed that distortions would undoubtedly occur
since certain important factors would be unknown, such as:
"genuine salary payments and distribution of proper depreciation allowance; the 
inclusion or exclusion from costs of interest borrowed and on invested capital, 
respectively, and variations in the cost of production of differing portions of 
output."7^
"In the case of an industry producing from the same plant and equipment a variety 
of kinds and grades of products, the exact determination of costs of production is 
impossible. All that is attained in ordinary business practice is the reaching of an 
estimate resting on theoretical assumptions of necessarily disputable validity with 
respect to what are the proper items to include in cost, and what are the most 
satisfactory bases of apportionment of joint costs to the different products from 
the point of view of guidance of price-policy and of future production." (emphasis 
added)7**
Viner would clearly have been opposed to SBC as a definition of dumping. He concludes;
"The development of comprehensive tariff legislation dependent upon the accurate 
determination of costs of production, whether foreign or domestic, for its 
administration is a dream incapable of even partial realization."7**
These arbitrary, unverified or unverifiable, figures are made very malleable by the
next step in determining the cost of production - - the allocation of the costs over a period
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of time. It would be ludicrous to expect a firm to recover all of its costs and a reasonable 
profit from a product on the first day of sales. Any single sale or even day of sales could 
not recover all costs. So, the time period used to judge costs is decisive.
The 1974 SBC statutory standard required that sales be below fully allocated 
costs.^  That is, one full product lifecycle must be considered and for an extended 
period of time/® A normal business cycle includes the amortization period for capital 
and development costs, degree of expectation of full recovery of costs plus profit in a 
reasonable period of time. Obviously with any new, market-leading good, the R&D costs 
alone, leaving aside all the other indirect costs, will not be recovered in the first six 
months. One only need think of a new generation of computer chips. On this basis the 
United States is bound to find a huge dumping margin on any product which will not 
recover costs before, let's say, two years. As such, the SBC standard renders the 
antidumping law a powerful weapon.
In practice, however, United States officials argue that they cannot divine the 
future. They can only look at the past. Since the 1977 Case, Carbon Steel Plate from 
Japan^® the practice has been to calculate the cost over most recent fiscal year or 6 
months from the date when the petition is filed. In the 1984 case Titanium Sponge from
on
Japan**' it was confirmed that it is not even necessary to consider a business cycle. The
Q1
six month practice could continue. Similarly, in the 1987 case Timken Co. v. US et al. . 
the CIT left the phrase "over an extended period" subject to wide interpretation. As it 
stands, Kaplan and Kuhbach explain, "... no clear cut rule of thumb jumps from the pages
oo
of these decisions. But, it is clear that in the modern business world profitability is
dependent upon projected changes in costs and/or the level of production. As such, the
six month procedure is bound to penalize normal, or typical, pricing policies. Kaplan and
Kuhbach offer a good analysis of the essential problem.
"One of the most troubling aspects is the prominent role the Court has assigned to 
expected costs in determining whether costs will be recovered over a reasonable 
period. When a case is in the investigatory stage, data are collected for the period 
beginning five months prior to the investigation and ending approximately five 
months before the preliminary determination. Thus, any analysis of future costs 
must necessarily be speculative.
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For example, assume that a responding firm argues that it intends to 
increase production by 100% over the next two years with the result that fixed 
costs per unit will halve. How is the administering agency to evaluate that claim? 
Should it be accepted at its face value? Or, should the Department make an 
independent judgement as to whether such a decision makes sound business 
sense? It is likely that the decision to expand production will depend, in part, on 
expected prices. Should the agency attempt, with the petitioner's help, to predict 
future prices? As other dumping law administrators well know, there are enough
difficult decisions in a case, particularly cost cases, without adding to the 
burden."83 
Domestic antitrust law, in contrast, penalizes only sales below average variable
costs.8* Ironically, this standard was adopted in the same year that antidumping law
began to apply sales below fully allocated costs, 1974. Imports therefore have not been
treated on the same basis as domestic goods after they have entered the market since 1974.
The SBC standard not only violates the principle of national treatment; it has great
implications, as Horlick points out, in an era when imports are often the price setters.88
Fred Smith cleverly captured the significance of this issue;
"if the same anti-dumping laws applied to US companies, every after-Christmas 
sale in the country would be banned".88
Complicated as this all is, measuring and comparing costs among different products
from different factories within firms and among different firms, it gets even more
complicated when the firms in question are located in different countries. The target of
the antidumping exercise is clearly a foreign firm or firms. Yet, foreign firms are being
pressed to change behaviour which to a large extent reflects the economic environment in
which they operate. Firm's costs reflect, for example, government fiscal and monetary
policy (the cost of capital). This means that the United States is actually pressing the
foreign enterprise or industry or even the foreign government to alter the business
environment. Clark recognized that costs were a function of the general economic
environment. He said,
"One of the most stimulating things in the study of overhead costs -- one which 
compels the imagination - - is  the fact that the content and behaviour of such costs 
are governed by the form of industrial contracts. They differ from industry to 
industry as a result of differences in the forms of contract used and they are 
capable of being revolutionized by that non-revolutionary method."8
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It is worth noting that cost accounting methodology was developed in an era when
labour accounted for the majority of incurred costs. Overhead costs were minimal in
comparison. But, Peter Drucker tells us now that labour has dropped to as little as 8% or,
at most, to 25% of manufacturing costs.
'The remaining costs -- and that can mean 80% to 90% --  are allocated," he 
emphasises "by ratios that everyone knows are purely arbitrary and totally 
misleading; in direct proportion to a product's labour costs, for example, or to its 
dollar volume."®®
The traditional cost accounting methodology used in antidumping investigations 
in the modern world of manufacturing renders the numbers more flexible since the major­
ity of costs are indirect.
With the SBC and the LTFV dumping standard, the United States determines, in 
the relatively arbitrary manner described, what a foreign firm's costs ought to be. Though 
the original purpose of the law was to encourage or enforce a market standard in pricing 
policy, the law has been transformed through changes in the statutory definitions 
definition and, more significantly, by administrative practice. Under the law foreign firms 
ought to price their goods not according to market forces but according to an abstract, 
flexible and arbitrary ideal of what is fair, normal, and desirable.
In spite of the fact that there are many reasons for selling below cost, the US 
continues to assume that all SBC sales are not "normal" "in the ordinary course of trade", 
as Horlick has pointed out. But, there are rationale for selling below cost, as Vermulst
O Q
makes clear. Most of the reasons for selling below cost have nothing to do with
predatory or anticompetitive objectives. For example, Vermulst cites the following reasons
why firms might sell below cost other reasons other than those implying predatory
behaviour. In some instances, "the firm was not aiming at maximizing profit but its market
share (this could be in the long-run but of course unless the firm received some other
form of income it could never make a profit on that particular product)."®® Or, in
another example, he explains;
"Some products have huge fixed overheads which compel a factory to work at near 
or full output all the time. In this situation firms will produce as much as they can 
and sell for whatever above marginal cost they can get.®^
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The issue under the AD law now, in short, is no longer the process by which prices 
are determined, nor is it whether home and export prices are different, but rather, 
whether the result, the chosen price itself, causes a real or perceived problem for 
American industry or even individual American competitors.
DUMPING MARGINS AND UNDERSELLING
The existence of a dumping margin should, theoretically, be independent of 
underselling, price suppression or price depression. Underselling refers to a situation in 
which the price of the foreign good is below the price of comparable US goods. 
Underselling can be caused, obviously, by plain old competitiveness. Underselling does 
not necessarily imply unfairness. Price suppression refers to the inability of American 
producers to raise their prices because the low-priced imports holds prices down. Price 
depression refers to a situation in which the American firm must actually reduce its price 
to meet the low-priced import competition. In theory, only unfairly priced, not just less- 
expensively priced, merchandise should be subject to dumping duties. In practice, before 
1981, the ITC compared (for the purpose of determining whether an American industry 
has been injured) the dumping margin to margin of underselling. Jameson explains that 
a high dumping margin in comparison to the margin of underselling would render the ITC
Mmore likely to make a positive finding of injury. This practice appears to stem from 
the Asbestos Cement Pipe Tube from Janan^  case in which the ITC said: "LTFV 
imports caused injury if either lost sales or price depression occurred."^ After 1981, 
the ITC simply stopped taking the size of the dumping margin into consideration when
qc
making injury determinations. Evidently, the ITC's concern is "whether the import
qc
volume is significant, not whether the magnitude of the margin is significant.'*70
In one intriguing case in 1987 a Korean respondent argued that it was not possible 
for their exports to the US to have caused injury. Although their imports into the US were 
priced 30% below comparable prices offered by American manufacturers, the imports had
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a dumping margin of only .9% to 1.47% by the Commerce Department's own investigation.
But, Jameson explains, the ITC said 'The statute speaks only of material injury "by reason
of" imports, not by reason of dumping margins."®^ In appeal, the ITC position was
affirmed. "When it comes to considering margins, the Appeal Court said, the ITC can do
whatever it wants."**® The exemption from its ostensibly primary responsibility (to
substantiate injury as caused by dumped imports) was ignored by most observers but it
provoked David Palmeter to this declaration.
"Such a grant of unbridled discretion to an administrative agency, such a self­
ouster of jurisdiction, is very unusual in a system specifically providing for 
judicial review of agency determinations to injure their conformity with the 
evidentiary record and with principles of law."99
In short, the presence of injury is derived from the fact that the actual price of the
imports in question is lower than the US price. In other words, whether injury is caused
by competitiveness or dumping is no longer the primary criteria for applying the law.
INJURY
As we have seen, the antidumping law is supposed to target the effects of dumping 
rather than the existence of monopoly power in a foreign market or the intent of foreign 
exporters. The most obvious effect of dumping is injury. Dumping is not actionable 
unless it is injurious whether it is defined as sales LTFV or SBC. Until 1954, the Treasury 
was responsible for making the determination of injury. However, Congress shifted this 
responsibility in 1955 to an independent body, the International Trade Commission. 
Congress felt that the ITC was not only independent within the domestic political 
structure; the ITC was also considered independent from the foreign policy considerations 
which had made the Treasury cautious in making its injury determinations.
What is meant by injury? How is it measured? Injury is incurred by whom? There 
are three concerns addressed by the International Trade Commission when it makes an 
injury determination in antidumping cases: (1) the amount of injury required, (2) the
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definition of domestic industry (which incurs the injury), (3) the causal relationship 
between the injury and the dumping.
The law is activated if "an industry in the United States is injured or is likely to 
be in ju re d " ^  due to dumping. After the GATT was created, in 1947, the United 
States came under greater pressure to adopt its "material1' injury s tan d a rd .^  Material 
injury, however, has never been clearly or workably defined in the GATT. Instead, the 
Treasury borrowed the term "serious" injury from the escape clause of the 1943 United 
States Mexico Trade Agreement. This remained the antidumping injury standard until 
1951.
Injury has been defined most clearly in escape clause cases (section 201). There has
been a tendency to rely on the escape clause standard when determining injury in AD
cases. For this reason it is necessary to cite all the relevant developments, even if some
arose in 201 cases. It is worth making note of Barcelo's comment: " ... less injury is
102required for antidumping than for safeguard relief."
Attempts were made to incorporate the "material" standard into the United States 
Trade Agreements Act of 1951. They failed.^®'* The 1962 Trade Expansion Act 
adopted the term "serious injury." It is unclear whether "material" injury should be 
considered a higher threshold than "serious" injury. The Commission's General Counsel 
apparently agreed that the Commission would define "serious" injury (in practice) as 
"material" injury, in the same way as the Treasury had done. Titanium Dioxide from 
France^ ^  in 1963 was one of the last cases in which the Commission used the GATT 
material injury standard. Specific reference to it was even made to it. But, by 1967, the 
Commission interpreted material injury in Soil Pipe from Poland^ ^  to be any injury 
greater than de minimis. By 1970 "serious" injury was interpreted in Whole Dried Eggs 
from Holland as "a showing of anything more than a trivial or inconsequential effect on 
the domestic in d u s try " .^
Having diluted the injury standard this far through administrative interpretation, 
the Congress had little compunction about diluting the statutory standard in the 1974
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Trade Act. "Significant"^^ injury was now sufficient to pass for material injury. In
1979 the term "significant" injury was interpreted by the Commission to mean, "harm
which is not inconsequential, immaterial or unimportant"(emphasis added). The 1979
Trade Agreements Act incorporated this new standard into the statute. From 1980
Commission practice has been to find lower levels of imports injurious, even though the
legislative history suggests the Commission should use the same standard as it applied
during the period 1975-1979.^ In a 1986, case one Commissioner's dissenting
opinion has caused some further reassessment of the injury standard.^® In his view,
dumped cement imports from several countries^ * prevented domestic prices from
rising, therefore, the imports should be considered injurious. This minority interpretation
signalled a lowering of the injury threshold to harm which is not "unimportant". It also
112signalled the new emphasis on price suppression, depression and underselling. '*■
Slowly but surely, the level of injury has been reduced so that it is easier to make
a finding of injury. The drop from "serious as material" to "serious" to "de minimis" to
"more than trivial or inconsequential" to "significant" to "harm which is not
inconsequential, immaterial or unimportant" is precipitous.
When making the injury determination, the ITC usually looks at a period of three
years. This is done in spite of the fact that Commerce has established that dumping
occurred on the basis of information which covers a period of only six months or so. Both
Commerce and the ITC argue that they cannot read the future. Yet, for Commerce to go
too far back into the past would potentially diminish the dumping margin (because there
11*3would be fewer instances of unfairly-priced sales). The ITC assumes that the 
dumping occurred at the level specified by Commerce steadily, not for the six months but 
for the entire period during which the petitioners allege dumping was occurring. As a 
result, when an allegation is made that dumping occurred over three years, Commerce uses 
six months of information to make a positive finding of dumping, but the ITC determine 
whether there was injury on the assumption that dumping occurred for the entire three 
years.
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Apparently, Horlick explains, Commerce excludes imports which were not at all 
dumped (i.e. there was no single instance of price underselling even allowing for exchange 
rate fluctuations). "But, if Commerce finds that 50% of a given exporters exports were 
dumped by 40%, the ITC assumes that 100% of the exports were dumped by 4 0 % ."^  
The final duty, of course, is applied on the assumption that dumping occurred at 
the level specified by Commerce for three years.
DOMESTIC INDUSTRY AND LIKE PRODUCT
Let us now look at the operative notion of the domestic industry. As noted earlier, 
the domestic courts have found that measuring injury to competitors is unequivocally 
inconsistent with competition policy objectives. Injury under domestic competition law 
must occur to competition and not competitors. How, then, has the antidumping law 
defined "domestic industry"?
The definition of the industry generally follows from the definition of the likeness 
of the competing products. Until 1988, the legislation required that the petitioner produce 
"such" or "similar" merchandise as the targeted import. In Bicycles from Czecho­
slovakia.^ ^  a case in 1960, the Commission defined the domestic industry by holding 
that the product produced by the importer is "similar" if that product is "identical" to the 
targeted imports. In that same year, however, the Commission held that makers of feldspar
in the United States could petition against foreign producers of nepheline syenite since
116these products were "substantially comparable." °
The Antidumping Code of 1968 defines "like product" as one which is "identical 
[that is] alike in all respects to the dumped product under consideration" or that have 
"characteristics closely resembling those" which are allegedly being i n j u r e d . T h e  
Code and United States law do not attempt to judge likeness by asking whether the 
products compete in the same product market. For example, wood and bricks are both 
used to build houses. They may be considered competitive products since people make a
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choice between them when building houses. Instead, likeness is judged by the physical 
likeness of products. So, one kind of brick is compared with another. For this reason, the 
GATTruled in 1987 that cattle and beef products are not "like”. However, firms have 
tried to circumvent antidumping duties and orders by making slight changes to the product 
in question so that it is exempt because it is not "like".
Fears that circumvention will render the remedy laws ineffective have exacerbated 
the broadening trend in the provision. To counter circumvention the Commission 
apparently developed a two part test sometime in the 1970's to determine what constitutes 
the domestic industry. First, the products must be "like". Second, most or all of the input 
used must be integral to the final product. This second test was developed because of 
special problems arising originally from agriculture cases. It was difficult to tell if a 
livestock industry was being injured by an industry which produced processed livestock. 
(The cattle industry claimed it was being injured by imports of beef products like beef 
jerky.) The second test has provided the justification for a broader notion of "domestic 
industry". For example, in 1984 the United States grape growers attempted to bring a case 
against the European wine industry. The 1984 Trade Act broadened the definition of the 
wine industry to include grape growers. Even though this violates the "like product" 
definition in the Code The Senate Finance Committee confirmed that this was acceptable 
since most of the grapes were used in making wine.^® It is worth noting that these 
changes were made even though the domestic wine industry was opposed to the 
antidumping investigation of European wine makers.
In the 1988 Trade and Competitiveness Act, the Congress provided new statutory 
language. "Such or similar merchandise" was replaced by "comparable merchandise".^® 
Clearly the new language is much broader. In addition, Section 1321 of the 1988 Trade and 
Competitiveness Act broadens the definition of a "like product" so that later versions of 
the product and products assembled in third countries can be made subject to existing 
orders. This, it is hoped, will prevent firms from making slight changes, either in the 
product or the place of its production, which might exempt products from antidumping
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orders. Horlick and Oliver point out that this amendment contravenes the Antidumping 
Code since it allows the United States "to extend an existing antidumping.... order to non- 
"like" p ro d u c ts".^
It is worth looking at one case in particular, on this subject of like product and
domestic industry. According to Patrick Macrory in Forklift Trucks from Japan the price
to price comparisons raised the like product problem.
"In that case, the Department selected home market comparison models on the 
basis of a ranking of twelve separate physical characteristics. Before the 
investigation began, it would have been impossible for a foreign manufacturer to 
predict the particular ranking chosen by the Commerce Department and hence, to 
determine which home market prices to compare with US prices, in order to 
ascertain whether it was selling at fair value."
So, "like product" is a concept which is wide enough that even the producers of the 
product cannot always tell which products and therefore which prices will be used in an 
investigation.
What then is the domestic industry? The conception of domestic industry is
important for two reasons. First, the domestic industry must produce a "like" product to
qualify for standing, that is, the right to file an AD petition. Second, the definition of the
domestic industry, whether broad or narrow, in effect defines the area which will be
examined for the injurious impact of the dumping. Petitioners often want to define the
industry as broadly as possible so that all injurious effects of dumping can be investigated.
This tactic, though, is no guarantee of success. By broadening the conception of the
domestic industry the actual impact of the injury may be weakened. For this reason
petitioners are often counselled to adopt a narrow product and industry definition so that
the impact of the dumping will be sure to pass the injury threshold. It is worth
remembering that there must be evidence of injury to the domestic industry, real or
potential, for the government to commence an investigation. This judgement is often made
on the basis of information submitted by a single firm, (often the one most injured)
though that firm may represent itself as the whole industry. The information provided by
100the firm is often neither statistically significant nor independently verified.
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Treasury had always used a nationwide definition of domestic industry. However,
when the ITC was given the responsibility for injury determination, the definition began
to broaden. In the 1955 case Cast Iron and Pipe from the United Kingdom the
Commission found that the producers of "like" pipe in California constituted an industry.
The domestic industry was defined as a "competitive market area". This decision was
heavily criticized. The Joint Committee on Economic Report in 1956 had this to say.
"...the challenged imports had no more than four-tenths of one percent of the 
domestic production of cast-iron soil pipe, and the domestic industry during the 
period in question had expanded its production, sales, capacity and prices. The 
Tariff Commission reached its conclusion regarding injury by deciding that the 
approximately 8% of national production located in California constituted a 
separate industry. But only one California producer who was represented at the 
hearings had shown losses during the period of imports, and these losses 
apparently were not the first he had experienced".^
Soon the Commission began to divide "competitive market areas" into segments for 
the purpose of injury determination. In the Dominican Cement^ ^  case of 1963 the 
"segment" rationale led the Commission to say that the producers of cement in the New 
York metropolitan area constituted the domestic industry. On this basis the Commission 
made a determination of "likelihood of injury" to the industry. However, in four other 
cases in 1963, involving imports of Steel Wire Rod^ ^ . the Commission rejected the 
"regional industry" concept. Except for these main exceptions the trend continued. In 
Carbon Steel Bars and Shapes from Canada. ^  Chromic Acid from Australia. ^  
Steel Reinforcing Bars from Canada. ^  Alexis Coudert tells us the Commission was 
criticized by its Chairman and one other member for making a determination of injury 
on the basis of a '"'competitive market area" that had only a tenuous relation to any
■jOrt
industry recognizable as s u c h " . I n  that same year in Chromic Acid from 
131Australia 0 the Commission found that the domestic chromic acid industry was being 
injured since the prices in the West Coast area were being depressed by dumping. The 
Commission defined the West Coast "competitive market area" as the domestic industry 
because it constituted a "major share" of "a major United States market". This logic was 
applied even though, as the Chairman pointed out in his dissent, all the of the domestic 
American producers were located on the East Coast. ^  Also in 1964 in Carbon Steel
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Bars and Shapes from Canada133 injury was found by determining that only 3 domestic
producers constituted the domestic industry. The 1966 case, Steel Jacks from
Canada.13^ one firm was found to represent the industry.
A dissenting opinion in White Portland Cement from Japan100 best indicates
the degree to which the definition of a domestic industry had been attenuated.
"If some producer or producers are injured by imports at less than fair value, it 
follows that the national industry may be materially injured because such 
producers are part of the national industry. An injury to a part is an injury to the 
whole."136
This logic was applied, in fact, six years later in Steel Bars. Reinforcing Bars, and 
Shapes from Australia13^ in 1970. In this "watershed"136 decision apparently only 
two states, in which only three domestic firms made sales (only one of which made 
national sales, and one of which was not registered in the complaint), were determined to 
constitute the domestic industry.136 Given this, and the fact that imports reached only 
5.5% of consumption in that "domestic market" as compared to 0.05% nationally, the 
Commission's conclusion was, as John Barcelo put it, "breathtakingly simplistic".1^ 6
Soon after, the Commission, having pushed to its extreme the logic of market 
segmentation -- the "breaking up of an industry into smaller pieces to measure impact (of 
injury)" -- began to adopt "a newly advanced theory",1^ 1 Toby Myerson explains. 
Injury could be found more easily by enlarging the industry. In 1975, in Lock in 
Amplifiers and Parts thereof from the United Kingdom1^ 3 the Commission said that 
the antidumping act uses the term "an" industry and not "the" industry. Therefore, the 
Commission could determine injury by looking at more than one industry.
One of the ways in which this broadening has been achieved has been the 
reinterpretation of "like product". As mentioned earlier, the "likeness" was broadened in 
the 1984 Trade Act so that the grape growers could bring a case against wine makers. The 
injury was found by examining the grape growers, not the domestic wine makers. The 
1988 Act confirmed this trend by granting standing to file petitions to coalitions of firms, 
unions and trade associations.1^ 3
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Let us stop here and look at the Antidumping Code criteria. Article Four of the 
Code defines a domestic industry as one Mwhose collective output... constitutes the major 
proportion of the total." The word "major" was added after long negotiations during the 
Kennedy Round. Rodney Grey,the Chief Canadian Trade Negotiator during the Kennedy 
Round, explains that the "major proportion" language was interpreted as a "substantial
proportion, but not invariably or necessarily, more than half the production of the goods
. 1 ,1 4 4in question".w
Of course, the Code has no real standing in American law.^® It is up to the 
administering authorities to implement and or interpret the Code as they see fit. Even if 
the authorities choose to apply the Code, it is possible to define the terms in the Code 
freely due to their ambiguity.
Let us now return to the definition of the domestic industry for the purpose of 
determining whether a petitioner has standing to make an allegation.
STANDING
14fiA complaint must be brought "on behalf of the (domestic) i n d u s t r y " b y  the 
industry, not a firm. The United States government also can initiate a case on behalf of 
an industry. Sometimes the government initiates or pursues a case even though the 
industry in question does not support the investigation or opposes i t .^ ^  The 
Commerce Department, which is responsible for the determination of standing, assumes 
standing is valid, unless the majority of the industry opposes it. But, Commerce refuses 
to solicit support for the petition. It checks only those who actively oppose the petition in 
determining whether the share of the domestic industry the opposition represents is 
significant. There is no statutory requirement that a majority support the petition. Com­
merce has only once found lack of s tan d in g .^
Amendments to the 1974 Trade Act require the American to provide very specific 
information about the dumper, for example the "fair value" of the goods in the home
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market, the injury to the domestic industry. In some cases, this allows a single firm the 
ability to make allegations based on information which may be dubious either in its source 
or interpretation.
AGAINST WHOM IS THE ALLEGATION LEVIED?
Early on, allegations were made against single firms. But, since 1974, complaints
can be levied against the country of the dumpers rather than against the specific firms.
There is little logic in this. States do not dump. There is little likelihood that all the
producers of the good in question are dumping. Thus, Toby Myerson notes,
T h e  allegation of dumping of goods becomes a basis for imposing burdens of the 
Antidumping Act on all suppliers from the countries named - - a  distinct 
protectionist advantage to an American manufacturer --  where in fact the 
offender or offenders may be only one or a few of the individuals 
implicated."^^ "Because of the disruption of commercial activity caused to a 
non-dumping exporter, there is no logic in permitting a blanket indictment against 
all suppliers without some indication of their culpability".
In addition, allegations are often levied against several countries at once. Again, this 
assumes that many firms in many different countries are in collusion. It would be a 
strange coincidence if all firms were selling at LTFV or below cost at the same time.
When antidumping orders can be applied to all exporters from a country this 
necessarily becomes a domestic political issue. The foreign government is called in by the 
foreign industry to protect it's industry from the assault. The foreign government advises 
or negotiates on behalf of its own domestic industry. Governmentsare drawn in because 
antidumping investigations create financial penalties and jeopardize the earning power of 
their domestic industries.
The antidumping law is thus an instrument which can be used to compel govern­
ments to change their behaviour. A list of the most politically powerful industries and 
firms in each foreign country is maintained by the Commerce Department and the United 
States Trade Representative. If a foreign government does not comply with American 
demands (or press its domestic industry to comply) then the US can use the threat of an
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antidumping investigation to create political problems for the foreign government at home.
On this point Viner said;
"When an antidumping law is administered in this manner (by naming a country 
instead of a firm or firms), the country specified in an antidumping order has 
clear grounds for protest that its treaty rights to equality of treatment are being 
violated. Treaty contracts are made by governments, and governments are or­
dinarily not responsible for the dumping practised by their c itizens."^
When an AD petition simply lists countries, many small firms get caught in the net
of the investigation. There simply is not enough time to make a full investigation of all
the firms. So the investigation concentrates on certin targets and the smaller firms are not.
Instead of enagaging in a full investigation, Commerce assesses these smaller firms at the
"all other rate”. GaryHorlick offers this telling example of the injury determinations likely
to result from this procedure. Commerce finds 60% of the dumped exports were sold at
20% less than fair value (home market price) and, therefore, Commerce issues a finding
that the dumping margin is 11.1%. The ITC assumes that all the imports were sold at 11.1%
LTFV.
’Thus, it is perfectly possible for Commerce to find one large company (with 50% 
of the imports) dumping by 20%, three small companies (with a total of 10% of the 
imports) dumping by 5%, and not investigate 40% of the total imports (which 
could be hundreds of companies, not sampled scientifically). The Department in 
its order setting estimated deposit rates would apply a weighted average margin 
of 17.5% to those 40% other imports (which had not been investigated), and the 
ITC will assume that they were dumped, when in fact no investigation of those 
40% of imports has ever been conducted, and there is every possibility that they 
would be found not to be dumping during the actual duty assessment process a 
year and a half later (if the small exporting companies can work their way through 
that process). ^
Thus, not only is it easier to make a positive finding of injury if the ITC ignores 
the fact that the imports were proved dumped for only six months, it is also possible to 
count non-dumped imports, even ones which have never been investigated, as dumped and 
injurious. And, if we recall the earlier discussion of underselling versus dumping, it 
becomes even more apparent that it is likely that injury will be established under the 
current administrative interpretations.
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CAUSALITY
Having explored the ways in which the terms "dumping", "injury", "like product" 
and "domestic industry" have been attenuated, let us now examine the causal link the law 
requires between the injury and the dumping. Remember, that there are three central 
operative notions behind the law: (1) the amount of injury required, (2) the definition of 
domestic industry, (3) the causal relationship between the injury and the dumping.
According to GATT and United States antidumping law, injury must be incurred 
"bv reason of" (emphasis added) dumped imports. If no causal link can be established 
between the injury and the dumping then injury resulting from fair imports, or from 
other causes, may be used to condemn the exporters. Such a result would be economically 
senseless. To condemn foreign actors for injury they did not cause is also politically 
problematic. Why should foreigners change their "fair" behaviour under such 
circumstances?
Rodney Greytells us that there are two concepts of injury: overall and separable. 
The significance of these concepts here is that they define the breadth of the causal link 
between injury and dumping. Injury in a separable sense means injury caused by a 
specific event, resulting in a specific injury. The fact that the industry is suffering from 
cyclical downturn in the economy at the time of the dumping is separable from the actual 
injury incurred by the dumping alone. The United States applies injury in an overall 
sense. That is, injury is caused by an event or an accumulation of factors which result in 
an overall lack of health or well-being of the industry. Under United States law the
■ J C O
Commission is prohibited from "weighing" the importance of differing causes.100 
Investigations merely attempt to determine whether dumping was one of the causes of 
injury. As in the case of injury language, the causality language sets out minimum 
thresholds. This causality threshold, like the others we have seen, has been lowered by 
administrative interpretation and statutory change. The United States does not apply the
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separable conception because it would make it more difficult for those industries which 
happened to be suffering from other causes, such as general economic downturn, and 
therefore are easier targets for dumping, to receive relief from dumping. Though it may 
seem counterintuitive, Grey demonstrates that the overall conception does not necessarily 
make it easier to find injury.^®*
Traditionally, the antidumping law has borrowed heavily from the causality 
language used in Section 201 of United States trade law (the escape clause which allows 
action against fairly-priced but injurious imports). The "escape clause" statute, Section 
201, sets the terms on which fairly-priced imports can be legitimately excluded from the 
domestic market. In 1955 the escape clause established the causal link with the language 
"contributed substantially towards causing"J®® The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 
changed this escape clause language to "major c a u se " .^  This was in practice, but 
never expressly, interpreted by the Commission to be "a cause greater than all other causes 
com bined ."^  This was soon found to be an onerous standard. After 1962 the 
causation language requires that injury be caused "in major part" by trade agreement 
concessions (remember, this is the language of the escape clause) and must be "a major 
factor" in causing injury. After 1962 major factor came to mean that dumped imports had 
to be a cause of injury more than the aggregate of all other factors causing injury. No 
cases qualified for this high standard.
Negotiators of the 1968 Antidumping Code attempted to prevent further 
diminution of the causality language. The Code required that dumped imports be 
"demonstratably the principal cause" in order to curb the overall (as opposed to separable) 
injury interpretation employed by the United States.1®® Senator Long, speaking on 
behalf of the Senate Finance Committee, explained that dumped imports under the Code 
"must be a cause of material injury, and such injury is greater than the injury traceable 
to all other causal factors".1®® This support for well-defined causality was soon 
overtaken.
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By 1970 a "cause” is interpreted to be a "major factor."^®® The 1974 Trade Act
changed the language to "substantial cause".1®^  This was defined as "a cause which is
important and not less than any o th e r" .^  This language implies that the dumping as
a cause must be both.
In 1971 the Commission became willing to minimize the importance of a causal
link in order to ensure a positive finding of injury. In Pig Iron from Canada. Finland and
West Germany.^®®it was reasoned,
"it is not necessary to show that imports were the sole cause nor even the major 
cause of injury as long as the facts show thatLTFV imports were more than a de 
minimis factor contributing to the injury." ®^
In that same year, in Elemental Sulphur from Mexico.^ ®® it was declared that 
dumped imports need not be a cause "sole, major, or greater than any other -- identifiable 
cause was sufficient". 'The relationship between LTFV and injury must be merely "iden­
tifiable."^®® This "identifiable" reasoning was confirmed in the 1975 case Electric Golf 
Carts from Poland.^®^
In 1979 Senator Heinz provided some encouragement to the Commission in the 
direction of a weaker causal link. Speaking in favour of the 1979 Trade Act he said,
"subsidized imports need not be a principal cause, a major cause or a substantial 
cause of injury to an industry when other factors may also be contributing to 
industry to an industry."^®®
However, the Commission ignored this offering in the 1980 case Certain Motor 
169Vehicles. The industry had suffered in the Commission's view not from dumped
imports but rather from a general cyclical downturn which affected the whole economy.
It ruled that the downturn was the cause of the injury and not dumped imports. The ITC
came under heavy criticism and in 1982 it adopted the broader notion of causality which
Senator Heinz had provided. It did so in Harley Davidson^® and Specialty Steel^
in 1982. In the Harlev Davidson case the Commission spelled out this new reasoning:
"There is no basis in concluding that the current recession is the principal cause 
of injury. Industry under import assault or threatened by such an assault should 
not be denied relief simply because the assault happens to coincide with an 
economic slowdown."’ ^
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CUMULATION
The causality concept has been further attenuated by changes in the ways in which
causal factors are measured and grouped together. Injury must occur, as we have said, "by
reason o f " ^  dumping. But, Horlick explains, "being injured in many nibbles at once
is just as bad as being injured in one large bite"J7^ On this reasoning, the Commission
has increasingly cumulated the effects of dumping.
Evidently, dumped imports from many firms in one country, Portugal, were
cumulated for the first time in Portland Grev Cement from Portugal.^7** By 1968,
imports coming from diverse firms in different countries were cumulated together for the
first time. The Commission measured injury in Pig Iron From East Germany.
Czechoslovakia. Romania and the USSR^ .  by cumulating the injurious effect from
each country. There was no suspicion of collusive activity among these producers.
Cumulation was merely a convenient method of surpassing the minimum injury threshold.
17ftIn the 1971 case Ferrite Cores from Japan 1 , we will remember, it was held that
anything greater than de minimis injury is sufficient to make a positive finding of injury.
In order to reach the de minimis level in this case it was necessary to employ the following
relaxation of the causal linkage.
"If injury is attributable in part to the LTFV sales... and such injury is more than 
de minimis, we must make an affirmative determination. 179 "The relative 
importance of such injury to injuries caused by other factors is irrelevant"
Traditionally the Commission had discretion to cumulate. The 1984 Trade Act
made cumulation of "like" and "competing" products m andato ry .^
Cumulation has since been stretched even further. The 1988 Trade and
Competitiveness Act allowed the Commission the discretion to cumulate when there is
only the threat of injury. In 1986 the Court of International Trade held that the 1984 Act
1QOmade cumulation mandatory. Astoundingly, it was held in Bingham Tavlor v US °
-too
that the 1984 Act requires cumulation between like dumped and subsidized goods.
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The ITC also made cumulation of dumped and subsidized imports mandatory. This is 
called cross cumulation. Evidence of collusive behaviour between governments and firms 
is not required for cross cumulation even though the cumulation of dumped and subsidized 
imports implies collusion.
The 1988 Act also makes another kind of cumulation mandatory. Under the new 
law the injury caused by imports which have been found to be dumped in the past and 
"which resulted in a final order, suspension agreement, or termination based on a 
quantitative restraint ag reem ent"^  in the previous year can be cumulated with the 
injury caused by the same imports in a new investigation. In other words injury from 
previous "offenses" is added to the injury from the alleged dumping under 
exam ination .^
CONCLUSION
Now it should be clear that it is impossible to understand the AD statute without 
acknowledging that the operative terms are imbued with various meanings at various 
times. And, at any given time, the operative terms are defined so as to improve the 
possibility of a positive finding against the foreign respondent.
Further, it should be kept constantly in mind that the act of interpreting and 
applying each of the operative terms is an act of economic statecraft. For changing the 
rules of the game changes the environment in which foreigners must do business. What is 
the United States compelling others to do with the AD law? This question can be answered 
only be delving into the detail as has been done here.
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CHAPTER SIX — REMEDIES
Ultimately, an antidumping case must reach a conclusion. If Commerce fails to 
substantiate that dumping actually occurred and/or the ITC fails to determine injury was 
caused by the dumping then the investigation results in a negative finding. When there 
is a negative finding no remedy is applied to the respondent. As explained in the Chapter 
One, most AD investigations result in a negative finding. Most respondents are not found 
to be dumping, in spite of all the efforts to facilitate positive findings.
However, just because an investigation is terminated with a negative finding does 
not mean that the respondent has paid no price. Allegations of dumping and the ensuing 
investigation are highly disruptive to the firms involved. Further, we recall, the 
respondent has had to pay the preliminary dumping duty which was estimated before the 
Commerce commenced with its investigation. That preliminary duty is paid for in cash or 
with bond (not with an I-owe-you as was allowed until 1984). The respondent pays this 
duty in order to ensure that the respondent's allegedly dumped merchandise will not be 
held in the Customs warehouses until the end of the investigation (often investigations 
take at least one year to complete). The respondent has also had to pay the preliminary 
duty under to the terms of AD investigations. We recall that respondents cannot challenge 
the investigation process, or the grounds upon which the investigation itself was launched, 
until after a final determination has been made.
Of course, during the investigation, the accused firm(s) have had to spend 
managerial time and money on the AD case. Further, firms will have had to pay for the 
specialized legal and economic counsel which play such an important role in influencing 
the applied definitions and calculation procedures employed in AD cases.
AD investigations are usually focused only on the major suppliers. As we know, 
small firms are assessed at the "all other rate". In spite of the fact that many, if not all, of 
the small firms will never even be formally investigated, these small firms will be liable
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for the preliminary and, if there is a positive finding, a final duty payment. As a result, 
these small firms are subject to financial penalties just for being named, or for being a 
producer in a country which is named, in an AD petition. The dumping margins for these 
smaller firms may be less than those for the major firms but, the smaller firms will be 
subject to financial uncertainty which is proportionally greater for them than for the 
larger firms.
Similarly the financial penalties, though less than those levied on the major firms 
being investigated, are proportionately more onerous for the smaller firms. In addition, 
few small firms can afford the large fees charged by legal and economic counsel. Thus 
small foreign respondents, have less opportunity to influence AD investigations in 
hearings.
It is worth noting that an AD investigation can reach a positive finding even if the
foreign firms in question never even exported merchandise to the United States. AD
investigations can be directed at the mere "threat of injury".
Having paid the preliminary duty, and then having been cleared by the
investigation, the foreign firm traditionally has been entitled to have it's money back. But,
in twist to the old procedure, the preliminary duties are no longer automatically refunded
or refundable just because the investigation results in a negative determination. Cameron
and Crawford elaborate on this new development:
"Since the Antidumping Act of 1921, the Antidumping Law has provided that
Antidumping duties should be handled on the same basis that Customs duties are, that is
they should be eligible for duty drawback." Duty drawback means the right to get the
money back if the firm is absolved in the investigation. But, they continue, Section 1334
of the 1988 Trade and Competitiveness Act,
"... reverses 60 years of practice and prohibits the refund of antidumping and 
countervailing duties placed on imported merchandise under drawback provisions. 
In passing this amendment, Congress eliminated equal treatment of customs and 
antidumping or countervailing duties, thereby demonstrating that dumping and 
countervailing duties are indeed punitive despite all statements to the contrary."^
Now, a respondent will have had to pay a very large price just for having been
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accused of dumping. Respondents must pay regardless of the fact that the US authorities 
have failed to prove that the foreign firm(s) engaged in dumping.
DUTIES
If an investigation results in a positive finding of dumping and injury then a 
remedy is applied. The typical solution is to apply a duty to the imports. Usually the ITC 
directs Customs to collect a specified amount of duties on the merchandise.
Requiring a foreign firm to pay a duty is, as it was explained in Chapter One, a 
form of economic statecraft. Duties are applied in order to neutralize the effects of the 
dumping. They are designed to dissuade the firm from continuing to dump. The impact 
of duties is not "incidental, unintended and perhaps even unwanted". Duties are designed 
and intended to help the petitioner(s) by hurting the respondent(s).
If the duty is applied to goods which are priced "fairly", that is, the merchandise 
is genuinely competitive (and, by extension, the firm that produced and priced it), then 
the duty acts as a tax on productivity. In such instances, foreigners are compelled - - to 
put it simply - - t o  pay for being more competitive than American firms. In this sense it 
is arguable that the antidumping law actually serves as a flexible tariff.
The duty is supposed to be commensurate with the margin of dumping. A duty 
that is larger than the dumping margin acts as an anticompetitive restraint on trade. 
Similarly, a margin that is generated more by administrative methodology and discretion 
than by firms' genuine pricing policies will result in a duty which is anticompetitive.
Duties, as examples of economic statecraft, imply the exercise of power by one 
actor over another. This use of power is not, to reiterate, in itself a bad thing. To the 
contrary, it is in the interests of the international community that power is used to prevent 
breaches of responsibility and enforce appropriate behaviour. Here lies the central point. 
What has the international community agreed is responsible and appropriate behaviour in 
international commercial affairs? We return again to the concept of competition. The
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legitimacy, that is, the objectives and methods the members of the post-war international 
economic order have agreed upon centre on competition. Duties, then, are legitimate if 
those duties offset genuinely anticompetitive pricing behaviour. But, AD duties are 
illegitimate if they are used to penalize competitive behaviour. The legitimacy of AD 
duties, is dependent on whether the dumping in any particular case is real and genuinely 
anticompetitive or a fabrication arising from administrative methodology and discretion.
There is no sunset clause on antidumping orders (the order imposes the AD duty). 
The exporter must show no sales at LTFV or SBC for two years or no sales in the United 
States at all for three years/* And there must be no likelihood that the dumping will 
resume.^ In effect, as Horlick points out, this puts a price tag on obtaining a revocation 
of an order, even after compliance/*
Duties can be also applied retroactively up to seventy days if there is a "history of
6 Tdumping . A dumping order can be revoked only after there is an official review/
Usually it takes at least 2 years from the date of the antidumping order just to initiate the
revocation process. Then, the order can only be revoked after an administrative "review"
by Commerce. These reviews used to happen annually. But, since 1984, Commerce no
longer engages in reviews unless the petitioner, or, though it is unlikely, the respondent,
Q
actually asks for a review. Once granted, the review procedure assumes "guilt". That is, 
the respondent or petitioner (depending upon who asked for the review) must prove that 
there have been no sales at LTFV (since the dumping order was put in place) which would 
create more than a de minimus (0.5%) dumping margin. If we remember how margins are 
calculated (just one instance of LTFV sales will generate a dumping margin because sales 
at prices above fair value (FMV, the home market price) are ignored, and sales below cost 
in the home market, if not more than 10% of the home sales, are excluded from the 
weighted average that is used to create the home market price) then, this de minimus 
requirement effectively means that the importer must not undersell its American 
competitors for the two years and then prove that it has not. Revocations of AD orders are 
also contingent upon proof that sales at LTFV are not likely to resume.
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Respondents costs can reach $50,000 for each annual review and $100,000 for a
revocation.® It is possible to get an expedited review1® (thus eliminating the need to
wait for one year) but Commerce has not granted any since 1984. The 1988 Trade and
Competitiveness Act restricts the authority to grant an expedited review even further.
Now it is impossible to get a review unless a case is extraordinarily complicated or unless
the final decision by Commerce was postponed.
If a dumping order stays in place the respondent must continue to pay the set duty.
The amount of the duty is supposed to be calibrated regularly to changing prices. But, this
is rarely done due to bureaucratic slowness. So, while new technology and increasing
management efficiency puts downward pressure on market prices the imports remain
subject to the initial (relatively higher) dumping duty.
If the firm tries to eliminate the margin by raising its prices for the future the firm
will now be penalized under the 1988 Trade Act. Crawford and Cameron explain that
Section 733(a)(1) of the 1988 Trade and Competitiveness Act11
" ... now provides Commerce with the authority to examine movements for 
different forms of a product sold in the home market, when the product is subject 
to an antidumping duty in the US. If the movements appear to reduce the dumping 
margin, the sales of the merchandise selected for comparison would be disregarded 
as well. The concern to those familiar with the workings of the antidumping 
statute and the tendencies of the Commerce Department is that the provision is 
ripe for abuse. This provision potentially penalizes companies for doing what the 
law allegedly wants them to do, eliminate dumping margins. This provision can be 
characterized as a "got ya" provision — "got ya" if you do, "got ya" if you do 
not."12
In addition, exchange rate fluctuations, as we have seen, can create or eliminate 
margins. If foreign firms want dumping orders against them to be revoked the foreign 
firms must be vigilant about repricing so no sales can appear to have been made at LTFV. 
No allowance is made in an annual review for exchange rate fluctuations.
When an order is revoked, however, the foreign firm is by no means free from the 
order. Commerce is authorized under Section CFR 353.54(e) to demand that the foreign 
firm promise in a written agreement to accept a reimposition of the AD order 
if there are any sales at LTFV. In other words it is not difficult for Commerce to 
reimpose AD orders even after such orders have been revoked. As such, the respondent
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remains subject to the terms set in the order even after it has been revoked.
Another new penalty imposed on those who are or have been subject to 
antidumping duty orders. According to the terms of Section 1323 of the 1988 Trade and 
Competitiveness Act, foreign firms which are subject to two or more dumping orders (or 
suspension agreements, these will be explained further on) and who have dumping margins 
in excess of 15% within an 8 year period, are considered second offenders. Those firms 
with three or more AD orders against them are multiple offenders. Second and multiple 
offenders automatically have the injury caused by each past instance of dumping now 
cumulated in future AD investigations.
In spite of the broad-reaching penalties duties can provide, duties have one 
fundamental failing. That failing is exactly the reason why duties are supposed to be used 
to offset unfair trade practices in the first place. Duties continue to allow competition to 
occur and market forces to play upon the American market. The duty merely adjusts the 
price difference. By charging a duty the US hopes to raise the foreign firm's costs, and 
thereby (hopefully) the price will be raised to the level that the price would have been in 
the absence of dumping.
To many petitioners, duties can appear ineffective and cause unsavoury results. 
There is no guarantee that the duty will be passed on to the customers. A foreign firm may 
absorb the cost of paying the duty. This is another reason why duties are often 
unsatisfactory to those US firms that feel they are being injured by dumping. Let's say the 
foreign firm raises its price to cover the cost of paying the duty. If consumers are buying 
the imports for quality reasons instead of price considerations alone then the import 
competition will not only remain intense, the foreign firm's profits will swell. Such a result 
only reinforces the market power of the foreign firm(s).
In addition, only the largest firms can usually afford to pay the duties, particularly 
very high duties. Smaller firms cannot pay. As a result, duties can reinforce monopoly 
power among the largest foreign exporters rather than reducing monopoly power. In some
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instances duties only encourage the foreign firms to operate more efficiently so they can 
maintain or increase their market share in spite of the added expense.
There is another reason why duties are not always perceived as the best way to 
resolve the problem - - i f  the problem is perceived to be not the unfairness of the imports 
but the very presence of competitive imports in the market. Even if duties are paid, the 
merchandise in question is still entering the American market. The real or perceived 
injury remains. Domestic industry will continue to generate pressure on politicians to "do 
something" about the imports. Since politicians find dealing with such pressure difficult 
and time consuming, and the bureaucracy is not easily able to handle such pressure, AD 
cases are sometimes resolved through settlements.
It is exactly because duties allow market forces to continue to function that they 
are not the solution of choice in politically-charged situations. The consensus among those 
closely involved with the administration of the AD law can be summed up as: when the 
heat is on we will do what we have to stop the imports. In other words, there are times 
when market forces via import competition are best eliminated. For this reason 
investigations are sometimes terminated or suspended in lieu of duties on the basis of 
settlements such as quotas, voluntary restraint agreements, price assurances, and other 
fundamentally anticompetitive arrangements.
SETTLEMENTS
Increasingly the United States has used large dumping margins as a means of 
forcing foreign firms into settlements. A settlement is a means of concluding an 
antidumping investigation. Technically a settlement is reached after the AD investigation 
has commenced but before the investigation results in a final order. An order is the 
remedy which the US applies to the firms which have been found to be dumping. Duties 
can be made large enough to endanger the foreign firms' access to the US market.
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Threatened with an exorbitant duty, foreign firms are often willing to reach a negotiated 
settlement.
In some instances a foreign firm will reach a "settlement" before an AD petition
is filed. In these instances the settlement is not official, it is for this reason quotation
marks are used around the term. Foreign firms, knowing how capricious an investigation
can be, knowing that the methodology and definitions are tilted against them, will often
respond to the mere threat of an AD petition. According to Horlick, the Press is often used
as a forum for not very subtle signalling by a potential petitioner. The message, or rather,
the threat, received by the potential respondent, often compels the respondent to change
its behaviour in some way. Quite often the foreign firm(s) will raise the price of the
merchandise in question. It is not unheard of for foreign firms to shift the focal point of
their sales in the US from one location to another.
Donald de Keiffer, explains this "settlement" by threat procedure.
"Often cases are brought to the attention of either Commerce or (USTR) and we 
(government officials), by discussing the case with the foreign company or foreign 
producer and the domestic industry, can resolve the problem. Such a negotiated 
settlement is cheaper, more effective, and more pragmatic in both the short and 
long run, than bringing a case. We already have literally scores of cases that have 
been resolved by settlement."^
Once an petition has been presented and standing granted it is now virtually 
automatic that an investigation will commence. When many observers refer to the fact that 
the AD procedure vests little discretion with the law's administrators, they are referring 
to this automaticity in the procedure.
After the investigation commences it is possible for the case, either before, but 
more commonly after, the final determination, to culminate in a settlement. Such 
settlements are extremely rare. But, since they offer concrete examples of instances in 
which foreigners were compelled to engage in anticompetitive behaviour, which otherwise 
they would not, it is worth looking at such settlements. Plus, since we don't know much 
about unnofficial settlements, it is helpful to see what has been done officially. There are 
two mechanisms for settlement. The investigation can be suspended or terminated. 
Suspension is dependent upon the respondent's promise to cease exporting to the United
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States completely or, to raise the export price so that the margin is elim inated.^ A 
suspended AD investigation can recommence at any time if the conditions laid down by 
the US are not met by the respondent.
When the government self-initiates an investigation ^  the government may 
terminate that investigation if termination is "in the public interest”. That is, termination 
is deemed to provide a better result for American industry that continuation of the 
investigation.
Before the Antidumping Code was first negotiated (1967) it was relatively easy for 
a case to be terminated before a final determination even if there was a likelihood that the 
United States authorities would find (or had found) both injury and dumping. Treasury 
could terminate AD investigations if the respondent eliminated the price discrimination 
either by raising the export price or reducing the home market price (such price changes 
are called price assurances), or if the respondent agreed to stop exporting the merchandise 
in question to the United States altogether.10 The Code allows price assurances only 
allowed when the dumping margin is "considered minimal in relation to the total volume 
of sales". ^
Treasury allowed suspensions when a price assurance settlement could be 
negotiated. The respondent would approach Treasury with an offer. "If we do X (raise our 
price) will the investigation be dropped?" The petitioner would be queried. It would reply 
with a request. "No but if you do X and Y we will request that the investigation be 
dropped." Treasury would then terminate or suspend the investigation. In essence a price 
assurance means that the importer's price has been approved if not actually set by the 
United States government in collaboration with American industries (or individual firms). 
The respondent was compelled to adopt that price. So, the government in cooperation with 
private American firms set the price of the imported goods in question.
Terminations and suspensions, however were soon perceived to be more beneficial 
to the foreign respondent(s) than to American industry. The lack of a final dumping order 
seemed to vindicate the respondent. Since 1984 Commerce can terminate a case only if it
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self-initiated the complaint.^® But, if the petitioners withdraw their complaint then 
Commerce can allow termination of the case.
Since 1979, when the authority for substantiating dumping shifted from Treasury 
to Commerce, an investigation can only be suspended if the investigation is "complex", 
meaning the case involves either new issues, or a large number of firms or a large number 
of transactions or a large number of adjustments. Suspensions are prohibited unless they 
are "in the public interest" (which is interpreted by Commerce). They are supposed to be 
more beneficial to United States industry than the completion of the investigation. It must 
also be practical to monitor the imports in question under a suspension agreement. 
Technically, a suspension agreement must preclude any surges in imports (meaning rise 
in the number of imports) for a maximum of six months.
Officially, suspension agreements can take three forms. First, the respondent(s) can 
eliminate the sales at LTFV (or SBC). Second, the respondent(s) can eliminate the 
injurious effects of the imports. Third, the respondent(s) can completely cease exporting 
to the United States. These options are available only if exporters accounting for 
"substantially all" of the imports in question agree to one of these options. All suspensions 
require that the exporters ensure that there will be no price underselling and no price 
suppression. Prices must be raised so that at least 85% of the dumping margin is 
eliminated.
Suspensions are extremely rare. The problems involved in monitoring and 
enforcing suspension agreements are immense. For example, there has never been a 
suspension based on the elimination of the injurious effects of dumping because it is 
virtually impossible to get 85% of all the private suppliers (who are competing with each 
other) to agree on anything let alone to ensure that they will never undercut or suppress 
US prices.
There have been only a few suspension agreements in AD cases.^® All have been 
based on agreements to eliminate the sales at LTFV or SBC. In practice this means that the 
importers must agree never to sell at a price which is below the "fair market value"(FMV).
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FMV is a flexible amount which is determined by Commerce. Three of these suspension
agreements have not worked, as Elaine Frangedakis put it, because the importers
" ... have no way of knowing what the fair market value is at any particular time, 
and thus have no way of ensuring that they are complying with the 
agreement."2^
In two other instances, Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors of 25
21Kilobits and Above from Japan and Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory 
Semiconductors from Japan . however, the threat of massively large duties compelled 
the Japanese semiconductor producers to reach a suspension settlement which has 
subsequently resulted in bilaterally negotiated quota arrangements between the US and 
Japan.
Withdrawals provide broader scope for agreement since there is no requirement 
that an agreement be reached at all.2'* In return for dropping a petition the foreign 
parties agree to settle "out of court" as it were. Most common is an agreement that the 
government of the foreign nation(s) in which the respondents reside will voluntarily agree 
to restrain the amount of imports into the United States and/or some third market or to 
ensure a quota arrangement. Even though AD cases are generally directed at changing the 
behaviour of foreign firms, foreign governments are often pulled into the negotiating 
process, and eventually the enforcement of any subsequent agreement. In this way they 
become the domain at which influence and power are aimed. Withdrawals provide the 
freedom to negotiate on highly political cases. Governments are drawn into the 
proceedings as a way of pressuring the foreign respondents into an agreement.
Four examples of such settlements are the 1982 voluntary restraints on steel exports 
to the United States, the 1983 quota on Polyester Fabric from Japan, and the special 
pricing schemes used for steel in 1982 (namely the Trigger Price Mechanism) and 
semiconductors in 1986.
In the Lightweight Polyester Filament Fabrics from Japan2^ case the Japanese 
government agreed to ensure the amount of exports of certain fabrics to The United States 
by Japanese exporters. It was a market-sharing arrangement based on a quota.
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In return for dropping over forty antidumping and countervailing duty petitions 
against steel producers in many countries, the governments of Germany, France, Japan, 
Korea, Sweden, and others agreed to ensure that steel exports to the United States from 
their countries would not exceed the level specified by the United States. In effect a 
government-enforced quota was established by a voluntary export restraint.
Special pricing schemes were used in two instances. Part of the 1982 steel 
settlement was an agreement that the respondents would be subject to new antidumping 
and countervailing duty petitions if the price of their steel imports exceeded the "trigger 
price". The trigger price was set by United States officials. In the semiconductor 
agreement the United States was able to get the major importers to change the price of 
semiconductors available in the US, in Japan and in third markets as well. Although, the 
US denies that it was able or even attempted to effect a change in the home market price. 
In return Commerce recalculated the alleged dumping margin which subsequently dropped 
by half according to those involved in the negotiation. Unfortunately none of the original 
figures for the initial final amount of the dumping margin have ever been made available 
to the public.
CONCLUSION
Settlements, duties applied to fair trade and excessive duties all inhibit market 
forces. They are all fundamentally anticompetitive. As such, they are illegitimate in the 
sense that they are not in keeping with the internationally agreed upon methods and 
objectives of the post-war international economic order. These objectives are mainly to 
promote competition with trade policies which enhance or at least make use of market 
forces.
Legally, settlements require collusion among unrelated foreign firms, indeed 
suspensions imply conspiracy on the part of American firms and the US Government to 
act in restraint of trade. Arthur George explains that AD investigations do not often
156
culminate in settlements because such settlements are anticompetitive under domestic
American competition law:
"This is partly because the antitrust laws may prohibit the restraints on competition 
that would necessarily result from a settlement arrangement between petitioners 
and respondents. ®
For this reason, he says, there is a need to ensure that conduct governed by 
suspension agreements is "immune from attack under the antitrust laws. °
One of the most fascinating characteristics of antidumping settlements is they 
would constitute a violation of domestic antitrust laws if a case was ever brought against 
them. Trade negotiators who contribute to anticompetitive settlements or anticompetitive 
duties could be legally prosecuted under domestic competition law for acting in restraint 
of trade. For example, settlements based on price assurances (read price-fixing) or on 
agreements to limit the quantity of imports are blatantly in restraint of trade. If committed 
domestically such actions would be punishable by very large fines and prison sentences. 
The major reason why this has never happened is because the Justice Department has 
chosen to ignore such violations. In addition, the Justice Department has actively advised 
trade officials about how they must conduct their negotiations to avoid prosecution under 
antitrust law.
It was at the insistence of the Justice Department that the "foreign compulsion
doctrine" has been adopted in trade negotiations of this kind. According to this doctrine
American trade officials must ensure that it appears that foreigners are engaging in the
97trade-restrictive practice on a purely "voluntary" basis. Agreements to limit the 
amount of imports are called "voluntary restraint arrangements" (VRA's) for this very 
reason. In some instances it has been necessary to provide statutory language offering trade 
officials immunity from prosecution for acting in restraint of trade. As early as the 1974 
Trade Act it was provided that, "no person shall be liable" under "the Federal Trade 
Commission Act or Anti-Trust Acts" for having negotiated a "voluntary limitation on 
exports of steel or steel products to the US."^®
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In other words, the foreign compulsion doctrine saves American officials from 
prosecution for acting in restraint of trade by explicitly requiring that the foreign actor 
be compelled to act in restraint of trade. In the exercise of this economic statecraft the 
United States compels the foreign actor to engage in the anticompetitive activity.
It is ironic that the AD procedure allows petitions to be filed against many 
unrelated firms in one country or in many countries -- which implies that those firms are 
colluding to dump, a highly unlikely scenario -- while the settlement procedure (either 
officially, or, if before the petition is filed, unofficially) requires that those same foreign 
firms collude on prices or sales volume in order to escape greater penalties under the 
American AD law.
Some have argued that settlements provide a "safe harbour" for respondents who 
are behaving competitively, legitimately, and yet are found to be transgressing the 
antidumping law.^® But, once caught in the net cast by the AD law, a foreign firm 
gains little solitude from the fact that a settlement appears to be a penalty less severe than 
the alternative. In the end all settlements are anticompetitive. All settlements require the 
foreign actor to change its behaviour when the United States has said that it has engaged 
in unfair trade practices.
Settlements are also outside the GATTrules. This is why they are called "grey area" 
measures. By compelling foreigners to undertake anti-competitive actions in the form of 
agreements which fall outside the purview of the internationally agreed upon rules the 
United States undermines not only the market principles it espouses but also the legal 
structures which support the post-war international economic order.
The problem is not simply that settlement agreements are generally bilateral. It 
is legitimate for the United States to use its power on a bilateral basis to compel foreigners 
to abide by the rules and act competitively. It is, however, illegitimate for the United 
States to use its power on a bilateral basis to compel foreigners to act against the 
internationally agreed upon rules and in restraint of trade.
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Finally, when examining what the United States is compelling others to do, we 
must keep in mind that the "remedy" reinforces all of the messages which are implicit in 
the investigation. The pressures on foreign firms to make profitability in the short run 
their central goal (as opposed to growth or increased market share), or never to undersell 
US prices, are reinforced by the final remedy whether that remedy takes the form of 
duties or settlements. Antidumping policy thus becomes a means by which the United 
States compels foreign firms to modify their behaviour and even the agenda of options 
from which those firms can choose. In other words, the antidumping law is a mechanism 
which allows the United States to cross the boundary of foreign autonomy and exert power 
and influence over autonomy. It seems that this use of power is aimed at breaking down 
competition, breaking down rules and breaking down autonomy.
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SECTION THREE
CHAPTER SEVEN — COUNTERVAILINGDUTY LAW: ECONOMIC STATECRAFT
The countervailing duty law (CVD) is best understood as an instrument of economic 
statecraft. With this economic policy tool, the United States compels foreign governments 
to cease pursuing those economic policies which, according to the United States, subsidize 
the manufacture or exportation of domestically produced goods. To countervail a foreign 
government's domestic policy is to penalize a government for having a subsidy policy, to 
prevent that government from pursuing that policy. CVD law is, therefore, an instrument 
with which the United States exercises power over sovereign acts of foreign governments.
Government subsidization of domestic industry has become an increasingly 
contentious issue among the Contracting Parties to the GATT, particularly among the 
industrialized signatories. That such controversies should arise among nations which can 
be generally described as having market economies may seem odd. But, the substantial 
differences of perception between these countries about the appropriate role of 
government in a modern market economy has given rise to questions that country, in fact, 
each government, answers differently. What is a subsidy? When is it legitimate to employ 
subsidies? When is it legitimate to countervail subsidies?
In the absence of any agreement on these questions, and ignoring (or perhaps 
ignorant of) the profound philosophical and political differences of opinion that prevent 
agreement, the United States has unilaterally and aggressively applied its CVD law, 
particularly since the late 1960's, in an attempt to stop foreign governments from 
subsidizing domestic industries.
Subsidies are some of the more obvious and controversial forms of government 
"intervention” in economic affairs. The so-called distortions caused by subsidies have 
become more apparent and pressing as tariff barriers have been progressively reduced (the 
falling-water level theory). Governments appear to have found that national comparative 
advantage can be enhanced by such government interventions and have engaged
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increasingly in subsidy practices (the rising-reef theory).^ In response, the United States 
has stepped up its attacks on foreign subsidy programs. The CVD law has been the 
primary instrument employed in this cause.
United States trade rhetoric claims that government "interventions" such as 
subsidies are "unfair" because they allow a foreign industry or firm to reduce costs, and 
perhaps prices as well, and thereby gain a larger market share either in the export market, 
or at home through import-substitution. The United States emphasises that the elimination 
of subsidies serves the interests of the international trade system as a whole, as well as 
American domestic interests. By preventing governments from creating or maintaining 
such distortions to competition, the United States acts to uphold the post-war international 
economic order. This order, as we have seen, is based on the premise that competition 
should determine the international pattern of trade. The conventional wisdom holds that 
by reducing foreign government "intervention" in economic affairs the United States helps 
the international economy to function more efficiently.
On the strength of this conviction, American policy-makers have substantially 
modified the countervailing duty law through statutory emendation and pragmatic 
administration. However, this process of change has subverted the statute. The American 
CVD law has evolved into a measure which is inherently anti-competitive both in 
principle and in practice. It probably generates greater "distortions" than the distortions 
the law was created to eliminate.
As a result of this process of change, a divergence developed between United 
States rhetoric of ensuring "free(r) and fair(er) trade" by the reduction of foreign 
government "intervention", United States countervailing duty policy which is, in reality, 
aimed at reducing the play of market forces and limiting the role of competition. It is now 
apparent that this divergence between rhetoric and policy has emerged as a profound 
contradiction between the supposed and the actual objectives of CVD policy.
This contradiction poses serious political problems in the realm of international 
relations. The most troubling aspect of this contradiction is not simply that the CVD law
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has been "captured by protectionist forces'1 , which some economists have put forward 
as the main issue.'* Rather, the real issue is that CVD law is an instrument of power, a 
technique of economic statecraft, which the United States uses to compel foreign 
sovereigns to change their behaviour, to change their economic policies, to change their 
economic ideology. The contradiction between the CVD law'ssupposed aims and the actual 
aims makes it necessary to ask: is this economic statecraft being used by the United States 
to uphold or to undermine the principle of competition?
A second problem posed by United States CVD policy arises with regard to the 
rules of the international economic order. Rules, as Hedley Bull demonstrated, help to 
sustain order. They define what kind of conduct is consistent with that order. One of the 
most striking aspects of the international rules on the use of subsidies is that the few rules 
that exist are highly circumscribed. Essentially the rules on subsidies aim not to eliminate 
the use of subsidies, nor even necessarily to reduce them, but rather to provide a means 
of regulating the use of those subsidies that distort trade patterns and injure 
competition.^ However, while what is internationally agreed-upon under the GATTand 
the Subsidies Code is often vague and ambiguous and therefore subject to controversy; 
what is not agreed-upon is definitely not agreed-upon. United States CVD policy, as we 
shall see, is aimed, for the most part, at the practices and issues on which there is no 
internationally agreed upon rule, nor even any agreed definitions. In short, this technique 
of statecraft is used to establish unilaterally, according to the judgement of the United 
States, what a legitimate trade practice is (subsidy practice) and what is not.
A third political problem also arises. In practice the CVD law is an instrument 
which works by infringing upon on foreign governments’ sovereignty and autonomy. 
Sovereignty, Richard Cooper explains, represents foreign governments' formal ability "to 
make their own decisions - - and to renounce decisions formerly made".® Autonomy, in 
contrast, describes "the ability to frame and carry out objectives of domestic policy which
e
may diverge widely from those of other countries."0 With the CVD law, the United States 
limits the range of options available to a foreign government when that government makes
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domestic policy choices. The very existence of a CVD law encourages foreign governments 
to capitulate to its terms if governments wish to avoid transgressing it.
We need to ask whether the methods and objectives of United States CVD policy 
are consistent with the legitimacy established under the post-war international economic 
order. Legitimacy in that context, we will remember, is defined by international 
agreement about the permissible aims and methods of trade policy/ The central 
permissible aim of trade policy is to enhance the role of market forces and competition 
in the international economy. The primary permissible methods are that trade policies 
should be applied on a most favoured nation basis, and according to the principle of 
national treatment. One of the most important tenets of the post-war economic order is 
that states and their governments have wide freedom to define their own economic best- 
interests and to pursue domestic economic policies which are in accordance with those 
interests.® The sanctity of sovereignty is, then, also an important element of the GATT 
order.
The CVD law serves to induce foreign governments to modify their policies, in 
effect to change the definition of their "best interests". The United States stresses that 
national and international interests on this issue (intervention through subsidies) converge. 
All countries will be best served by reducing the role of government in economic affairs, 
specifically, by eliminating subsidies. However, this convergence of interests is neither 
certain nor necessarily served in practice. The United States' rhetoric emphasizes "market 
ideology" and "market standards". Yet, if we strip away the rhetoric we shall see that it 
obscures from view many policy actions that are in complete opposition to that rhetoric. 
It is easy but dangerous to confuse rhetoric and reality, especially because rhetoric is 
always tailored for political presentation.
To get at the substance of CVD policy, it is necessary to examine the CVD law in 
detail. It is necessary to examine how CVD policy is used to compel foreign governments 
to change their behaviour, to ask, on what grounds a change is demanded and to 
determine, to what end power is exercised?
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In this chapter the central thesis is explored with regard to the CVD law. Rhetoric 
and policy have not only diverged, rhetoric and policy contradict each other. By 
strengthening the CVD law, the United States has increasingly undermined -- not 
enhanced -- market principles, competition and, as a result, the post-war international 
economic order.
WHAT IS A SUBSIDY?
There has never been any international consensus about what constitutes a subsidy. 
Governments have fundamentally disagreed with one another over definitions, according 
to their respective notions of the proper role of government in economic affairs. Due to 
this lack of consensus the numerous international negotiations that have tried to define and 
negotiate subsidies have typically, as two frustrated American trade negotiators put it, got
Q
"nowhere" "slowly". The lack of consensus is caused primarily because many 
governments believe that most subsidies are "strictly a question of national or internal 
policy."1^
For the most part there is agreement that those subsidies that have "trade effects" 
should be regulated. When do subsidies have "trade effects"? Subsidies that governments 
use specifically to improve export performance obviously will have trade effects on export 
markets. For this reason it has been agreed that export subsidies on primary and non- 
primary products should be regulated and reduced if not eliminated. Indeed, under the 
GATT, export subsidies on manufactured goods are prohibited. There are some entire 
sectors of commerce which are not subject to the GATT rules such as textiles and much 
of agriculture. A seperate set of rules has been developed to address these sectors. But, 
governments provide many subsidies domestically for domestic reasons. It is often 
difficult, if not impossible, to discern whether such subsidies have trade effects. It is even 
more difficult to get those engaging in domestic subsidy programs to admit to trade 
effects. In the end, all governments that pursue subsidy programs, whether the subsidies
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are domestic or export, do so for "domestic reasons". No agreement on the definition of 
a subsidy has been reached because a definition would constrain governments from using 
subsidies to achieve their domestic objectives.
Neither the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs Trade nor the Subsidies Code explicitly 
define the term subsidy. Instead, the GATT rules allow contracting parties to use 
nationally legislated CVD law as a means of resolving subsidy problems that arise between 
nations. In practice it has been left to national discretion to define what constitutes a 
subsidy and to determine when subsidies are actionable.
Oddly, in spite of this lack of a common definition for the term subsidy, it has 
been widely accepted for some time that subsidies can be divided into two categories: 
export subsidies and domestic subsidies. For the purpose of opening our examination of 
subsidies, we can very broadly define an export subsidy as a payment or an aid which is 
given by government to a domestic industry or firm, and is itself contingent upon the 
exportation of merchandise. A domestic subsidy, in contrast, is most broadly conceived 
of as any aid or benefit, such as payments or exemptions from regulatory schemes, 
bestowed by government on domestic industry or firm. However, broad definitions of 
subsidies, as we shall see, are impractical.
International efforts have concentrated on regulating the use of export subsidies.
It is not possible to relate the entire history of these international attempts here. Basically,
the GATT rules require that signatories relinquish the use of export subsidies^ on both
12primary and non-primary products.
In contrast, domestic subsidies are not only unregulated, they are expressly 
authorized as long as they are paid exclusively to domestic producers and do not aim to
1<j
affect the pattern of international trade. °  Countries whose subsidies do create trade 
effects on the economies of other contracting parties are required to notify the GATTif 
those subsidies result in increased exports (whether by accident or design). According to 
the GATT, Contracting Parties should be willing to negotiate about the limitations of 
subsidies that produce trade effects. As one would imagine, there is little incentive for a
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government to admit that its subsidy policy has trade effects on other national economies. 
Given the difficulty of establishing the link between the cause and the effect in 
international trade, ^  there are few instances when governments have been willing to 
admit the effects of their policies, let alone change the policy.
National governments are free under the international agreements to countervail 
any sort of subsidy they like, whether such subsidies are strictly in violation of the GATT 
or not. There has been greater international consensus and agreement about regulating the 
procedures by which national governments countervail than about what they countervail.
In lieu of definitions, governments have instead developed lists of those specific 
subsidy practices which are considered objectionable. For example, the Subsidies Code, 
to which not all the Contracting Parties are a signatory, includes the Illustrative list of 
Export Subsidies that simply describes certain objectionable subsidy practices.^ Often, 
though, the listed practices are considered more objectionable by some governments than 
others.
It has been left to individual governments (at the insistence of individual 
governments) to define what constitutes a subsidy, to set the terms on which a subsidy 
becomes actionable under their laws, and also to choose the method used for determining 
the size of both the subsidy and its commensurate countervailing duty.
However, even national governments have been unable to define subsidies in any 
easily apparent or fixed manner. In United States trade law there is now no express 
statutory definition of a subsidy, nor has there ever been. Rather, the applicable definition 
has been established by administrative interpretation. The target at which the statute is 
actually aimed remains vague and ambiguous.
There are too many different kinds of trade practices that can and have been 
labelled "subsidies" to discuss all of them fully in this study. Instead, we will engage in 
a rough overview of the methods the United States has used to define subsidies. The 
implications of CVD law and policy in international affairs will become evident from this 
overview.
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE STATUTE
Before examining how subsidies have been defined in practice it is necessary to
briefly review the statute's history. This will clarify why there is no fixed definition of
a subsidy in United States trade law. Also, it will reveal the intended and perceived
purpose of the law. It will also demonstrate how the law has evolved as a technique of
statecraft. Finally this review will outline the process of transmutation by which the law
has been modified and thereby subverted.
Lack of inter-governmental consensus in the late 19th century about how, or even
whether, to regulate foreign governments'subsidies on sugar exports prompted the United
States to create a countervailing duty law in 1890. If the United States could not
diplomatically compel foreign governments to stop giving cash bounties and grants to their
domestic sugar producers upon exportation the United States could at least countervail
against such subsidies.
Like the antidumping law the CVD law draws from two competing traditions. It
is a confusing mishmash of concepts and aims drawn from competition policy and from
tariff policy. Peter Buck Feller points out that subsidies, at the time the first law was
passed, were viewed chiefly
"as a means of negating the effect of the US tariff wall. The countervailing duty 
law, therefore, was intended to function as a repair mechanism to insure the 
integrity of that wall in the face of threatened breaches." 'They [subsidies] were 
not considered evil in the antitrust sense". "In brief the thrust of the countervailing 
duty law was at the outset to protect domestic interests, rather than to protect 
competition as such."^
However, this tariff policy interpretation has been wholly superseded by a 
competition policy interpretation. After the Sherman Act was passed (the first anti- 
monoploy, competition law) it was recognized that foreign trade practices could have anti­
competitive effects on the domestic commercial environment. A subsidy can allow the 
export price to be lower than the domestic price. The early law, according to this, now 
predominant view, envisaged subsidies as a form of price discrimination. The effects of 
price discrimination were well accepted to be anticompetitive. °  Subsidies were
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actionable under the law solely because they resulted in anti-competitive price 
discrimination. Prices lowered by such "artificial” means (government payments) allow 
exports to "unfairly" gain a greater share of the export market at the expense of 
unsubsidized domestic merchandise.
It is now the accepted wisdom (though this interpretation is reliant on revisionist 
history) that the CVD law was created to serve - - and that it now ought to serve - - as a 
competition policy measure.^® The purpose of the CVD law is to protect competition 
(not competitors), rather than to restrict competition/^
The CVD law could not function exactly like the Sherman Act. As a criminal 
statute, the Sherman Act targeted the predatory intent of commercial actors. However, the 
United States judiciary has consistently refused to allow any questions involving foreign 
governments' sovereign acts of states to be redressed from the United States court system. 
According to the Act of State Doctrine the United States courts do not have the legal 
jurisdiction to challenge foreign acts of state. 1 The United States is not legally able 
to subject foreign governments to criminal proceedings for having violated American 
domestic competition law. The judiciary has thus from the earliest days tacitly recognized 
that the CVD law is an instrument of statecraft since the United States aims to challenge 
foreign acts of state with the law. For this reason, the original CVD law was structured 
as an administrative, not a criminal, procedure. Instead of attacking the policy itself, the 
foreign act of state, or attacking the government's intent in pursuing the policy, the 
administrative procedure allowed the United States to "countervail" or offset the effects 
caused by the subsidy.
It might be said that the practice of offsetting the effects of subsidies should not 
be conceived of as statecraft. However, as was argued in the case of antidumping policy, 
offsetting or countervailing effects of foreign governments' trade practices allows United 
States authorities to exercise power over those foreign governments. The application of a 
countervailing duty neutralizes the advantage the foreign government had hoped to 
achieve for its exporters. As a result, the duty dissuades the foreign government from
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continuing with the subsidy. Dissuasion and persuasion are employed to modify a foreign
government's policies. Adams and Dirlam confirm this view by pointing out that an
antidumping duty (the comment is also valid for a countervailing duty) is a duty "...of a
very curious sort. It is applied specifically rather than generally."
"Thus while the duty resembles a tariff in form, on a functional level it more 
closely resembles a sanction intended to punish or deter a particular undesirable 
act, such as a violation of an antitrust law.
Frankly, even if no duty is applied the investigation procedure subjects foreign 
governments to the scrutiny and judgement, and therefore pressure and power, of another 
state. Whether the foreign government likes it or not, once it has been petitioned as a 
respondent in a CVD case, it is completely subject to the United States' definition of what 
constitutes a subsidy. Therefore, governments tailor their trade practices - - that is, change 
their behaviour - - t o  avoid transgressing United States CVD law. In this sense the 
law provides a means of exercising power over foreign governments; the United States sets 
the terms of what is acceptable behaviour in the international commercial environment.
It should be noted that the original CVD law contained a provision for targeting 
private subsidies (subsidies provided by non-government sources) which has remained in 
the statute. However, it seems that this language was included only to make the law as 
comprehensive as possible. Private subsides generally come under the antidumping law. 
No case has ever been brought against private subsidies. The law's central focus is foreign 
governments policy.
The first and second CVD laws, of 1890 and 1894, were applicable only to certain 
types of sugar im ports/^ Both allowed United States authorities to apply a relatively 
small fixed surtax to specific sugar imports which had been subsidized upon exportation. 
But, by 1897 a consensus had formed that it would be useful to make the procedure 
applicable to all merchandise that benefitted from foreign subsidies. In 1897 coverage was 
broadened to include all dutiable merchandise. The breadth of coverage was not extended 
again until the 1974 Trade Act which designates all imports, whether dutiable or not, as 
countervailable.
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It was the 1930 Trade Act, which is still the basic CVD law, that codified the 
current CVD administrative procedure (in Section 303). In this statute the fixed import 
surcharge was abandoned. It is at this point that the "tariff wall" interpretation was 
superseded by the "competition policy" interpretation. A flexible, discretionary approach 
was adopted. By virtue of its existing control over the Customs Bureau, where all imported 
merchandise was identified and could be controlled, the Treasury Department was given 
the authority to determine whether a foreign subsidy existed and, if so, to judge how large 
it was and to apply a commensurate remedy. This procedure is codified in Section 303 of 
the Trade Act of 1930:
"[T]hen there shall be imposed on such merchandise a countervailing du ty .... equal
to the amount of the net subsidy."
The countervail procedure allows American authorities to tax subsidized imports 
so that the price or cost of the imported merchandise is raised to the level it would have 
been, had no subsidy been available. This remedy thus allows the imports to enter the 
United States on equal terms with domestically produced goods.
However, the administration of the law has from the beginning begged the central 
question; what is a subsidy? Since the law specified neither a definition, nor the criteria 
which should be used to determine whether a subsidy exists, the administrative authorities 
have had wide freedom to use their discretion. "Nowhere in our foreign trade regulation," 
Frederich Davis wrote in 1966, "is the amplitude of administrative discretion wider than
o c
in the countervailing duty arena. °  He characterised the CVD law as a "sleeping giant," 
"[o]wing to the absence of really effective legal controls governing its availability."^® 
The law provides the authority to act but does not explicitly specify the grounds on which 
action should be taken.
Even if the law is used only to offset the effects of a foreign government's subsidy 
programs the CVD law is made a powerful instrument by this lack of specificity with 
regard to grounds. Administering authorities can aim at a wide variety of practices, 
unilaterally claiming that the practice in question constitutes a subsidy. A duty can then 
be applied to the imports in question and a foreign government can be, thereby, dissuaded
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from continuing to engage in the practice in question.
But, the lack of legal jurisdiction to change a foreign government's behaviour is 
often perceived as a mere legal technicality. For many jurisdictional problems have never 
been a wholly satisfactory reason not to use the law more aggressively. There have long 
been two competing interpretations of the statute arising respectively from the "tariff wall" 
and the "antitrust" background in the law.
According to the antitrust interpretation, the economic rationale for the 
administrative system dictates that distortions caused by subsidies should only be 
"corrected" or neutralized by countervailing duty taxes. The tax ought to equal exactly the 
net subsidy (as required by the statute). A tax that is larger than the net subsidy would 
only create a new distortion. According to this "antitrust" interpretation, the statute should 
be used solely to counteract or "neutralize" the effects of a foreign subsidy on competition. 
The law does not aim to circumscribe the prerogatives of foreign governments. As in the 
case of antidumping policy, the government's traditional orientation, derived from the 
antitrust reading, is to protect competition from anti-competitive trade practices, not 
competitors.
In contrast, the "tariff wall" interpretation gives rise to a very different conclusion. 
Seen as a protectionist measure, the law appears as a means of securing relief for 
American competitors who are damaged by foreign government's subsidies. Those who 
subscribe to this view have long favoured a competing approach to the "antitrust" 
interpretation. Not only should the law be used to reduce or stop unfair imports from 
entering the United States, the law should be used to deter, challenge and change (read 
eliminate) foreign governments' subsidy programs. A remedy should imply a penalty. 
According to this "relief" approach, the roots of which are embedded in the "tariff wall" 
background, the object should be to just plain stop foreign governments from subsidizing 
industries, to proscribe the actions of foreign governments, to deter foreign governments 
from providing subsidies in the future.
In recent years, as subsidy questions have become more pressing, the United States
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government's orientation has shifted substantially toward the "relief" approach. For
example, the United States Trade Ambassador confirmed in 1988:
'The one essential target of our strategy is to get government out of business: out 
of the business of making steel, selling grain, growing beef, building ships, and 
the hundreds of other ways that governments distort trade." She emphasized that 
the CVD law would be used to "get foreign governments out of business".
When I queried the Ambassador about this shift in the aim of policy she appeared
to be unaware that there was any significant difference between targeting the effects of
28foreign governments' policies and targeting the policies themselves. This shift renders 
the law an more important instrument in United States trade policy. This instrument can 
be dangerous, however, because it suffers from the lack of guidance or controls over its 
aim. At which practices is this powerful instrument aimed?
EXPORT SUBSIDIES
The early statute was directed only at merchandise which was subsidized "upon 
exportation".33 In the simplest case a subsidy would be paid for every unit of 
merchandise as long as the merchandise was exported. The subsidy would allow the seller 
to provide the exported good at a lower price than costs would normally require. The 
result of this subsidy would be to allow the export price to be lower than the domestic 
price. Or, if the "tariff wall" interpretation is applied, the imports would be undervalued 
and therefore subject to a lower import tariff, thus reducing tariff income for the United
States. In such instances the countervailing duty law could offset the subsidy by requiring
. . . 80  that a tax be paid on the subsidized imports.
For example, in 1937 the Italian government passed a Royal Decree officially
proclaiming that cash payments would be given to any domestic silk producers contingent
directly on the export of silk. This program was countervailed by the United States in 
1937.31
However, most subsidies do not take the form of direct payments. Instead,
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governments have been very resourceful in creating a variety of indirect export subsidies 
which are less easily identifiable. Indirect export subsidies occur when funds or benefits 
which aid exportation are made available through some means other than a direct payment 
from government. For example, governments have sometimes created multiple exchange 
rate systems to favour exportation or have manipulated their currency to enhance export 
performance. Or, governments have exempted a domestic firm (or industry) which 
produces mostly for export, from tax(es), even though other domestic have had to pay the 
same tax(es). In other words, as subsidy can exist even if there is no actual budgetary 
expenditure fir it.
The early CVD legislation gave express authority to countervail both direct and 
indirect subsidies precisely because many subsidy programs could be camouflaged through 
the use of indirect means. The majority of CVD cases since 1934, when records were first 
kept, have been brought against these indirect export subsidies.
However, there are two fundamental problems with targeting indirect export 
subsidies. First, in some indirect export subsidy cases the export price and the domestic 
price may be the same. The existence of the subsidy may be ascertained only by looking 
at its impact on the costs of production. For example, in the case of a tax exemption the 
cost of producing the good is not as high as it would have been had the product been sold 
in the domestic market. Second, it is difficult if not impossible to draw a clean distinction 
between indirect subsidies which intend to aid exportation and domestic subsidies which 
do not intend improve export performance, but in fact do. Therefore, a domestic 
production subsidy is often also an indirect export subsidy.
The domestic subsidy problem was envisaged in the early 1920fs. New language for 
the statute was drafted which broadened the statute to cover all indirect export subsidies 
even when such subsidies did not create price discrimination. It would be folly, however, 
to grant that the drafter(s) had the foresight to anticipate the emergence of domestic 
subsidies as a major international trade problem. Domestic subsidies, are now one of the 
single most contentious issues among governments, were not seen as a major issue when
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the law was changed to include them. Even Jacob Viner, whose ideas so deeply influenced 
international thinking on international trade
problems, and continue to do so, clearly did not think domestic subsidies were or would
be problematic. He wrote;
T h e  grant of official bounties on production has rarely, if ever, occurred, and it 
is altogether unlikely that it should ever attain importance as a factor in 
international competition. 2
As with so many crucial changes in the trade remedy laws, this important change 
was made with no discussion or debate. In the 1922 Trade Act the Congress 
profoundly changed the CVD statute by dramatically altering the language. Jacob Viner 
explained.
"But without any emphasis in the various committee reports on the bill while in 
progress and without any mention in the Congressional debates the clause was 
m odified."^
The words "upon exportation" were changed to: "upon the manufacture or 
production or exportation of any article or merchandise manufactured or produced 
in ... such country".
The primary issue would now be the impact of a subsidy on a firm's costs. 
Reductions in a firms costs allowed unfair changes in prices and/or operating margins. 
The effects of these changes in costs would be felt by American competition.
The inclusion of domestic subsidies required that the statute be changed in another 
way. Since the act of providing a subsidy could not be legally challenged by the United 
States, the statute could not continue to use the words "upon exportation". Not all exports 
go to the United States. It was the "effects" of subsidies on United States competition
which was now important. This is why the 1930 Trade Act replaces the words "upon
exportation" with,
"upon the importation of any such article... into the US......there shall be levied and
paid, ... an additional duty equal to the net amount of such bounty or grant"
(emphasis added).
So, ever since the 1930 CVD law was passed, the actionable phenomenon has been 
the trade effects on United States commerce caused by the subsidization of exports.
How does the United States target the effects of foreign subsidy programs?
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Unlike antidumping law, the CVD statute did not require or allow the presence of injury 
(to competition as caused by the unfair trade practice) to be a relevant factor until 1979. 
No linkage needed to be shown between the subsidy and incurred injury. This saved 
officials who administered the statute from the problem faced under antidumping law, 
namely the need to distinguish between the injurious effects of healthy, normal and fair 
competition, and the injurious effects of predatory and unfair competition. As we have 
seen, the AD law's administrators have resolved this problem badly. Under the AD law 
the test is not usually injury to competition but injury to competitors - - a  standard that 
is contrary to the protection of competition from the adverse effects of predatory trade 
practices.
But, how are adverse trade effects found to exist, let alone measured, if injury is 
irrelevant? Under the law a price differential between imports and exports is superfluous. 
There are only two choices. Either a subsidy can be found and then it must be argued that 
the subsidy has trade effects, or trade effects can be found, which prompts an 
investigation to establish that a subsidy exists. But, subsidies exist in many forms and it 
needs to be emphasised again, there is no substantive definition as to what constitutes a 
subsidy.
The law's administrators have never been statutorily required to justify the criteria
that is used to label and condemn a practice as a subsidy. The mere existence of a subsidy,
as defined and determined unilaterally by the United States, is sufficient to activate the
statute and bring pressure to bear on a foreign government. While Treasury administered
the statute its practice was, as Butler notes, "to announce that it believes that a subsidy is
being granted and that it intends to impose countervailing duties unless satisfactory
37evidence is presented to negate its tentative conclusion'.
It was left to the discretion of the Treasury department to determine when a 
subsidy existed, whether export or domestic, direct or indirect. As long as the statute was
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not actively applied it remained a fairly academic question to ask, and a few academics 
did ask, how Treasury defined subsidy and how Treasury determined whether a subsidy 
existed.
But, as this formerly obscure law was taken off the shelf, dusted down, and put
<50
to work in the 1960's, the arbitrary nature of the decision-making process has become
an increasingly important problem. Now that the statute has emerged as one of the
primary trade policy tools employed by the United States Governmentit is crucial to ask:
What is a subsidy? How is it substantiated that a subsidy is real?
It is difficult to tell what criteria Treasury used to define the term subsidy because
CVD orders were accompanied by only a terse explanation, if by any at all. In 1955, a
Congressional investigating committee concluded,
"in the absence of any reports from the Treasury Department as to the basis on 
which its determinations of the existence of subsidization have been made, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to analyze the administration of Section 303 (the CVD 
law)."39
Until 1979, the United States Courts upheld the Treasury Department's authority 
to omit complete explanations. The ambiguity and broad flexibility allowed appears to 
have been perceived by Congress as favourable to American interests. While academic and 
professional observers criticized the lack of controls over the decision-making process at 
Treasury, the very arbitrariness of the process, industry and Congress assumed, worked 
in favour of the domestic petitioner.
After 1968, when the statute was more actively being brought into play, Congress 
appears to have become increasingly frustrated by Treasury's freedom. Only a single 
countervailing duty order was issued by Treasury between 1954 and 1969. Fear grew that 
Treasury's decisions were being driven more by international considerations, Treasury' 
agenda being more driven more by foreign policy concerns than by domestic concerns. In 
1979, Congress transferred the authority to make CVD determinations to the Commerce
Department because the consensus in Congress was that Treasury was not being tough 
enough on foreigners.
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The lack of a fixed definition for the term subsidy is important not only because 
the law has emerged from its former obscurity as an important policy tool. Once subsidies 
began to be seen as an increasingly important trade issue, in the late 1960's and early 
1970's, Congress and various frustrated petitioners wanted to broaden the range of 
actionable subsidies. This was partly because foreign governments were becoming more 
adept in obscuring and camouflaging subsidy programs, it was also partly because the fast- 
growing impact of imports, whether subsidized or not, on the American economy. 
Legislators began to take the breadth of the 1922 language seriously for the first time.
The line between indirect export subsidies and domestic subsidies had always been 
blurry. But, the line of demarcation appeared clearer the farther away Treasury kept from 
it. Now that the United States began to venture toward that line, it became apparent that 
the line was a very murky area indeed. While export subsidies have remained a major 
target of American CVD policy, and all countervail investigations until 1968 were aimed 
at export subsidies^ (almost entirely indirect ones), domestic manufacturing and 
production subsidies have increasingly become the focal point of CVD policy in the 1970's, 
1980'sand will continue to be in the 1990's.The distinction between an export subsidy and 
a domestic subsidy has deteriorated. If an indirect export subsidy or a domestic subsidy 
has an effect on exports to the United States and, therefore, an effect on American 
competition then the subsidy is actionable under the statute.
A STATUTE SUBVERTED
If we look at the CVD law as an instrument of economic statecraft the lack of a 
definition for the term subsidy is a singularly important issue. The modifications made to 
the 1930 statute magnify the law's importance. The statute is codified as an administrative
procedure that targets the "effects" of a subsidy without defining what constitutes either 
a trade effect or a subsidy.
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Though the law is supposed to serve as a competition policy measure, the 
alterations made in the statutory language have subverted it.
As the scope of the statute has been broadened the notion of a "distortion" has 
shifted away from specific phenomena, the trade effects direct export subsidies cause, to 
an undefined range of phenomena: the effects of subsidized imports on the United States 
(export subsidies, indirect export subsidies, domestic subsidies). The distinction between 
an export subsidy and a domestic subsidy remains artificial since there is no statutory 
definition to provide substance. In short, the statute provides the administrators the 
authority to unilaterally judge whether or not any foreign government policy can be 
construed to be a subsidy. And, it allows those authorities to take action against subsidies. 
But nowhere is it made clear what a subsidy is.
There can be little doubt that the United States uses CVD policies to exercise 
power over the sovereign acts of foreign governments. The private American firms and 
industries which invoke the law are well aware of this. For example, in a guide to CVD 
law Donald E. deKieffer, well-informed from his experience at the United States Trade 
Representative, made the point unequivocally.
"Countervailing duty actions provide an administrative.... mechanism to attack the
domestic economic policies of foreign governments ...
In applying CVD, law the United States challenges the validity, the legitimacy of 
foreign acts of state ( the term "legitimacy" is used here in a more general sense than we 
have been using it with reference to international economic order in earlier Chapters). The 
American authorities decide when a foreign government's economic policy constitutes a 
subsidy and when it doesn't. The critical point is that the countervailing duty law, as it is 
currently structured, requires American authorities to decide whether a foreign 
government's subsidy programs are legitimate (it is supposedly the economic legitimacy 
of such programs that is in question). But, American officials are required to undertake
this task using a law that provides no specific criteria or rules by which such judgements 
should be made.
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How can it be determined that a particular foreign government program is 
actionable under the CVD law if there is no definition of a subsidy? The lack of 
substantive and legal constraints or guidelines provides those who invoke the law with 
wide leeway to simply attack foreign economic policies which the United States does not 
"like". This can be justified by arguing that these policies cause "distortions" to trade or 
are an example of "inefficient government intervention". However, a "distortion" to one 
government often appears to be a "correction" to another. "Inefficient" policy to one is 
often undertaken by another to "correct" market failure. Judgement on such controversies 
is a question of perception, ideology and, above all, politics. We shall return to this 
fundamental point in greater detail later.
So, we must ask what is the United States compelling foreign governments to do 
or not to do? On what grounds are foreign economic policies actionable under the CVD 
law? We return to that same question. What is a subsidy? On what grounds is the United 
States compelling foreign governments to change their behaviour? The law is supposed to 
be a competition policy measure, that is, it is supposed to protect competition from anti­
competitive trade practices. But,
what, under the law as it has been structured, is an "anti-competitive" trade practice? 
SUBSIDIES: THE INTERVENTION VERSUS NON-INTERVENTION APPROACH
Although the statute provides no explicit definition of the term subsidy, it does 
contain certain implicit assumptions which guide policy-makers and administrators in 
their interpretation of what constitutes a subsidy. The main guidance provided, as Daniel 
Tarullo points out, is in the law's implicit assumption that "governmental non-interference 
in the market" is both desirable and "normal".^ Goetz, Granet and Schwartz similarly
point to the law's inherent assumption of "public sector neutrality".^ These assumptions 
derive from the law's theoretical basis.
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Sometimes it is said that orthodox neo-classical international trade theory, or free 
trade theory, has become irrelevant, assuming it ever was relevant, to understanding how 
the international trade system actually works. Even though this is may be true in one 
sense, it is surely false in another. While theory has been so abstracted that it often fails 
to portray real problems in the real world very accurately, policy-makers have nonetheless 
created policies and laws which are based on the abstract theory. CVD law is a classic 
example of this. To understand what a subsidy is under the law one must first look to the 
theoretical foundation of the CVD law.
ORTHODOX TRADE THEORY
International trade theory has historically been a relatively neglected offshoot in 
the study of economics. International trade theory has generally been created by 
extrapolating the most idealized conditions possible in microeconomics and narrowing 
their application to special cases. Ricardo, for example, who is considered the founder of 
(liberal) international trade theory, developed the doctrine of comparative costs.^ This 
theory was based on the assumption that under conditions of perfect competition two 
nations, England and Portugal, each of which could produce cloth and wine (respectively) 
with less labour and more cheaply than the other, would be better off by buying the 
desired goods from one another than by attempting to produce them at home. Of course 
conditions of perfect competition exist only in the imagination. It is now acknowledged 
that comparative advantage is a dynamic, not a static, condition.^ Even though 
international trade theory has vastly improved in this century it still tends to explain what 
will happen under special and idealized circumstances.
The concept of subsidies under the CVD law is also based on the highly idealized 
concept of perfect competition. This assumes that there are a large number of buyers and 
sellers in the market, all of whom have perfect information about all the available prices, 
and none of whom can either demand or offer a quantity large enough to affect prices. In
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addition, the pure theory of international trade assumes that there is a tendency towards 
general equilibrium in the market. This is often referred to as "Pareto optimality". 
According to this notion, equilibrium occurs when the value of national exports is just 
equal to the value of national imports. This notion would seem to be subject to serious 
doubts today.
Both of these concepts, perfect competition and Pareto optimality, themselves rest 
on the assumption that governments and markets are separate entities which should be 
kept separate. Orthodox neoclassical economic theory posits that competition which is 
unfettered and undisturbed by government "intervention" or monopoly power will create 
the most "efficient" economic outcome. Extrapolated to international trade, this notion 
is the heart of free trade theory: reliance on genuine comparative advantage will give rise 
to the most productive and efficient economic outcome. Interventions by governments, 
especially interventions which are designed to favour some sector or producer, provide 
artificial advantages which create distortions to the most efficient pattern of trade. This, 
in turn, creates a less than optimal economic outcome.
Subsidies, particularly those which enhance export performance, are considered 
"anti-competitive" within this model of perfect competition for several reasons. Subsidies 
are predatory in that they deliberately attempt to artificially displace the sale of non- 
subsidized goods in the export markets. If the subsidy is made available domestically then 
sales of domestically-produced goods are encouraged at the expense of non-subsidized 
imports (this is called import-substitution). The upshot of this, as far as the theory goes, 
is that the pattern of trade is distorted. Artificially created changes in the pattern of trade 
forces the restructuring of markets. This means changes are effected to the pattern of 
production, the pattern of sales and employment and income. Ultimately these 
"distortions" lead to innefficient alterations in the structure of industry.
The intended purpose of the United States CVD law is to "correct" the distortions 
caused by foreign government's attempts to create artificial advantages for their domestic 
industries through subsidies, thus returning world trade to its state of perfect competition
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and Pareto optimal terms.^® But, orthodox trade theory and non-interventionist ideology 
leave certain issues unresolved. What exactly is a distortion? What exactly is a subsidy?
EFFICIENCY ONLY
By one interpretation the CVD law envisages any benefit conferred by 
governments on domestic industry that either aids exportation or increases import 
substitution in the home market as a subsidy which distorts the normal, desirable, most 
efficient economic pattern. The so-called "efficiency-only” school of thought reckons that 
perfect competition is disrupted by subsidies. The solution is to use the CVD law to offset 
the effects of subsidies through the application of a border tax to the subsidized imports. 
Seen this way the CVD law serves the interests of efficiency by "correcting” the distortions 
caused by foreign government intervention.
The purpose of a subsidy is, as Robert Gilpinhas comments "to create comparative
advantage and internationally competitive industries especially at the "high-value added"
end of the industrial spectrum, and also to promote an export-led growth strategy."^
Much of the modern rhetoric surrounding the use of CVD law emphasises the inefficiency
4ftof foreign government subsidies. Intervention via subsidies is associated with 
mercantilism. It has become popular in recent years to refer to subsidies as a manifestation 
of the so-called New Protectionism, a modern form of mercantilism.
There is another camp in the "efficiency-only" school of thought. Some say that 
CVD law itself causes greater distortions than subsidies. The law has been captured by 
protectionist forces. The CVD law has been abused to the degree that it no longer serves 
efficiency objectives but undermines them. It has become common among this wing of the 
"efficiency-only" school to refer to the recent irresponsible use of the CVD law itself as 
a manifestation of the "New Protectionism". This is not a recently discovered angle. True 
laisser faire economists, such as those of the Austrian School have often claimed that 
competition policy is itself an unnecessary "intervention" since the abuses of market power
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it is supposed to police are not generally that severe. The "free market" solution it is 
believed works even with regard to the abuse of monopoly power.
Both camps in the efficiency-only school agree on one point. The law should be 
used only to serve the cause of efficiency.
For the efficiency-only school a subsidy is any government intervention that 
confers a benefit on the production or purchase or exportation of domestically produced 
goods. A subsidy can take the form of a payment, or a regulatory scheme which confers 
a benefit on domestic industry, or an exemption from a regulatory scheme or taxes, among 
others. Any government aid which benefits domestic industry leads to a less efficient 
outcome is a subsidy. Subsidies are defined by the fact that they are "inefficient".
The official rhetoric used to justify the use of the CVD law tends to emphasise 
that subsidies are bad because they are inefficient. The purpose of the law is to eliminate 
inefficiencies created by subsidies.
INJURY ONLY
There is another, competing, interpretation of the CVD law. This interpretation 
is that it is unrealistic to start by assuming that there is perfect competition. Since the 
early part of this century, certainly with the work of Joan Robinson , many economists 
have accepted that markets are "imperfect". Once the underlying conditions of the market 
are relaxed in this manner then it becomes much more difficult to simply condemn any 
intervention by government. In fact, it becomes obvious that government must play an 
active part in "correcting" the imperfections present in the market. Since the so-called 
first-best solution (that the market can function perfectly all by itself) is unavailable there 
is a need to turn to the second-best solution (governments must help markets to function 
perfectly, or as well as possible). A distinction must be made between interventions which 
correct market failure and interventions which cause or sustain market failure.
CVD law, interpreted in this light, is an instrument to be used to attain or
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approach a situation of perfect competition. It should be used to correct foreign subsidy 
policies which create market failure, distortion, which are anticompetitive. The only trick 
is determining the criteria on which the distinction between policies that correct or cause 
market failure can or should be made.
Subsidies are defined in the same way for the injury-only school as for the 
efficiency-only school. The difference is that the injury only school, drawing from an 
antitrust reading of the statute, promotes the idea that only inefficient subsidies, those 
which cause or sustain market failure, should be actionable under the law. Market failure 
usually manifests itself in the form of injury to competition. Therefore, subsidies are 
actionable when they cause "injury" to competition.
Both schools have several points in common. Both aspire to reduce the role of 
government in economic affairs in order to allow competition to function more perfectly. 
For both the CVD law is a means of achieving this. For both the CVD law should not be 
abused and transformed into a protectionist instrument.
THE FAILURE OF THE EFFICIENCY-ONLY AND INJURY ONLY SCHOOLS
United States CVD law is based on the implicit assumption that perfect 
competition, even if it is not attainable, at least is something for which we ought to strive. 
Economics can be separated from politics. Or, politics should be made to serve economics. 
When governments intervene it should be to foster competition not impede it.
It is nothing new to claim that subsidies are a fundamentally political phenomenon. 
It is the political nature of subsidies which has long made them so objectionable. A foreign 
government's decision to provide special support for a particular industry is political, 
though it may be manifest through economic policy (the granting of a subsidy), since it 
necessarily involves making choices about who will get support/*® Subsidies which aid
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exports are considered pernicious political acts. Subsidies are, as John Jackson points out, 
an,
"obvious attempt to impose burdens on other countries (burdens which are more
political or producer-oriented than they are economic in a broader sense),..."^
Governments provide subsidies, whether for exports or for domestic production, 
for only one reason; it is precisely because they want to alter the economic pattern which 
market forces left alone would create. They want to change the economic outcome. State 
power (via subsidies) is aimed at improving the terms of trade. This is traditionally 
considered the distinguishing characteristic of mercantilism. Therefore, subsidies are 
political acts. They "politicize" economics.
The problem with the intervention versus non-intervention approach is that it 
culminates in the following dead end. Subsidies are a form of the "New Protectionism"; 
and, CVD law, if abused, can be a form of the "New Protectionism". This traditional line 
of analysis -- intervention versus non-intervention -- renders the problem and the 
solution indistinguishable. The apparent end result of the traditional approach is to 
depoliticize economics by simply eliminating government intervention altogether, whether 
the intervention takes the form of either subsidies or trade restrictive CVD policy.
Here we reach the traditional point at which economics and politics are considered 
to be at odds with each other. Given that this theoretical position has been so well 
developed and so widely accepted for at least 300 years, one would think that a definition, 
a good solid economic definition of subsidies ought to have emerged from this purely 
economic "intervention versus non-intervention" approach. But it has not. Why not?
GOVERNMENTS AND MARKETS
Daniel Tarullo has eloquently demonstrated that the implicit assumption that states 
can be separated from markets is counterf actual.^ It is not possible to separate 
interventions by governments from the market system. After all, it is the very existence
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of government which allows the market to function. It is government that guarantees and
protects the property rights and the contract rights without which a market cannot exist.
When government plays this role it "aids" the production and manufacture of goods and
services. Even F.A. von Hayek5^  one of the most virulent defenders of market
principles and competition, concluded;
"In no system that could be rationally defended would the state just do 
nothing".
Under the CVD statute, administering authorities attempt to determine what the
cost of producing a subsidized import would have been in the absence of the subsidy. The
difference between the subsidized cost and the "true" unsubsidized cost equals the amount
of the countervailing duty. This procedure assumes that there is an inherent discernable
true cost which would be apparent but for the intervention by government. But Daniel
Tarullo's argument shows that this is false. He explains;
"Basic choices about the kind of contract system to be adopted affect the costs of 
the activities under analysis ... 1,55
"So there is no coherent concept of costs that is not associated with choices about 
the form of state intervention that will create property and contract rights."56 
(emphasis added).
There is no inherent true cost that would appear in the absence of government
intervention because the market itself could not function (or, at least, not very well)
without government to protect basic property and contract rights. Costs are heavily
influenced by the role of government; how government protects contract and property
rights affects the whole economic environment in which firms must function.
In addition to basic legal structures, states provide infra-structure support, as
recommended by Adam Smith.
"Governmenthas the duty of erecting and maintaining certain publick works and 
certain public institutions which it can never be to the interest of any individual 
to erect and maintain because the profit could never repay the expense to any 
individual or small number of individuals though it may frequently do much more 
than repay a great society."5^
Governments perform those activities which the market does not deem profitable but
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which are in the public interest. States build roads and schools, set up income tax systems 
to redistribute wealth, and create regulatory schemes, among other things. This "aids" the 
production and manufacture of goods and services.
The "cumulative effects" of these roles are so great, Tarullo emphasizes, that we 
cannot reasonably "disentangle these effects from some hypothetical underlying, 
undistorted, market (emphasis added)"^®; especially since no underlying, undistorted 
market, free from government intervention exists. Without government no free 
competitive market exists. Any market that did exist would be an example of competition 
that was far from perfect, since, at a minimum, contract and property rights would be 
uncertain.
There is no good, solid, workable definition of subsidies because it is impossible
to make a clean distinction between the state and the market. If any government aid to
domestic industry is a subsidy then the very existence of a government that provides
market-promoting legal structures, can be construed as subsidy.
It is highly ironic, then, that the United States should be aggressively applying the
countervailing duty statute, and attempting to impose a tough "non-intervention" market
ideology on its major trading partners in the post-war period. For this is exactly the period
in history when there has been near universal agreement among economists, politicians,
and the general public that the pure "free market solution" not only does not work (in
economic terms) but also that it does not meet social needs (in political terms).
"What must be clear," the economic historian Lord Roll tells us, "is that the 
acceptance of responsibility by governments -- elected governments in one or 
other form of democratic system -- for the maintenance of a high level of 
economic activity, for avoidance of major economic fluctuations, perhaps even by 
implication, for some progress towards greater economic equality, is one of the 
major turning-points in modern history. 9
This "staggering change"00 was achieved not only for political reasons. The
majority of contributions to economic theory and thinking in this century, particularly
since the Second World War have confirmed that "the spontaneous tendencies of the
market can now be shown as by no means inevitably leading to an optimal distribution of 
£?1
scarce resources."0 Nor would it inevitably lead to stability, growth, a stable or high
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level of employment, or an optimal or stable cost of money (inflation and interest rates).
Economists have differed, of course, over the appropriateness of various methods 
of achieving these goals. But, the major controversies, for example the one between those 
who favour broad macroeconomic management by means of fiscal expenditure (neo- 
Keysians) versus those who favour macroeconomic management by means of a controlled 
supply of money (monetarists), have been caused by differences of opinion about how and 
not whether to achieve these economic and political goals. Almost no one would argue that 
government should not seek, as Lord Roll explains, "to subserve the broad objectives of 
economic policy as now commonly accepted: full use of resources, growth, stability, 
international balance."0
So, during the post-war period governments have been increasingly actively 
engaged in altering the economic pattern which market forces left alone would create. 
Governmentshave deliberately sought to improve the economic outcome. To condemn in 
total these efforts as "inefficient" or anti-competitive would be ludicrous in the modern 
world.
Even if the political requirements necessary to manage a democratic economy
could be reduced or even eliminated, economic theory still would not be able to resolve
the essential problem. Harry Johnson's explanation makes this clear.
"One implication" (of the efforts made by Meade, Lipsey, Lancaster and others to 
relax the Pareto optimal conditions and develop a theory of second-best options) 
"of that theory is that it is impossible to predict on a priori grounds -- that is, 
without comprehensive information about the tastes and technology of the 
economy -- whether the substitution of one violation of the Pareto optimality 
conditions for another will worsen or improve economic welfare.'
There is no purely economic method of determining whether a particular
intervention enhances or reduces efficiency when efficiency is defined by political
criteria. Macroeconomic management is undertaken mostly to improve the quality of
peoples lives. A policy that "corrects" market failure in the view of one government
"distorts" the market in the view of another. Making distinctions about the "efficiency" of
interventions, or what constitutes an improved economic outcome, really boils down to
political issues. The problem is exactly as Harald Malmgren explains.
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"Perceptions of private and social costs and benefits vary and thus pose a
fundamental analytical problem."^
The reason why no workable definition of a subsidy has emerged from economic 
theory is because the central assumptions of liberal economic theory, that states and 
markets, and politics and economics can be separated, and that perfect competition is 
attainable, are faulty. How, under the "intervention versus non-intervention approach" can 
we make an economically sound distinction between the building of schools and roads, 
national health programs, regional development incentives and the exemption of certain 
exports from domestic taxes? All are "subsidies" in the sense that they provide "aids" to 
industry which, without government would not exist or would not exist on such 
preferential terms.
How does one make a sound economic distinction between those government 
policies which aim to achieve broad macroeconomic goals and those which "subsidize"? 
The answer is that it is not possible. Any solution is made according to political and not 
economic criteria. And this is, in reality, how subsidies are defined under the 
countervailing duty law: according to political criteria and political expediency. Neither
the efficiency-only nor the injury-only schools of thought identifies or addresses this 
point.
Proponents of the injury-only school accept that some interventions correct market 
failure and some create it. Some subsidies correct distortions caused by market failure. 
Some subsidies cause distortions. The trick is deciding which subsidy is which - - a  most 
intractable problem. How does one distinguish between pro-competitive and anti­
competitive subsidies when all subsidies are justified by the government employing them 
as a necessary means of achieving the broad macroeconomic goals required by modern 
democratic society?
The answer, for this school, has been to concentrate on the "injury" to competition 
caused by subsidies.^* Only those inefficient subsidies that cause injury should be 
countervailed. But, as we saw in the antidumping chapter, normal, healthy and fair
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competition cause injury. Again, how does one distinguish between the two? This tack 
brings us no closer to a definition of a subsidy.
THE ANALYTICAL PROBLEMS
The analytical problems inherent in subsidy and countervailing duty issues are, to 
reiterate: (a) how to define a subsidy when a line cannot be unarbitrarily drawn between 
the state and the market, and, (b) how to distinguish between market-correcting and 
market-distorting subsidies, especially when most government interventions are defended 
and justified as a necessary means of achieving the macroeconomic goals necessary to the 
management of a modern industrial democracy. No definition of a subsidy can emerge 
from purely economic analysis because there is no coherent concept of costs that is 
independent from the political role governments play in a national economy. This is 
perhaps the greatest analytical problem of all. We continue to treat subsidies within an 
economic context, when the issues involved in subsidy questions are primarily political.
As long as policy-makers and economists focused mainly on export subsidies the 
analytical problems could mostly be avoided. Everybody could agree that a direct export 
subsidy was relatively easily identifiable and definitely injurious (even though the statute 
required no finding of injury until 1979). An expenditure for it could be found in the 
government budget, or the laws or administrative procedures that were created to 
implement the subsidy could be identified (although this required US authorities 
essentially to interpret foreign law, an undertaking which was not always done easily or 
accurately), or price discrimination could be identified. The old subsidy arguments, 
regarding international trade matters, stopped at export subsidies. Arguments were made 
for and against them in the case of infant industries, situations in which currencies 
were over or under-valued, and income redistribution. Governments and liberal 
economists were able to agree generally that export subsidies should be condemned.
Where there was a need to apply a subsidy to "correct" a market failure in the
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domestic economy for domestic reasons, whether political or economic, it was commonly
accepted that a production subsidy was a lesser evil than an export subsidy. Thus,
governments were encouraged to use production subsidies in lieu of export subsidies. H.G.
Johnson emphasised this point:
T h e  point of central importance is that the correction of domestic distortions 
required a tax or subsidy on either domestic consumption or domestic production 
or domestic factor use, not on international trade."66
However, subsidies are increasingly considered actionable under the statute 
because of their trade effects. Indirect export subsidies and domestic subsidies have 
increasingly been seen to have trade effects. As indirect export and domestic subsidies 
have become the target of United States CVD the fundamental analytical problems have 
emerged. There is no unarbitrary economically-sound way to distinguish between those 
subsidies which governments may undertake in their attempts to achieve broad 
macroeconomic goals and those which are injurious or aimed at improving export 
performance. Tarullo emphasises this point.
"[T]hus in administering the (countervailing duty) statute the Commerce 
Department must determine the propriety and presumptive efficiency of foreign 
governmental policies. Analysis of the market correction norm embodied in the 
countervailing duty law is particularly significant for differing conceptions of 
proper and efficient governmental policies are at the root of much contemporary 
debate on international trade competition."(emphasis added)6^
The "legitimacy" of domestic economic policies thus becomes a central point of
contention. Legitimacy here refers not to the internationally established legitimacy but is
used in a more general sense. According to the international legitimacy, governments have
wide freedom to pursue their domestic political objectives as they see fit. Domestic
subsidies are not illegitimate in that sense. How is "legitimacy" in the general sense, then,
defined?
If all governments had the same macroeconomic objectives and methods of 
achieving them perhaps this point would not have become contentious. But governments 
do not. This is not just a matter of disagreement on policy questions. It arises partly
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because governments guarantee contract and property rights in different ways, von Hayek
articulated this point though probably without realizing that it would become an important
issue in international politics:
" ... in order that competition should work beneficially, a carefully thought-out 
legal framework is required ..." But, he went on. "It is by no means sufficient that 
the law should recognize the principle of private property and freedom of 
contract; much depends on the precise definition of the right of property and 
freedom of contract as applied to different things."68
DIFFERING MACROECONOMIC GOALS
Differing visions on policy questions, differing views about which macroeconomic
goals to aim for and which methods should be used to achieve them, give rise to greater
disagreement among the GATTcontracting parties than differing legal structures. Harald
Malmgren captured the point when he said,
"the role of government is pervasive, and where subsidy begins and socially 
necessary legislative and administrative conditions and constraints end will never 
be entirely clear. ®
Here it is relevant to recall the comment by Henry Kissinger introduced in Chapter 
Two/® He explains that it is extremely difficult to resolve problems through negotiation 
when ideological differences exist among players. Germanyand Japan differ from the 
United States in the ways in which their governments guarantee and protect contract and 
property rights. For example, in Japan there are very few lawyers and legal disputes are 
extremely rare. Problems in Japan tend to be settled through negotiation. In the United 
States, in contrast, contract and property rights are protected by a large and frequently- 
invoked legal framework. These differing legal structures affect the costs of doing 
business. Further, the Japanese legal system only allows a few hundred new lawyers to pass 
the required exams each year, and, as a result very few Americans become fully qualified 
lawyers in Japan. The Japanese cannot understand why they should change their legal 
system to comply with American demands that more Americans be allowed to practice law
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in Japan. The Americans cannot understand how business can be conducted, i.e., contracts 
and property protected, without lawyers. Also the differences in national approach to 
managing the domestic economic environment are profound. Note that for many years the 
United States has been trying to get Germany to abandon its anti-inflationary policy of 
tight control of the money supply. The United States wants Germanyto grow faster and 
thereby generate greater economic activity in the world economy, read the United States 
wants the Germans to buy more from American firms. The Germans cannot understand 
why they should abandon a policy which they believe to be prudent and Germany has 
failed to comply with American demands. Both believe the other to be less committed to 
the "market” than themselves.
The differences in opinion and perception about the "appropriate" role of 
government in the domestic economy and "appropriate" policies are the cause of great 
debate and political struggle even within each country among domestic political parties 
and among government ministries and the public.
Already we can see that the differences between the most powerful economies 
have given rise to intense debate over which "model" best serves the ideal of a market 
economy. The American model of capitalism, the Japanese model and the German model 
differ substantially. As the United States broadens its definition of subsidies, it opens the 
door to these questions: what is the "legitimate" model, what is a legitimate macroeconomic 
objective, what is a "legitimate" method of achieving such objectives?
To date one of the most complex problems the CVD law's administrators have had 
to grapple with is how to define what constitutes a subsidy in a non-market economy. 
They have struggled to reconcile the different philosophies of the market economies with 
the non-market ones so that the CVD law could be applied in non-market economy cases. 
How could a "normal" or true market price or cost be determined when there are no 
market forces at work, when there is no price mechanism? This was a problem of the 
past.
The problem now, and the problem of the future, is reconciling the differing
196
philosophies among the market economies. How can we tell what the true market price or 
the true cost of production would be in the absence of a subsidy when the differing 
methods and objectives governments pursue in managing their domestic economies means 
that the market conditions present in one country are not really comparable to those in 
another? There is not only no true price or cost discernable in the absence of government. 
The presence of different governments with different efficiency objectives -- when 
efficiency is defined by political considerations -- means that there is no universal true 
price or cost.
When one government says another has a policy that unfairly "subsidizes" a 
domestic industry, the real issue is not economic efficiency. The real issue is that one 
government objects to the political role and/or political objectives another has set out to 
achieve. The CVD law is the mechanism the United States uses to veto or penalize the 
political choices made by foreign governments. All the rhetoric about market standards 
and efficiency objectives obscures this fundamental point.
Harald Malmgren explains that the reason why no international or multilateral 
body would ever be allowed the authority to judge when or whether a government's 
internal measure constituted a subsidy^ is because:
"This would be tantamount to asking an international body to evaluate and approve
the economic, social and political objectives of a particular country."^
Yet, this is exactly the purpose of the CVD law. With it, the United States 
unilaterally judges, approves or disapproves, of a foreign government's domestic 
economic, social and political objectives. In effect, the law is used to unilaterally establish 
when a foreign government's objectives are acceptable and when the are not. The CVD 
law is itself a political instrument since its effective aim is political: to compel foreign 
governments to change their conception of their proper and efficient role. Or, it is to 
penalize foreign governments when they do not change their view.
The key questions are these: what changes are being demanded? Are those changes 
consistent with what has been internationally agreed?
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CHAPTER EIGHT— COUNTERVAILING DUTY POLICY: A BETTER APPROACH
The traditional economic arguments against "mercantilism" deprecate the use of 
state power in economic affairs. But the maintenance of international rules, of 
international order, requires that states use their power to prevent others from breaking 
the rules or undermining order. It is wholly legitimate under the post-war international 
economic order to use the CVD law as a technique of statecraft, as a means of upholding 
the internationally-agreed upon principle of competition.
The important issue, then, is not the use of power but the use to which power is 
put. This crosses the political question. What is the United States compelling foreigners to 
do? Are they being asked to behave in a manner which enhances competition, or one 
which reduces competition? Is power used in a manner which upholds the internationally- 
agreed upon aims and methods of foreign policy goals or not?
HOW SUBSIDIES ARE DEFINED IN PRACTICE
There is no explicit definition of a subsidy in the CVD statute. One must look to 
examples of Congressional and administrative interpretations to establish the applied 
definition. In 1965, for example, a Joint Economic Committee of Congress concluded that 
a subsidy was:
”[A]n act by a governmental unit involving either (1) a payment, (2) remission of 
charges, or (3) supplying commodities or services at less than cost or market price, 
with the intent of achieving a particular economic objective, most usually the 
supplying to a general market a product or service which would be supplied in as 
great quantity only at a higher price in the absence of the payment or remission 
of charges."^
More recently, in 1984, the Commerce Department, stated:
"we believe a subsidy .... is definitionally any action that distorts or subverts the 
market process and results in a misallocation of resources, encouraging inefficient 
production and lessening world wealth".^
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According to these definitions a wide variety of foreign government activities 
should be actionable under the statute. Governmentsprovide aids to the general domestic 
market in a multitude of ways. The provision and enforcement of regulatory standards 
"aids" the general domestic market. When governments seek to fulfil broad macroeconomic 
goals this "aids" the general market. When governments provide direct "aid" in the form 
of state financed roads, dock facilities, schools and federally insured loans, when they 
allow tax breaks or benefits to certain industries, when they guarantee bank deposits, 
when they provide export insurance or bailout failed companies, to give only a few of 
many examples, these or the benefits accruing from them are available to the general 
market.
If a subsidy is defined by the fact that it causes the "misallocation" of resources, 
then who defines what constitutes a misallocation? This question is particularly important 
in the post-war period when the reallocation of resources is a specific government 
objective that is undertaken precisely because a market-led allocation would have 
undesirable economic and social effects.
THE LINE
And so, all of those who have administered the CVD law have had to draw a line 
between those subsidies that would be actionable under the statute and those that would 
not. The law's administrators did not have nearly the resources that would be necessary to 
countervail all of the ways in which foreign governments "aid" their domestic economies. 
Frankly, Treasury also lacked the conviction that all "subsidies" should be countervailed. 
As Barcelo notes, the United States cannot simply proscribe all subsidies.
To be actionable, a subsidy must have trade effects on the United States. Until 
1974, Treasury had the discretion to reject CVD petitions if the subsidy in question had 
no trade effects. But, too many foreign government policies and activities were actionable 
under the statute for this procedure to be practicable. Rather than attempting to enforce
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a literal reading of the statute Treasury attempted to limit actionable subsidies, purely for 
the sake of practicality.
The act of drawing the line between actionable and inactionable subsidies, or 
redrawing it is, of course, an act of economic statecraft. For to change the line, is to 
change the rule by which foreign governments must abide to avoid transgressing American 
CVD law. Such statecraft changes the environment in which others must conduct their 
affairs.
The line is important for several reasons. First, wherever the line is drawn, as 
Tarullo rightly points out, the United States introduces an "inchoate notion of the
o
appropriate functions of government."0 Actionable subsidies are those which go beyond 
the "appropriate" functions. In other words, some government activities have been 
accepted as "normal" and others have been labelled "subsidies". The initial distinction was 
made simply between actionable and inactionable subsidies. This distinction has 
encouraged a belief that actionable subsidies are "unfair" and inactionable subsidies are 
"fair".
The very existence of a line confirms the fact that the standard being enforced 
is not a market standard. A true market standard, which, as we have seen, would be 
impossible to enforce short of eliminating the existence of government altogether, would 
require that §11 subsidies be actionable. By drawing a line the United States creates a 
standard based on implicit notions of what is a "normal" and "appropriate" role for 
government to play. However, when the test is not "pure efficiency by market standards 
but normalcy", Tarullo elegantly concludes,
'This is ideology, not economics."^
How is this normal standard defined and applied in practice? Why do we ask this? 
If the "normal" standard is not pro-competitive, or enforced in a way that enhances the 
play of market forces, then the United States CVD law is clearly at odds with the central 
internationally agreed- upon aim of the post-war international economic order, which is: 
competition.
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It is difficult to tell how or why Treasury drew this line while it administered the 
statute from 1930 until 1974. Even though Treasury was responsible for defining what 
constituted a bounty or a grant, Treasury "refused to disclose or make public the standards 
or criteria which move its judgement".® It would require extensive interviews with 
Treasury officials from that period to discern exactly how Treasury defined a bounty or 
a grant whether direct or indirect. Even more research would be necessary to understand 
the reasons why some subsidies were considered actionable but not others. Since the focus 
of this study is developments in CVD policy
since the late 1960's, and since the law was not widely or actively applied until 1967/1968, 
only a brief discussion of the early definition of subsidies seems necessary.
Two aspects of Treasury practice are important since these aspects set the tone for 
subsequent CVD policy. The first is the arbitrariness of the way in which subsidies have 
been defined. The second is the selectivity of enforcement.
NORMAL SUBSIDIES
It was essential for Treasury to narrow the focus to some manageable set of trade 
practices. A pure market standard was not practicable. So, a "normalcy" standard was 
gradually introduced. Because trade effects have to be present to activate the statute 
Treasury focused on export subsidies. Direct export subsidies, those involving payments, 
were clearly actionable. Nobody could claim that direct payments from government to 
firms, payments which were contingent upon the exportation of merchandise were not 
bounties or grants. However, as mentioned earlier, few examples like the Italian Roval 
Decree case ever occurred.
Official export credit, which would seem the most obvious form of aiding 
exportation, has been regulated by international agreements ever since the Berne Union 
in 1934. Any breaches of the international credit arrangements, such as providing credit
207
on more preferential terms than was agreed acceptable, could be countervailed as a direct 
export subsidy.
It was in the area of indirect export subsidies that judgement was necessary. It is 
here that we start to see the line begin to follow an arbitrary path. Treasury officials had 
little to guide them except a precedent set by the judiciary, and a vague notion that if the 
United States government did not engage in a particular activity with regard to the 
economy then that activity was probably not "normal” or "appropriate". Treasury did not 
explicitly define what constituted a bounty or grant, but rather "carved out" its 
definition(s) on a "case-by-case basis.
It is, perhaps, necessary to emphasize here that the problem with this exercise in 
line drawing is not that it is done in an piecemeal manner. The common law tradition 
which entails addressing and resolving problems as they arise is well-suited to this 
difficult area of policy. The problem with the line drawing exercise is rather that the line 
has been drawn in such a way as to achieve policy objectives which are inconsistent with 
the ostensible purpose of CVD law. By tracing the way in which the line between 
actionable and inactionable subsidies has been drawn over time it is possible to see how 
this development has come to pass.
The law expressly permits the countervailing indirect export subsidies. But, many 
"normal" practices in which most governments engage in such as remitting internal taxes 
upon exportation, can act as indirect spurs to exportation/ Treasury tried to limit the 
range of targetable export subsidies by aiming only at those that deliberately intended to 
promote exports. For example, it considered the official manipulation of currency for the 
purpose of promoting exports to constitute a subsidy. During the Interwar period, 
(between World War One and World War Two) the Germans and the Russians in particular 
were countervailed for this practice. Or, in another case, the Lithuanian Governmentwas 
countervailed in 1937 for maintaining a price support system which ensured that no export
Q
sale of butter received less than the guaranteed minimum domestic price. Other export 
subsidies included currency retention plans, tax benefits and the rebate of domestic direct
208
axes such as income taxes and payroll taxes. But Treasury tried to exclude those practices 
that accidentally or only incidentally helped to promote exports.
In doing so, Treasury relied on a "precedent" provided by the Judiciary. In two tax 
cases the Supreme Court established the most explicit definition of a grant or a bounty 
available when Treasury began to administer the statute in its current form. Treasury 
relied on the judiciary's interpretation not because it was legally bound by the precedent 
but because it was the only "precedent" available.
The Supreme Court interpretation of a bounty or a grant (these were the terms 
used to describe a subsidy before the term subsidy was brought into current use) was 
established in Downs vs US in 1903 and Nicholas and Co vs US in 1919. In Downs the 
question at issue was whether a Russian government plan to regulate the domestic price 
of sugar by refunding internal taxes upon exportation, taxes which would have been 
required if the sugar had been sold domestically, constituted a bounty or a grant. In 
Nicholas the question was similar. Did the British government's rebate of a domestic tax 
on all exports of spirits distilled in Great Britain constitute a bounty or a grant? The 
rebate was only large enough to offset the excise tax imposed in Great Britain. The 
Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in both cases. Unfortunately, its conclusion 
in both cases was equivocal.
In both cases the Court held that an export subsidy existed only if the remission 
of the internal tax is larger than the original internal tax paid. Simply remitting the exact 
amount of internal tax upon exportation, the court held, is not a subsidy. However, in 
Downs, the Court "proceeded beyond a consideration of the Russian program to embrace 
a broad definition of a bounty, a definition which had been reported by a Committee at 
the Brussels Convention of European Powers in 1898," according to Craig Brown (who's 
review of the history of this controversy is excellent).® According to that broader 
definition, any remission of internal taxes constitutes a bounty or grant. The holding, 
(which provided the narrow definition of a subsidy in Downs) according to Black's Law 
Dictionary,^® is: 'The legal principle to be drawn from the opinion (decision) of the
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court. Opposite of Dictum (the singular of Dictum). It (the holding) may refer to a trial
ruling of the court upon evidence or other questions presented at the trial."^ This is in
contrast with the Dicta (which provided the broader definition in Downs) which are:
"Opinions of a judge which do not embody the resolution or determination of the specific
case before the court. Expressions in the court's opinions which go beyond the facts before
the court and, therefore, are individual vewies of the author of the opinion and not
12binding in subsequent cases as a legal precedent."
Ever since Downs, the administrative courts have struggled over whether to follow 
the broad definition of a subsidy as defined by the holding, or the broad definition as 
defined by the dicta. The pundits have been wrangling about whether any rebate of 
internal taxes alone ought to be considered a bounty or a grant or a subsidy or whether 
only the excessive remission of internal taxes is a subsidy.
Treasury chose to follow the Court's holding, which, in this case, constituted the 
narrow definition. Treasury followed the logic that even though tax remissions do aid 
exportation such remissions do so only incidentally, whereas, remissions that are larger 
than the original duty are clearly deliberate attempts to enhance export performance. Both 
practices aid exportation. But, the Treasury made a decision to draw the line to enclose 
only the narrower ground. The rebate of direct taxes such as payroll taxes, income taxes, 
social security taxes were considered actionable. To rebate such taxes is to provide 
manufacturers with overall lower operating costs than normally would be possible. Article 
VI of the GATTconfirms that rebates of direct taxes are subsidies.
These efforts to draw the line in such a way as to narrow the actionable range of 
subsidies were essentially arbitrary. This does not mean that these decisions were not well 
thought out. It simply means that there is only one reason, as the law has been written 
since 1930, why subsidies should be narrowed to only these phenomena. That reason is 
simply pragmatism. The line was drawn where it was for the sake of practicality. Again, 
this is not necessarily bad. But, the practical forces pushing the line ended up steering the 
law in a direction opposite to the intended purpose of the law.
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When we consider the law as a technique of statecraft this element of "practicality” 
takes on great significance. Though many believe that the law is used to compel foreign 
governments to act "fairly" and abide by "market standards" and "market principles", it is 
not. The law does not enforce a market standard. It enforces a normalcy standard. The line 
is drawn according to what the United States finds "normal" and "abnormal" behaviour for 
governments - - in other words, according to political and not economic considerations. 
Normal and appropriate behaviour are defined by the United States' political and 
ideological vision.^ The line is further controlled by purely pragmatic considerations. 
Subsidies are actionable not primarily because they are anticompetitive but because the 
United States objects to a given practice on primarily political and pragmatic grounds.
One of the most intriguing aspects of CVD law enforcement is that the United 
States has often attempts to underscore the belligerence of foreign trade practices by 
highlighting the fact that the United States Government does not engage in the subsidy in 
question, when in fact, the United States maintains a very similar program, often for 
similar reasons. For example, Tarullo points out that the United States countervails 
government grants to firm. But, the United States government has guaranteed private loans 
to Chrysler Corporation and to bailout the Savings and Loan B anks.^ Recently the 
Pentagon invested $4 million in Gazelle Microcircuit, a semiconductor company that was 
strapped for cashJ® The United States Federal Government, as well as most individual 
states, maintains regional development programs, provides research and development aids 
to industry (mostly in the form of defense contracts), and aids in the production of 
harbour facilities. Yet, it has applied the CVD law to foreigners for engaging in all these 
activities.
Perhaps a short digression is necessary here. This apparent double standard arises 
at least partly from the fact that the United States' subsidy programs are usually highly 
camouflaged. Public opinion in the United States is overwhelmingly committed to the 
ideology of free markets, at least in comparison with public opinion in most other 
countries. Great pride is taken in domestic industry's lack of reliance on government. For
211
this reason, subsidy schemes in the United States reflect the need to achieve the desired
results through mostly invisible means.
Amitai Etzioni argues that this need reflects an American preoccupation with the
"immorality" of government intervention in economic affairs. He provides this telling
example. American sugar growers needed subsidies to survive but the growers considered
"government handouts and subsidies as a source of shame. Therefore, they fought to obtain
18a less visible form of government support."10 The sugar growers and the United States
Governmentdevised a plan. The sugar growers put up their sugar as collateral for securing
loans from the government. These loans, which would not otherwise have been available,
were provided on very soft terms (i.e., the interest rate on the loans was lower than market
conditions warranted). In effect, a subsidy was made available, but the subsidy was
obscured by the ways in which traditional lending techniques were employed. Overall, the
cost of this program, Etzioni finds, was substantially higher than if subsidies were given
outright. But the program was consistent with what the sugar growers believed to be the
"morally proper take-no-handout position."^
This same commitment to "market principles" has overwhelmingly prevented the
passage of blatantly protectionist legislation such as the Burke-Hartke Bill and the
Gephardtamendment.
In spite of this ideological commitment, practical solutions to pressing trade
problems must be found. As a result of the two competing factors -- ideology and
pragmatism -- the United States has become adept at creating less visible means of
18achieving the desired result. One instrument which has been harnessed and even 
subverted in this cause is the CVD law.
And so we see Grunzel's phenomenon at work. We recall that he found that those 
most committed to free trade or market ideology are the ones most likely to resolve 
problems by manipulating these market principles in application, not by modifying the
■JQ
principles as such. Accordingly, as early as 1956, The Randall Commission labelled 
United States CVD policy "Janus-faced".^
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It is in the law's application that the CVD law has itself has become a means of 
achieving desired "corrections", that is, of reaching pragmatic solutions to trade problems. 
Imports can be investigated, taxed and restricted from entering the United States on the 
grounds that the imports are "unfairly" aided by government assistance. However, 
allegations are made on the specious grounds we are in the midst of exploring. But our 
attention to the reality of policy is diverted by the rhetoric which is used to justify actions 
taken pursuant to the law. Reference to market principles and market standards prevent 
us from seeing that in practice such actions are in complete opposition to the goals the 
CVD law ostensibly seeks to serve.
Double standards are nothing new in the realm of international affairs. That they 
exist here is not especially surprising. It may also be reasonable to argue that it is not that 
important. It may be worthwhile to enforce "good" policy abroad even if the enforcer is 
lax in policing itself at home.
This double standard has important implications for our study of statecraft. The
fact that the United States itself engaged in many "subsidy" practices by its own definition
has from the beginning forced the United States to be selective in its enforcement of CVD
policy. It has actively tried to avoid having to face retaliatory countervailing duty
proceedings from foreign governments. It has always been important not to establish a
precedent which could ricochet the United States'own standards right back at the United
States. As a result, the CVD law has been enforced selectively. For example, Uruguay was
countervailed in 1963 for maintaining a multiple currency system which, though approved
21by the International Monetary Fund , was designed to improve export 
perform ance.^ The case ended up in an appeal Curt case, Energetic Worsted. ^  Judge 
Richardson, in his dissent, noted that the nearly identical multiple exchange rate scheme 
created by Argentina that "stood squarely behind the initial influx of wool tops (from 
Argentina) .... has escaped the condemnation". The fact that sixteen other nations also 
maintained a similar system, but only Uruguay was countervailed demonstrates this 
element of selectivity.^ Similarly, the United States has refused to countervail widely
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available agricultural subsidies because the United States fears being countervailed for its 
own policy of providing cheap water to American agriculture.
THE PLIANT LINE
To return to our exploration of the line between actionable and inactionable 
subsidies, we will now look at the first major shift in policy. Treasury's early efforts to 
draw the line in such a way as to limit the target to a narrow range of practices began to 
change in the 1950's. It was then that pressures for a more expansive reading of the statute 
began to gain momentum. Some wanted to broaden the range of actionable indirect 
subsidies and to start countervailing domestic subsidies. It is then that Treasury's line 
began to buckle.
It appears that Treasury realized that any attempt to redraw the line (which put 
fiscal export subsidies on the actionable side and other "subsidies" on the non-actionable 
side) would open up the messy analytical problems. It avoided wading into the murky 
territory in many cases by simply not acting at all. It issued only one CVD order between 
July 1954 and April 1966.^*
Treasury officials took the position that certain "subsidy" questions were primarily
political. Such questions, they believed, ought to be resolved through diplomatic channels
and not with the CVD law. Some of the first petitions against the European Community's
Common Agricultural Policy give a good example of this (even though these petitions
occurred later than the 1950's). The National Milk Producers Federation filed petitions
from 1968 until 1973 asserting that European Economic Community's Common
Agricultural Policy was subsidizing dairy exports into the United States. These petitions 
26were simply ignored. At the time, the Department of Agriculture was actively 
maintaining import quotas against the relevant dairy products, so political pressure did not 
arise over the Treasury's neglect on the petitions. But, when the quotas ended in 1973 and 
1974 Congress began to pressure Treasury into acting. Congress forced Treasury to take
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action within a specified time period and, in the 1974 Trade Act, provided petitioners 
with the right to subject Treasury to judicial review by the Customs Court for not having 
acted promptly.
By 1963 a change in policy became apparent in the case Uruguayan Wool
2 7  • • •Tops. In this case, we can clearly see the line between actionable and inactionable
indirect subsidies being redrawn. Treasury countervailed Uruguay for maintaining a
multiple exchange rate system which allegedly provided better exchange rates for exported
wool tops than was warranted. Even though the exchange rate program was fully
sanctioned by the International Monetary Fund, Treasury determined that it constituted
a bounty or grant.
The initial positive finding of a subsidy by Treasury was challenged on 
administrative grounds by an American importer, Energetic Worsted. Judge Richardson's 
vitriolic 10 page dissent to the final Customs Court ruling highlights Treasury's changed 
and broadened definition of a subsidy. Richardson recalls the Spanish Almond case in 
which Spain was countervailed for paying Spanish exporters a fixed fee for every pound 
of almonds exported. But, he recalls, Treasury retroactively revoked the duty in November 
1948 because the Spanish government scrapped the direct payments in favour of a multiple 
exchange rate system. That system was very similar to the one allegedly provided by 
Uruguay in the wool tops case. Under the system the official exchange rate was 10 pesetas 
to the United States dollar but the exchange rate for almond sales was 19.75 pesetas to the
U.S. dollar. In 1948 Treasury had given tacit approval to such a scheme. By 1963 such a 
scheme was considered an actionable subsidy.
Treasury's narrow interpretation of a tax remission as a subsidy also came under 
pressure in 1963. Controversy over the Judiciary's equivocal opinion in Downs and 
Nicholas resurfaced in the Canada Automotive Products' °  case. The initial question in 
this case was related to the rebate of import duties rather than internal taxes. But, the
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principle in question was the same: were the rebates excessive and therefore actionable as 
a subsidy?
The Canadian Governmenthad instituted a plan under which Canadian automobile 
manufacturers were rebated the duty the manufacturers had paid on imports of raw and 
semi-finished automobile parts. The availability of the rebate was conditional upon the 
exportation of automobiles. In effect the program provided duty free entry for imports 
of automotive components, conditional upon their subsequent exportation as part of whole 
automobiles. As a result, the plan encouraged exports by removing a barrier to trade, 
namely the firm's cost of paying the import duty. The United States argued both that the 
remission was excessive and that the remmission was not directly related to the original 
levy. A CVD investigation commenced, but little evidence of the alleged practices 
materialized.
The central point of concern for the Americans was that the program encouraged
exports even if there was no excessive rebate. The rebate itself promoted exports. Thus,
the broader definition of a subsidy was raised in debate. But, the subsidy essentially
amounted to duty free importation. The manufacturers benefitted from the removal of a
barrier to trade. They did not benefit from a payment since they received no more than
they had initially paid. As the line was drawn there was no way to define this as a subsidy.
Bruce Butler has explained in reviewing this case, "the removal of an obstacle to trade did
create an advantage over previously existing situation." But, he went on,
"to characterize this removal... as a subsidy would be intolerable since any trade 
concession could then be classified as a subsidy. The expansive reading of the 
CVD statute to include any such advantage or concession must be rejected as 
unworkable, because this would engender chaos in international trade as a result 
of the retaliation which would undoubtedly occur."^
Ultimately the pressures of the investigation helped to force the Canadian 
government into the United States-Canada Automotive Products Agreement of 1965. 
Under its terms Canada agreed to broaden its duty free policy to more automotive 
products and automobiles. In return the United States abandoned the investigation. In this 
way the United States ensured that there were fewer duties to rebate and therefore fewer
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opportunities to grant excessive rebates. The importance of this case was that it directed 
attention to the whole question of rebates and remissions which could encourage 
exportation even if they were not excessive.
These pressures for a broadened definition of a subsidy influenced the 1967 case
O f t
Italian Transmission Towers. Article VI of the GATT specifies that the rebate of 
direct taxes such as income taxes, payroll, social security taxes etc., constitute a subsidy. 
Until this case, Treasury had not countervailed against rebates of direct taxes. In this case, 
however, Brown explains, Treasury countervailed the Italian government for the full 
amount of its rebate on indirect taxes paid to the exporters of transmission towers and not 
just for an excessive rebate. Originally the taxes had been levied as direct taxes. The taxes 
included: customs duties/import charges, registration duties, stamp taxes, stamp taxes on 
transportation documents, insurance taxes, mortgage taxes, advertising and publicity taxes, 
government licenses and authorizations, taxes on the registration of motor vehicles and
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surtaxes on all of the above. But, the Italian Government had evidently recast these 
taxes as indirect taxes by the time of the United states' CVD investigation. Brown 
explains that Treasury was "motivated by the fact that the technically indirect taxes 
resembled direct ones."^
"By countervailing against the full amount of the remission," Guido and Morrone 
confirm, "the Treasury Department had for the first time abandoned its policy of focusing
3 3
solely upon excessive indirect tax rebates."^ Treasury made a positive finding.
In an appeal the next Federal Court, in American Express vs the United 
States. ^  it was established that Treasury treated the "taxes" in the Transmission Towers 
case according to their underlying nature (as direct taxes on general overhead) not the 
illusory form given them by the Italian government (indirect taxes on specific products)", 
therefore, Treasury could "justify the imposition of a countervailing duty to offset Italy's 
remission of the taxes upon exportation".^ In other words, in the Italian Transmission 
Towers case, Treasury countervailed against the full amount of indirect tax rebates, thus
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adopting the broader interpretation of a subsidy. It was easier for Treasury to do this
since the taxes were treated as being direct taxes in effect.
By 1970 the pressures for broader definition of a subsidy -- that any rebate of
indirect export taxes was a subsidy - - began to win over. That year Zenith, an American
36electronics company, filed a CVD petition against the Japanese government. Zenith 
claimed that the Japanese Commodity Tax Law provided a subsidy within the meaning of 
the countervailing duty statute. At issue was essentially the same question as was posed in 
the Canada Auto case; was the rebate of an internal tax, even if not excessive, a subsidy? 
After a six year investigation Treasury found that no subsidy existed. The length of time 
it took to reach a conclusion is probably indicative of Treasury's reluctance to officially 
redraw the line. Zenith appealed to the Customs Court which reversed Treasury's finding.
John Barcelo recalls that the Custom's Court finding "stunned the rest of the 
w o r l d , I t  decision was stunning, "since virtually all countries rebate internal 
production taxes".'*® Treasury then appealed to the Customs Court of Patent Appeals 
(CCPA), which had newly acquired the authority to hear such appeals. The CCPA backed 
Treasury's initial finding of no subsidy.
Not surprisingly, given the potential ramifications of such a decision -- which 
would be that all governments would have to abandon the longstanding policy of remitting 
indirect domestic taxes, a policy which had been designed to prevent subjecting commerce 
to double taxation, in order to avoid transgressing the American CVD law -- there was 
an appeal to the Supreme Court. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion in Zenith Radio 
Coro v US. He confirmed that Treasury's narrow interpretation of a subsidy was 
appropriate. Although the Downs opinion was "admittedly opaque", Justice Marshall 
stressed:
"Regardless of whether this legislative history absolutely compelled the Secretary 
to interpret 'bounty or grant' so as not to encompass any nonexcessive remission 
of an indirect tax, there can be no doubt that such a construction was reasonable 
in light of the statutory purpose."
This case received wide publicity. The two positive determinations by the Customs 
Court and the Customs Court of Patent Appeals fuelled the hopes of those who wanted to
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"get tough" on foreign subsidy programs. But the Supreme Court decision appears to have 
settled this particular subsidy issue. Ever since then, efforts to broaden the range of 
actionable subsidies have been aimed at other kinds of subsidies.
There are too many subsidy practices in existence to permit a comprehensive 
classification and analysis and discussion. Instead of describing all of the subsidies the 
United States has countervailed, it will be more productive to concentrate on two aspects 
of American CVD policy. The first is the way in which the United States has drawn a line 
between actionable and inactionable subsidies. The second is how the United States has 
broadened the term subsidy.
The central logic behind the statute is that the United States has a right to 
challenge or correct foreign subsidy practices that have "trade effects". Given the ease 
with which a causal link between an unfair trade practice and trade effects can be 
established, this logic provides the rationale for continually increasing the kinds of 
practices that can be labelled actionable subsidies. The next step from indirect export 
subsidies is to tackle domestic ones.
DOMESTIC SUBSIDIES
Intent is notoriously difficult to prove. The CVD law does not require its 
administrators to judge the intent behind foreign governments' policies. But the way 
Treasury had drawn the line, the alleged intent of the foreign government had, in practice, 
become an important relevant matter. Treasury countervailed those indirect export 
subsidies that reflected the intent to promote exportation. Treasury did not, or tried not 
to, countervail those that only accidentally or incidentally promoted exportation. But its 
heavy reliance on the concept of trade effects encouraged potential petitioners to argue 
that certain practices which may not have intended to create such trade effects were, in 
fact, giving rise to them. Petitioners began to countervail foreign governments' domestic 
subsidies by the 1970's on the grounds that domestic subsidies create trade effects.
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Petitioners turned to the 1922 domestic subsidies language. But petitions invoking 
this language forced the law's administrators to face the sticky analytical problems.
The first important domestic subsidy case occurred in 1972. The Greekgovernment 
had paid a subsidy to domestic producers of tomato paste to promote its production.^ 
The subsidy was not intended to aid exportation but, as it happened, much of the tomato 
paste produced under the benefit of a subsidy was exported to the United States. 
Therefore, the United States construed the subsidy to be an indirect export subsidy. But 
to make all domestic subsidies actionable under the CVD law (just because some portion 
of the subsidized product is exported) is to give the United States a direct veto over the 
domestic policies, the sovereign acts of foreign governments.
The Greek Tomato Paste case raised an important question. How much of the 
subsidized product had to be exported for the subsidy to be considered to have trade 
effects and therefore to become actionable under the CVD law?
The Michelin Case. ^  raised the same question. In this case the national, regional 
and local Canadian Governments cooperated to encourage the Michelin Tire company to 
move to a plant site in the largely underdeveloped part of Canada, Nova Scotia. This effort 
was part of a national commitment to encouraging regional development. Michelin was 
given loans (which were guaranteed by the national, regional, and local government 
agencies), a plant site by the local community and other real incentives to move there.
The plan did not aim to aid exportation. Its primary purpose was to achieve a 
domestic political objective -- the enrichment of a depressed region. As it happened, 80% 
of the manufactures produced in this factory were exported to the United States. The 
United States countervailed on the grounds that the subsidy was effectively an export 
subsidy. Again, the question in the Tomato Paste case appeared. How much of the 
production needed to be exported for the domestic subsidy to be considered an export 
subsidy by the United States? The difficulty of this point can be appreciated when looking 
at the way in which William Walker grappled with it in his focused study of the 
problem .^ He concluded that any time the subsidized merchandise is destined
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"primarily” for export and is subsidized, it is countervailable.^ But he leaves the crucial
question unanswered. How much is "primarily”? Is 2% sufficient? Is 80% sufficient?
The Michelin Company challenged the positive determination of a subsidy made
by the United States in X Radial Steel Belted Tires from C anada^. That Court did not
use the trade effects rationale upon which the administrators had relied. Rather, the Court
judged that the central question was the "reasonableness of the benefit conferred”.
Reasonableness was determined by reference to whether other nations engaged in such
programs.^ It is unclear to this author how the Court concluded that the Canadian
program was not "reasonable". Guidoand Morrone clearly explain:
"The Canadian practices countervailed against in Michelin are embarrassingly 
similar to US programs designed to achieve similar goals. Only by reading the 
terms of Section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 without reference to 70 years of 
administrative precedent and by relying on the dicta of two early 20th-Century 
Supreme Court tax rebate cases can legal basis for, the Michelin decision be 
fathomed."^®
This case, then, is a perfect example of the United States using the CVD law to challenge 
foreign governments political goals. In spite of the fact that the United States, among other 
nations, maintained a similar program with similar aims and similar methods, the Court 
rendered a judgement in favour of the Treasury.^ The message was clear. The Courts 
would uphold Treasury's definition of a "normal" domestic subsidy. The Canadian regional 
development program was not a "normal" activity for government.
The same problem appeared again in 1975 in Float Glass.^T hough the level of 
exports from the subsidized factories was lower than the level of exports found in previous 
cases in which positive findings were made, Treasury made a positive determination. Float 
Glass is important, GaryHufbauer explains, because in it Treasury established a "rule of 
reason" for future reference. If the domestic subsidy had a "de minimus" trade effect on 
United States commerce then it would be actionable under the CVD law. Where de 
minimus falls on the scale between 100% and .001% of the firm's exports is unclear. But, 
it is fairly easy to prove that a de minimus trade effect exists. By drawing the line at this 
place, Treasury opened up the possibility of countervail petitions against many foreign 
governments' domestic subsidy programs. But Treasury realised that the pressure would
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be too great if such a rule was maintained. Challenges to normal, legitimate and 
appropriate management of the domestic economy by foreign governments would begin 
to appear. So, Treasury created the specificity test.
SPECIFICITY TEST
Although there is no record, it appears that Treasury began to apply a "specificity 
test" sometime in the early 1970's. It has been required by the statute since 1979. The 
specificity test provides a means for separating actionable subsidies from non-actionable 
ones. According to the terms of the test a domestic subsidy is countervailable only if it is 
not "generally available" but is made available only to some specific industries or firms in 
the domestic economy. As the test has evolved, it has come to mean that subsidies which 
are made available to specific industries or firms are countervailable.
Tarullo explains; the United States seeks the "soft efficiency aims" which are best 
described by Alfred Kahn in The Economics of Regulation. ^  Kahn demonstrates that 
the only practical way to address the central problem, where to draw the line, is to look 
for distortions, "given the existing schemes of private and public law."^ All states, it 
is reasoned, build roads and schools. All governments pursue macroeconomic goals. These 
activities confer benefits on all participants in the domestic economy. They are part of the 
"given framework". Therefore the United States does not attempt to countervail them. 
Using this "soft efficiency" reasoning, the United States employs the specificity test to 
distinguish between actionable and inactionable domestic subsidies. Only those subsidies 
which confer a benefit on some industries are subject to countervail.^ The test serves 
as an "Ockham's razor", as GaryHufbauer has sa id .^
The specificity test was adopted into the statute and made mandatory in 1979.^ 
Perhaps, by now, we should not be surprised to find that the legislative history is "... 
surprisingly silent on Congressional motives for enacting the specificity test It
is likely that the test was borrowed from the test suggested in the Subsidies Code. A
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countervailable domestic subsidy under the Code is one that is "granted with the aim of
Eg
giving an advantage to certain enterprises,... either regionally or by sector."00
As one might expect of such an arbitrary method of dealing with the analytical and 
administrative problems raised by domestic subsidies, the specificity test has been 
challenged. The test distinguishes between "fair" and "unfair" subsidies but it does so in 
a manner which makes little economic sense. Just because a subsidy is generally available 
does not mean that no benefit has been incurred by the recipients.^ As such, the test 
ignores whether competitive advantage has been created by a subsidy.
This was the issue in the 1983 case Cabot Corp vs US. ^  Unfortunately, as with 
so many trade cases which end up in appeal, the Court's opinion in Cabot was equivocal. 
The opinion has given rise to several interpretations. The Court clearly rejected the 
"generally available" test on the grounds that such subsidies may benefit all but they do 
not benefit all equally. That is, even a generally available subsidy confers a benefit on 
some more than others. The Court concluded that the statute's administrators should look 
for a de facto benefit which accrues to a specific industry or group of industries.
The Court created a new set of administrative and analytical problems by raising 
the point that a subsidy should be countervailable if it has a real effect on competitiveness. 
How does one determine if a de facto competitive benefit exists? GaryHorlick points out 
that three interpretations of the problem arose from the Cabot case. "First, if individual 
recipients of a program could be identified, any benefits they received would be 
countervailable."^ It is fairly easy to find individual recipients of any program, so this 
interpretation was the broadest. "Second, even if the individual recipients could be 
identified, the Commerce Department would have to analyze the operation of the program 
to determine whether certain recipients benefitted more than others."®^ "Finally, 
Commerce merely had to confirm that, in addition to being generally available, the 
program was also widely used.'10
Being subject to such divergent interpretations, the specificity test soon came 
under intense speculation and pressure. The general consensus endorsed the view that the
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main point in domestic subsidy cases should not be a subsidy's availability, which is what 
the "generally available" test confirms, but rather the effect of the subsidy on 
competitiveness.
In 1987 the Court appears to have sanctioned the third interpretation of the Cabot
godecision in PPG Industries Inc. v. United States. In PPG the Court judged that the 
appropriate test was a de facto specificity test, although the particulars of administering 
such a test were not addressed. However, the Court rejected the concept of a "competitive 
benefit" test. Under a competitive benefit test, petitioners would claim that a wide variety 
of foreign governments' domestic economic policies created a competitive benefit. This 
would give rise to huge administrative and, more importantly, political difficulties. Such 
a test would clearly be a nightmare to administer. What criteria would be used to identify 
or measure the existence and degree of a competitive benefit? But, there is another reason 
-- perhaps it is the major reason -- that the de facto specificity test has been maintained 
and the competitive benefit test rejected. Redrawing the line by employing the 
competitive benefit test would mean that many activities engaged in by the United States 
would blatantly transgress its own standard.
So the specificity test stands, but it is subject to discretion. A subsidy may be 
generally available but it may be benefitting only a few in practice. Therefore, it 
constitutes a de facto subsidy which passes the specificity test.
We see in the particulars of the Cabot and PPGcases that judgement and discretion 
must be used to substantiate the existence of a de facto subsidy. Both cases involved the 
sale of natural resources to the domestic market. In Cabot the state-owned and state- 
controlled firm Petroleos Mexicanos, a natural gas producer and processor, provided one 
of the natural gas spinoff products, carbon black, at prices that were substantially below 
the going rate in the world export market. It was "generally available" in the broadest 
meaning. However, there was only one real user of the subsidized product. The Court's 
decision implied that normally this would interpreted as the de facto existence of a 
subsidy. In this particular case the Court found that it was owing to the underdevelopment
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of the Mexican economy and the manner in which the government made the substance 
available that more users did not exist.
In PPG the sales of natural gas at prices below the going rate in world markets was 
made possible in Mexico by a government plan that restructured the Mexican natural gas 
industry. Many different industries and firms benefited from these reduced rates. 
Therefore, no de facto subsidy existed.
In 1988 the statute was amended so that the law requires the administrators to 
countervail not only de jure subsidies but de facto ones. This is an extremely important 
change in the statute. For substantiation of the existence of a de facto subsidy is wholly 
dependent upon the discretion of the investigators. The test requires no mathematical 
constructs. How would one mathematically determine who all the potential users might be 
in order to substantiate that fewer than that in fact benefitted? Instead, as Alexander 
points out, the test requires Commerce to "exercise judgement and balance various factors 
in analyzing the facts of a particular case in order to determine whether a countervailable 
benefit has been conferred."00 In other words, Alexander makes it explicit that "the 
determination of what constitutes a significant distortion of an economy requires line 
drawing on a case-by-case basis."®*
This brings us back to the central point about the CVD law. It allows the United 
States to judge the "appropriateness" of foreign governments' domestic policies.
We see the United States doing just this in two cases which were brought against 
the Canadian Government. Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada (1983)®® 
and Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada (1986).®® In both cases it was 
alleged thatthe Canadian Government subsidized lumber sale prices to well below the 
world price both domestically and internationally. The wood products in the 1983 case 
were not found to violate the specificity test. They were not sold to any specific firms or 
industries. The wood was sold to all comers. The United States had no grounds under the 
specificity test for a case. No subsidy was found.
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The Canadian Government was countervailed again, in 1986, on the same 
allegation. This time the de facto test was applied. The United States argued that in 
practice the Canadian government had administered the program in a manner that ensured 
that only some firms and industries benefitted from the subsidized lumber. In short, the 
Canadian Government'sintent was to provide a subsidy to those specific industries. On this 
basis, the United States made a preliminary determination that the subsidy existed and was 
countervailable. In response to the American decision to reverse its earlier finding of no 
subsidy the Canadian government agreed to implement a scheme that taxed the lumber 
products upon their exportation. In return for this settlement the United States terminated 
the investigation.
The de facto test, then, rests on the discretion and judgement of the administrators 
and investigators. Judgements are made about a foreign government’sintent in pursuing 
domestic subsidy policies. In short, the United States officials have the authority and 
discretion to judge whether a foreign government's domestic policy is reasonable. It allows 
the United States to penalize a foreign government for its intent in pursuing domestic 
economic and political objectives.
The specificity test and the de facto specificity test provide a seemingly hard rule 
for isolating actionable domestic subsidies. In practice, however, these tests do not provide 
a hard rule. They are dependent upon the judgement of the investigators and those 
administering the law. And, they are in practice, highly flexible. These tests render the 
Countervailing Duty law an instrument with which the United States exercises broad 
power to judge and influence the foreign governments' domestic policy choices.
UPSTREAM SUBSIDIES
There has been one other effort to broadened the range of actionable subsidies. 
That has been to countervail so-called upstream subsidies. It is argued that a producer may 
benefit from using subsidized inputs. Even if the manufacturing or exporting process is
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not subsidized, it should still be possible to countervail against imports if any of the inputs 
used in making the imports have been subsidized. Cheaper inputs allow manufacturers 
and/or exporters to artificially reduce their costs. Therefore, upstream subsidies should 
be countervailed.
The term upstream subsidy refers to a subsidy which has been given to a product
before it is used by a manufacturer or exporter. For example, if a maker of wood
furniture uses subsidized wood in its products then it benefits from an upstream subsidy
and may be countervailed. According to the 1988 Trade and Competitiveness Act a
subsidy is bestowed when the;
Minput price is lower than the price that the manufacturer or producers of 
merchandise which is the subject of a CVD proceeding would otherwise pay for 
the product in obtaining it from another seller in an arms-length transaction. 7
What is the use of countervailing imports which have benefitted from upstream
subsidies? Why not just countervail the upstream subsidy directly? It is because most
upstream subsidies would be generally available. Many buyers in many different
industries would purchase and benefit from the subsidized input. Therefore, the upstream
subsidy would not be eligible for countervail. Generallyavailable subsidies, we recall, are
not countervailable under the terms of the specificity test.
One way of getting around the restriction imposed by the specificity test is to
countervail the users of upstream subsidies. Their products might very well pass the
specificity test. A separate three part test was introduced by the Commerce Department
in the early 1980's which was codified in the 1984 Trade and Tariff Act. Three questions
were asked to determine if an upstream subsidy was countervailable. First, was the
upstream input subsidized? Second, was the subsidy available to all or only to a specific
industry? Third, did the subsidy confer a benefit on the downstream producer? If any of
the questions were answered no, then a negative determination was made. But in recent
years the practice has been the opposite. If any of the questions can be answered yes, then
the subsidy is countervailable.
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One can imagine the difficulty of investigating all the potential input subsidies on 
all exports. The potential targets, Peter Koenig points out, "might include a cast of 
thousands".®®
Not surprisingly, it has been found administratively convenient to rely on a de 
minimus doctrine. Koenig explains that this means that, "only those inputs whose cost is 
significant relative to the total cost of the exported good"®® will be actionable. Of 
course, as we have seen before with the use of de minimus doctrine, there has been little 
effort to define the term "significant".
Subsidies, then, are defined less by genuine economic criteria than by non- 
interventionist ideology heavily tempered by pragmatism. If the law was used to compel 
foreign governments to abide by a pure market standard then it would require the virtual 
elimination of government altogether. Once government even begins to create and protect 
contract and property rights in a market economy it aids domestic production and 
manufacturing. So, instead of a market standard the United States defines the term subsidy 
by drawing a distinction between the normal and appropriate activities in which 
governments should engage, and abnormal interventionist ones. In this way the term 
subsidy is defined by non-interventionist ideology. The United States permits, or does not 
penalize, all of the ways in which foreign governments confer benefits upon its domestic 
industries'production, manufacture and export; only some government activities transgress 
the law.
The United States draws a line between actionable and inactionable subsidies. 
Which subsidies are which have been established by various tests which serve to separate 
one from the other pragmatically. Initially the test was simply whether the goods 
benefiting from the foreign government's subsidy were exported to the United States. But, 
a mere de minimus amount of exports was sufficient to trip the line. As a result this test 
placed too many subsidies on the actionable side. So the test was abandoned. In its place 
the specificity test draws the line based on whether the subsidy is available to specific 
industries. If so, the subsidy is actionable. The specificity test is not based on economic
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logic. It ignores whether the subsidy actually confers competitive benefits. But, in practice 
this test has tended to draw the line a little too conservatively. Some subsidies which in 
practice confer a benefit have been left on the inactionable side of the line because the 
subsidies are widely available. For this reason the statute has been modified to allow the 
test to be applied in a manner that allows the subsidy’s de facto specificity to be 
established. Such a test requires judgement to determine who effectively benefits from the 
subsidy.
Ultimately, then, even with the assistance of these pragmatic tests, the 
determination of what constitutes an abnormal and actionable practice is subject to 
discretion. In other words, a subsidy is not a fixed term under the law. Rather that term 
is applied to those foreign government practices or policies that are determined to confer 
benefits and to which the United States objects. Objections are based not on pure 
economic market standards. Normalcy is not even defined by the United States' own 
practices and policies. In the United States subsidies are defined by broad ideology but 
constrained by practicality.
WHAT IS THE VALUE OF THE SUBSIDY?
Once it is established that an actionable subsidy exists -- however a subsidy is 
defined -- it is then necessary to determine its size or value. The duty is supposed to be 
commensurate with the magnitude of the subsidy - - a t  least in theory. Remember, in 
principle, it is not the act of subsidizing nor the government's intent that the United States 
countervails; it is the trade effects of subsidized imports on the United States market that 
are countervailed. The United States can countervail a subsidy only insofar as it affects 
imports into the United States or third markets where the subsidized goods have trade 
effects on American exports. Therefore, the law does not require that the administrators 
determine the size of the whole subsidy. Rather, they must determine that portion of the 
subsidy which reduces the cost of producing those specific exports which enter the United
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States or otherwise have trade effects on American commerce. This is called the net
subsidy. As Goetz, Granet and Schwartz have put it, the
"fundamental issue [is] of how a benefit paid to induce the introduction of some 
input, like a plant, is attributed to a particular unit of output exported to the 
USA."70
For example, if a government provides an actionable subsidy of $1,000,000 either 
in cash or in value, to a firm or an industry, it is within its rights as a sovereign power to 
do so (unless the action contravenes international agreements). But, if any of the produce 
from the beneficiary firm or industry is exported to the United States, or exported to some 
third market where it competes with comparable American-made products, then the 
subsidy will be subject to the American CVD statute. An investigation will ensue if a 
petition is filed against the subsidy. But only the portion of the $1,000,000 that affected 
those specific exports is actionable.
This procedure raises several questions that are crucial to our understanding of the 
CVD law as a technique of economic statecraft. First, how is the size of a subsidy 
determined? Second, how is the subsidy attributed to the exports? Third, how is the size 
of the countervailing duty determined?
These questions are crucial because the size or value of the alleged subsidy 
determines the amount of the countervailing duty. The duty is in effect a penalty for 
behaving "unfairly" in international trade. The size of the duty determines the size of the 
penalty. The severity of the penalty determines how forcefully the foreign government is 
compelled to do whatever it is that the United States wants the foreign government to do. 
Also, the larger the subsidy is (as determined by the United States) the greater the 
implication of "unfairness". These questions are important because in answering them it 
will become clear whether in practice there is any genuine relationship between the 
amount of subsidy received and the amount of duty paid.
The single link between the subsidy received and the countervail is the calculation 
methodology. It determines whether that link is genuine or fabricated. For these reasons 
the calculation methodology needs to be explored with some care. It is worth noting that,
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"In CVD cases, the possibility that Commerce will completely change its method between 
its preliminary and final determination without giving all the parties notice, arises more 
frequently than in antidumping cases."^
THE CALCULATION METHODOLOGY: A QUESTION OF COSTS
Government subsidies to industry are considered "unfair” under the current CVD 
law (since the 1960's) primarily because they allow recipient firms to lower their costs. It 
is assumed that there is a "normal" cost of producing the exports in question which would 
be apparent under market conditions and determined by "market forces". Then there are 
"subsidized" costs. When American officials have determined that a subsidy does indeed 
exist the next step is to establish the impact of the subsidy on the recipient firms' costs of 
producing or supplying the merchandise exported to the United States. They compare the 
"normal" cost to the "subsidized" cost. The difference between these two is the subsidy. 
The subsidy must then be apportioned to the exports in question. This is the net subsidy. 
The countervailing duty should equal the net subsidy.
A firm may or may not alter its prices to reflect reduced costs. It may maintain a 
price in spite of the subsidy, thus enlarging its operating and or profit margin. Unlike in 
dumping cases, price competition is not, therefore, the main issue under the CVD law. The 
subsidy does not need to bring the import price down to or below the level of comparable 
American-made goods to be actionable. For example, widgets from country X cost $10 per 
unit to make and the firm sells them at $20 per unit. But with the benefit of a subsidy the 
cost of making the widget is only $8 per unit. The fact that the price of the widgets 
exported to the United States is $20, whereas the highest price of a comparable American 
made widget is only $10, is not germane to the investigation. Although, in practice, the 
administering officials have sometimes declined to investigate or countervail those 
subsidized imports whose price has been substantially above the American market price.
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Costs, as we have seen in the last chapter, are elusive creatures. But, before we
begin to explore whether it is even possible to discern the relevant costs in CVD cases we
should note that the CVD procedure assumes not only that there is a relationship between
subsidies and costs but that the relationship is proportionate. These assumptions are
tenuous at best and probably often false.
A few sharp observers, such as Goetz, Granet and Schwartz, have pointed out that
a subsidy usually causes a firm to increase its costs. For example, a firm may build a plant
that it would not have built without the subsidy. Obviously a new plant or increased
72capacity will increase the firms' costs/* It will probably also change the ''normal"
variable costs of production.
Further they argue that the size of the subsidy and the magnitude of the impact
on costs may not have a proportionate relationship;
"...the net effect on cost will only be some highly variable fraction of the apparent 
subvention paid out by the government. As a result there exists no simple 
relationship between the magnitude of the subsidy and the reduction in variable 
costs, the crucial variable in determining the competitive effect of the 
subsidization. ^
If the American authorities do not take the real impact of the subsidy on costs into 
consideration, but rely instead on the assumption that subsidies always reduce costs (an 
"at least partially mythical" assumption) then, these authors conclude, "this approach tends 
to provide substantially greater protection than is actually justified..."^ In effect, the 
assumption allows the United States greater leverage to penalize the foreign actor.
Even if Commerce officials knew the full amount of the subsidy because a specific 
expenditure for it exists in the foreign government's budget, still Commerce officials must 
apportion the amount of the subsidy among many recipient firms. But this task is done 
without making any allowance for the fact that a subsidy of the same value probably will 
not have a uniform impact on the cost structure of different firms. Costs are, of course, 
determined in no small part by economies of scale and size. The impact on a small firm 
or a firm with relatively high variable costs is bound to be different from the impact of 
the same subsidy on the costs of a very large highly diversified firm or one with relatively
232
low variable costs.
Further, a subsidy will undoubtedly have a very different impact on the cost 
structure among various factories within a single f irm .^  If the law is used to 
countervail all the allegedly subsidized imports from one country at the same rate the duty 
will obviously not correspond to the subsidy's genuine impact on costs.
Thus, countervailing duties paid by each firm cannot and do not exactly equal the 
value of the subsidy the firm received. Rather, the amount of the duty is based on the 
conjectural impact on costs, by the average, not the genuine, value of the alleged subsidy.
"NORMAL" COSTS
The law rests on the assumption that it is possible to discern the "normal” cost of 
producing that portion of a firm's produce that is exported to the United States. The 
firm's overall cost of production is not at issue.
Is there a "normal” cost of producing something? When the amount of the subsidy 
is not easily apparent Commerce officials sometimes construct a foreign firm's costs so that 
a comparison can be made between the "normal” cost and the "subsidized" cost. In this way 
it is possible to isolate the value of the subsidy. Commerce officials use the same formula 
here as is used in antidumping cases. Costs include the cost of materials and fabrication, 
plus 10% for general expenses, plus 8% of the sum of these costs and expenses for profit, 
plus the packaging and shipping costs. This formula describes the "normal" cost of 
production as defined by United States. However, by using such a fixed formula the 
officials then are not trying to determine the firms' actual costs but rather to determine 
what their costs ought to be. The CVD law, then, is used to send a message to foreign 
firms: it is used to tell foreign firms what their costs should be.
The fact that market conditions or efficient production may allow a reduction in 
costs below the level specified by the United States' cost formula is completely ignored.
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Market forces and their impact on foreigners' costs -- the very forces that the law 
ostensibly seeks to enhance -- are denied significance under the CVD procedure. Foreign 
firms' are penalized if they respond to such market forces by reducing their prices below 
the level of costs specified by this formula.
The CVD procedure then makes the implicit assumption that it is possible to 
determine both "normal" costs and "subsidized" costs. Costs, however, as we have seen in 
the last chapter, are difficult if not impossible to discern. Rather costs are isolated through 
a variety of arbitrary (and often outmoded) accounting procedures.
We recall Tarullo's fundamental point that there is no coherent concept of costs 
that is independent from the role government plays in supporting the market structure. 
From police protection to education policy to regional development policy the state 
pursues a variety of actions which affect the costs of doing business. The role government 
plays varies from state to state. Therefore, "normal" costs must vary from state to state. So, 
there is no universally "normal" market-determined cost of production. "Normal" costs of 
production must vary from state to state.
In addition, costs are bound to vary from state to state depending simply on the 
differing conditions of supply and demand. To require that all firms from several 
countries be held to the same cost criteria is to deny that competitive conditions vary, that 
market elasticities vary, and that such variance is precisely what gives rise to comparative 
advantage and international trade.
Even if US authorities accepted that there is no universal "normal" cost of 
production, and even if it were possible to gather enough information to calibrate the US 
cost formula to allow for differing government and market structures in different states, 
administering officials would still not be able to determine the costs relevant to CVD 
investigations in an unarbitrary manner. Because, as explained in reference to the sales 
below cost standard in AD investigations, there is no unarbitrary way of determining the 
cost of producing a single unit in a multiproduct firm.
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It may be possible to determine direct costs. Although, in determining the cost of 
the leather which is used to make a single pair of shoes, it would be necessary to know the 
exact price which was paid for the specific batch of leather used. The price of the leather 
may change over time due to genuine market fluctuations or the negotiation of discounts 
on bulk purchases. Investigating officials would generally not have access to the 
information that would be required to discover the actual direct cost nor the time to 
process it within the investigation deadline. As a result, even direct costs are cast in a 
somewhat arbitrary manner under a CVD investigation.
Indirect costs, which, according to Peter Drucker, usually account for the majority
of incurred costs in modern manufacturing operations, are much more elusive. Overhead
costs account for all those costs that must be paid regardless of the level of production.
These costs can vary according to many factors including the pace of product innovation 
and the learning curve, as well as the volume and character of production.
The concept of "normal" costs is empty, devoid of meaning. Applying it in practice 
is, as Jacob Viner made clear, an absurdity.
•SUBSIDIZED" COSTS
The "normal", supposedly "market-determined", cost of production must then be 
compared with the "subsidized" cost. In some cases the full amount of the subsidy is 
known. In export subsidy cases the size of the subsidy is sometimes apparent either 
because the subsidy is paid on a per unit basis or because the full amount of the subsidy 
is evident in foreign law or policy.
In the first instance, an export subsidy paid on a per unit basis, it is assumed that 
there is no need to determine the "normal cost" because the "normal cost" is simply that 
which would have been necessary had the subsidy not been available. In such a case 
determination of the duty is, according to most observers, a "routine matter". As John 
Sciortino put it:
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"Because the subsidy is already allocated on a per product basis, Commerce need 
only find an appropriate rate of exchange to calculate the dollar value of the 
subsidy by the amount of the product exported to the United States.""
This procedure raises problems. First, which exchange rate is used when rates are
floating? Obviously the choice of exchange rate becomes the crucial factor in determining
the magnitude of the duty. The same constraints, or lack of them, placed on the
administrators in AD cases hold true in CVD cases. That is, the administrators can allow
exchange rate fluctuations alone to create the appearance of a subsidy when none really
exists. Or, such fluctuations can be allowed to magnify the size of a genuine subsidy.
One more step is required before the net subsidy figure can be reached.
Traditionally, as in dumping cases, the subsidy figure was adjusted to allow for
circumstances of the sale. Expenditures, such as application fees or export taxes and duties
which were designed to offset the subsidy received, could be subtracted from the figure.
Or the United States would adjust the figure downward to account for a loss in the value
7ftof the subsidy arising from its late receipt. But it is not necessary to delve into the
details of circumstances of sale adjustments because the 1979 Trade Act eliminates them
79from the procedure. Few or no circumstances of sale adjustments are now made.
What about the majority of CVD cases in which the subsidy is not available on a 
per unit basis? In the case of indirect export subsidies and domestic subsidies Commerce 
may be able to discern from foreign law or policy the full amount of the government 
expenditure. For many years Treasury and Commerce refused to countervail against a 
subsidy unless there was an identifiable expenditure for it. More recently, however, the 
administering agencies have been under pressure to interpret foreign law and policy in an 
attempt to determine the de facto existence and de facto value of the subsidy. Clearly 
interpretation of foreign law and policy requires judgement and discretion. This implies 
that the subsidy's value, particularly since it is a de facto subsidy, will be more attributable 
to discretion than genuine economic factors.
Either way, having determined the size of the subsidy, Commerce must then 
apportion the full subsidy among the recipient firms. In addition to apportioning the
236
subsidy among the recipient firms, Commerce ought also, in theory, to determine the 
impact of the subsidy on the cost of producing those exports that went to the United 
States. The impact of the subsidy on the firms overall costs is irrelevant.
It is virtually impossible, theoretically or practically, to isolate the effect of a 
subsidy on the cost of producing a few products in a multiproduct firm. Further, it is even 
less possible to isolate the cost of producing those few products which are actually 
exported to the United States. Neither the firm itself nor modern accounting procedures 
can provide an unarbitrary way of determining the impact of the subsidy on overall 
production costs.
"Subsidized” costs are just as elusive and meaningless as "normal" ones. Whether due 
to analytical difficulty, lack of all the relevant information, or neglect in accounting for 
the fact that there is and can be no universal normal or subsidized cost, the final "normal" 
and/or "subsidized" costs are bound to have only the most tenuous link to reality and will 
inaccurately represent it. Any figures created on the basis of costs or cost information are 
the product of judgement, discretion and are bound to suffer from faulty and/or false 
input. As a result, such figures are almost entirely the product of invention.
ALLOCATING DUTIES
Usually a subsidy is too large to be countervailed all at once. Take the case of a 
large one-time subsidy. If the firms that received the subsidy were required to pay the 
entire countervailing duty either at once, or in the course of a single financial year, it 
might well drive them out of business altogether. For this reason the United States 
allocates the duty over a period of time. The allocation procedure raises and intermingles 
with questions about the value of a subsidy. The allocation gives the firm time to pay the 
duty. But, is the subsidy worth more or less over time?
Traditionally Treasury allocated the duty over half the useful life of the equipment 
used to produce the subsidized exports. It was assumed that newer equipment would be
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more valuable than older equipment. That is, the subsidy would be worth more to the firm 
in the early than in the later days. United States officials apportioned the duty through a 
simple straight line depreciation so that the amount of duty paid would be front-loaded 
and reduced over time.
As pressures to countervail increased, this methodology became subject to 
question. The value of the subsidy over time issue appeared in the 1982 Michelin case. 
Michelin argued that the duty should have been allocated over the full useful life of the 
equipment that had been purchased with the subsidy. The Court queried whether "any
Oft
justification exists"0'7 for the half-the-useful-life method. This method was rejected by 
the Court because it was "arbitrary and not in accordance with the law."8  ^ The Court 
ruled in Michelin:
"the use of a oeriod of half the accounting life of the capital assets amounts to a 
procrustean82 method, unrelated to the facts and unsupported by law or 
rule."83
Congress appears to have agreed that the old methodology was not useful, but, for 
a different and opposing reason. By 1980 Congress was concerned that "current methods 
of amortizing subsidy values should more accurately reflect the competitive advantage
CMgained from subsidies..."0^ They turned to the now popular Time Value of Money
Theory which posits that money received today is worth more than money received
tomorrow. On this assumption it was argued that the value of a subsidy increases over
time. Commerce officials began to use Net Present Value methodology (NPV is the
accounting term for the time value of money). It was argued as we see in Carbon Steel
A5Products from Belgium. that the new methodology would maintain the desired front- 
loading effect.
"However, so long as we allocate the subsidy in equal nominal amounts over the 
entire useful life, it will still be effectively front loaded [sic] in real terms (as long 
as a positive discount rate is used) since money tomorrow is less valuable than 
money today."86
Once adopted, this new methodology raised new issues in subsidy cases. Now the 
primary concern in assessing the duty was determining the value of the subsidy both at 
the time of receipt and in the future. For example, a $1,000,000 loan or grant from
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government was probably worth more than that in real terms. Commerce began to ask how 
much it would have cost the company to raise the same amount on commercial terms. The 
fact that the grant was given precisely because no commercial alternative would have been 
available is ignored. Instead, US officials have often determined that the subsidy was 
worth the commercial rate. So, if a commercial loan would have required $300,000 in 
interest payments then the full value of the subsidy is $1,300,000. Or, in some cases, they 
have determined the government’s cost of money and held that the subsidy was in fact 
worth that amount. The government's rate of interest is generally lower than the 
commercial rate.
The new methodology was first generally employed in 1982, most notably in the
0 7
one hundred and fifty Carbon Steel0f CVD petitions. The issue of the actual cost of
D O
money arose most vividly in Ceramic Tile from Mexico. It was decided in this case 
and in three others, Certain Pig Iron from Brazil. ^  Ferroalloys from Soain. ^  and 
Leather Wearing Apparel from Argentina. ^  to use the commercial cost of obtaining the 
relevant funds. This sounds simple enough. But is there a standard commercial cost for 
funds? In connection with this methodology Hufbauer and Erb ask: why do corporate 
credit ratings matter to commercial banks? It is because not everybody is eligible for loans. 
Even if a loan equivalent to the subsidy was possible it would be offered at a different 
rate of interest and/or on different terms from one customer to the next, depending upon 
differing risk factors and credit ratings. So, while the cost of money is "administratively 
convenient" as Hufbauer and Erb point out, in reality there is no uniform commercial rate. 
The link between subsidy and cost of commercial funds to a firm is "tenuous"^ for 
these reasons.
The decision to use the commercial cost of money or the government's cost of 
money is clearly an important one. And it is one which is not constrained by the statute 
or administrative regulation. It is interesting to note that the United States makes a great 
effort to determine the real nominal value of a subsidy. US officials look at commercial 
borrowing rates and the cost to government of lending or giving the money. Yet, those
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officials ignore the fact that subsidies in "real” terms are worth different amounts to
different firms depending upon how the subsidy was employed.
In addition, there is no effort made to determine whether the recipient used the
subsidy wisely or effectively and therefore got the full value out of it. In other words, as
John Sciortino points out, the genuine nominal value of the subsidy depends upon how it
was used.®'* One firm may choose well and get the full value out of the subsidy in their
investment. Another firm might make a bad choice and only get half the value of the
subsidy in real terms. If the United States wants to isolate the genuine nominal value of
the subsidy, then the US has to take account of the fact that value depends on the
investment decisions made by the recipient firms. But, the United States CVD law,
regulations and officials do not acknowledge this in such calculations.
Having arrived at a figure for the nominal value of the subsidy how, then, does
Commerce allocate that value? After determining the nominal value of the grant or loan
or subsidy, by using the procedures that have just been outlined, Commerce then allocates
the subsidy over the useful life of the assets. It is unclear who decides what constitutes the
"useful life". The physical depreciation of assets that had figured so prominently in the old
methodology is now completely ignored. The current practice,
"to spread the benefit received over the output for the useful life of the asset, 
purchased wholly or in part with the proceeds of the subsidy, is employed to 
arrive at a subsidy per unit of importation into the USA."®4
Goetz, Granetand Schwartz believe that:
"such an approach, however, is wholly arbitrary if the purpose of the attribution 
is to capture the effects of the subsidy on competition in the American 
markets. 6
They argue,
'To calculate the present value of a physical asset over time without taking into 
account the parallel depreciation of that asset simply ignores reality."®6
According to most accounting experts Net Present Value methodology can be
useful only if very restrictive conditions are applied.®^ Commerce is very loose with
this methodology.
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Instead of relying on depreciation to determine the value of money over time, 
Commerce chooses a discount rate to reflect the projected changed value of money over 
time. The discount rate (also known as an interest rate) is also chosen arbitrarily. In 
different cases Commerce has employed different interest rates. These have included the 
long-term average corporate debt rate, the long-term government debt rate, and a 
weighted cost of capital devised by Commerce itself. Thus, Goetz, et al.. draw attention 
to the problem:
'Whatever (discount) rate Commerce chooses, it is clear that the use of such a rate 
.... has no rational connection to the benefit conferred by a subsidy. Use of this 
rate only makes sense if the facts follow assumptions to be made as to alternative 
uses of the subsidy or as to whether the investment would be made in the absence 
of the subsidy. In none of the reported cases has Commerce articulated these 
assumptions, much less established a rational basis for making them."9®
There is no requirement that a particular time period be used to calculate the
present value. Commerce's method does not determine the benefit of the assets for which
a subsidy is used. Rather, it determines the benefit of a subsidy received in the year the
grant was made.
'There is no relationship between the life of the assets and this financial subsidy. 
The use of the useful life of the assets merely engraft onto Commerce's chosen 
methodology a concept that is required legislatively but has no inherent connection 
with the theoretical basis of the financial subsidy benefit calculation."99
Net Present Value methodology is a technique which enhances the power of the
CVD law as an instrument of statecraft. Although it appears to be sound as a mathematical
procedure, in practice it allows the introduction of discretion in the production of a figure
for a subsidy's nominal value which does not and cannot accurately reflect a subsidy's
genuine value. Sciortino reaches this same conclusion.
"As used by Commerce, the present value methodology involves a series of 
assumptions which operate in a manner apparently designed to maximize to the 
extent possible, without regard to logic, the subsidy value attributable to foreign 
governments practices."
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DE FACTO VERSUS DE JURE
One important ramification of the present value methodology has been to focus 
attention on nominal value. As a result, subsidies which were previously avoided by 
United States officials, namely those for which no expenditure exists, have increasingly 
been perceived as having nominal value. The 1984 Trade and Tariff Act directs the 
administering authorities to countervail not only de jure subsidies but also those which 
exist de facto (that is, they pass the de facto specificity test described earlier). In other 
words, the United States can now look beyond the expenditure in a foreign government's 
accounts, it can look beyond a mere legal description of a subsidy. It can determine that 
a subsidy exists even if there is no expenditure or legal description of it. If such a 
"subsidy” is widely used it can be countervailed under the amended statute. The inclusion 
of de facto subsidies under the statute pushes the whole CVD process further into the 
messy analytical problems inherent in subsidy cases. If the line between actionable and 
inactionable subsidies seemed murky before, continuing in this direction pitches the whole 
problem further into darkness.
INJURY, DOMESTIC INDUSTRY
Since the 1979 Trade Act it has been necessary to substantiate that the subsidy 
causes injury to the relevant American industry. A final positive determination requires 
that a subsidy exist and that it causes injury to the domestic industry be substantiated. The 
definitions of injury and terms relevant to it, such as "like product", "domestic industry", 
"causal" links between "injury" and a "subsidy", are the same as those applied in the AD 
procedure. Similarly the same attenuated thresholds for each of these operative terms
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apply. As we have seen in AD policy, there is a strong tendency to interpret these terms 
broadly, as broadly as is practicable and necessary to best ensure a positive determination.
CONCLUSION
As with the AD law, CVD law and policy can only be clearly understood by a 
careful examination of the ways in which the operative terms and calculation 
methodologies are applied in practice. Every act of statutory and administrative change, 
every act of interpretation and application, is an act of economic statecraft. Each act is 
designed to affect the behaviour of foreign governments. By examining the details in the 
CVD law it become clearer what the United States is compelling foreign governments to 
do under the law.
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CHAPTER NINE — COUNTERVAILING REMEDIES
In the majority of CVD cases, Commerce is unable to substantiate that the subsidy 
exists and/or the ITC is unable to substantiate that injury was incurred to the domestic 
industry by reason of the dumped imports. However, if dumping and injury are 
substantiated then a positive determination is made against the respondent. Most often the 
subsidy is countervailed with a commensurate duty. The duty is levied on the subsidized 
merchandise. The firms that benefitted from the subsidy are required to pay that duty. 
There is no way to make the foreign government(s), which provided the subsidy, directly 
responsible for the duty payment.^ It is hoped that the penalized firms will bring pressure 
to bear on their governments' to cease with the subsidy program, or that the reduction of 
export sales and revenue will induce the foreign governments' to cease with the subsidy 
practice. Or, as often happens, the foreign firms will refuse to participate in the program. 
As such, the CVD law sometimes evokes a change in the behaviour of foreign firms, not 
just governments'.
If the investigation terminates before a final determination is rendered or, if the 
final determination is negative, the firms that allegedly benefitted from the subsidy will 
be refunded the deposits which were paid upon the commencement of the investigation. 
This short-term financial penalty is sometimes sufficient to create pressures which lead 
to a change in government policy. It is worth noting that the initial deposits could be paid 
in the form of a bond until 1984. This meant that firms could avoid a cash outlay pending 
the final determination. But, under the 1984 Trade Act the deposits must be made in 
negotiable instruments, thus requiring a cash outlay. As a result, the firm incurs a 
financial penalty between the beginning and end of the procedure. Since the 1988 Trade 
and Competitiveness Act, the firms are no longer automatically eligible for a refund of 
these initial deposits.
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The United States maintains lists of the most politically powerful industries and 
firms in every foreign country precisely because a CVD procedure, or for that matter an 
AD procedure bring pressures to bear on the government. The threat of provoking a 
government's most powerful industry constituents and thus creating a domestic political 
problem is a potent one. As a result, the fact that the government may not be directly 
responsible for the payment of duties does nothing to diminish the persuasive force of 
duties on that government.
SETTLEMENTS
CVD investigations may be terminated or suspended as in AD cases. In lieu of 
duties the foreign government may be requested or compelled to agree to a settlement. 
Large margins are the most common means of forcing foreign governments to change their 
policy or modify their behaviour in compliance with the United States' demands. Large 
margins imply large duties which will jeopardize the firm's viability in the United States 
market.
Suspension agreements can be reached if the foreign government(s) agree to 
eliminate or offset the subsidy entirely. Or the government(s) must ensure that the 
subsidized goods cease being exported into the United States. In other words, government 
to government quotas must be negotiated or voluntary restraints of exports must be 
undertaken. The statute requires that 85% (substantially all) of the exports in question 
cease being exported for quotas. A third option specifies that the investigation can be 
suspended in "extraordinary circumstances" if the government(s) ensure the elimination
o
of all the injurious effects caused by the subsidy. Under this last type of suspension all 
price suppression and price undercutting must also be eliminated.
If the settlement under the suspension fails to meet the United States' requirements 
the case can be resumed. A final determination will be made. If the determination is 
positive duties will then be imposed.
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It is almost impossible to eliminate a subsidy's injurious effects. For this reason, 
this kind of suspension agreement has never been reached in a CVD case. It is too difficult 
to negotiate an agreement among 85% of all the governments in question and to ensure no 
price underselling or suppression. Governments simply lack the authority (in market 
economies) to control their domestic firms' pricing policies sufficiently to guarantee 
compliance. And there is always the possibility that the government(s) in question will 
provide another subsidy to offset the effects of the settlement. This kind of suspension, 
though allowed, has never been done.
In contrast, governments' have often agreed to offset or eliminate the subsidy 
entirely. That is, the foreign government(s) accept the judgement of US officials that their 
subsidy policy is not appropriate. For example, in 1983 the Government of Singapore 
agreed to apply an export tax on its exports of subsidized refrigerators.* But Section 611 
of the 1984 Trade Act prohibits the termination of a suspended case based on such offsets. 
So, the foreign government's export tax must remain in place as long as the United States 
believes the subsidy exists.
Export restraints can be negotiated between governments. But such arrangements 
are rare. It is necessary to protect those United States officials who negotiate quotas from 
prosecution under domestic competition policy for acting in restraint of trade. Generally, 
the Justice Department counsels them about how to negotiate. Voluntary export restraints 
have been the preferred method for implementing quotas. These arrangements are purely 
voluntary on the part of the foreign government. Therefore American officials cannot be 
liable under such arrangements for engaging in anticompetitive practices. But voluntary 
restraints are difficult to police since there is no legal requirement that the foreign 
government maintain voluntary restraints.
CVD investigations can also be terminated. Usually this happens when the 
petitioners agree to withdraw their complaint. Again, voluntary export restraints or 
voluntary commitments to eliminate the subsidy are the most common means of settling. 
After a termination the case cannot be reopened as it can under a suspension. Withdrawal
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terminations are particularly interesting instruments of economic statecraft. Once the 
petition has been withdrawn the negotiators are not bound to adhere to the terms of the 
petition. Therefore, the foreign government can be compelled to address issues or exports 
that are beyond the scope of the petition. Elaine Frangedakis mentions the steel settlement 
of 1982 as an example. Steel pipes and tubes, which had not been mentioned in the 
petition, were included in the voluntary quota to which the major steel producing nations 
agreed.® The 1984 Trade Act Section 604 allows termination of CVD cases based on 
governmental understandings and agreements to limit the volume of exports to the United 
States.
The majority of suspended or terminated CVD cases rest upon the foreign 
government's agreement to abandon its subsidy.
COMPETITION POLICY: ANTICOMPETITIVE ENDS
The political aspect of CVD policy should be clear. As a technique of statecraft 
the CVD law aims to change a foreign government's policies, behaviour, actions, beliefs, 
ideology and propensity to act. Power is an integral element of this political aim. Foreign 
governments are compelled to do what the United States demands or, at the least, to abide 
by the standards of commercial behaviour the United States is enforcing.
If the United States was promoting market standards and penalizing genuinely 
anticompetitive behaviour then this use of power and the implicit political aim would be 
legitimate. That is, the use of power and the aim of politics would be in accordance with 
the internationally agreed upon methods and objectives of conducting trade policy. But, 
as we have seen, the CVD statute is not used to enforce market standards. It does not draw 
distinctions between competitive and anticompetitive commercial behaviour based on any 
sound economic criteria. Instead, the criteria is based on market ideology -- governments 
should not "intervene” in economic affairs -- tempered by pragmatic considerations.
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Most analyses of CVD policy and competition policy take these pragmatic 
constraints as given. But for analysts of international relations and international politics 
this is the most interesting and important aspect of CVD policy. Why is it that pragmatic 
constraints exist? Why can't the United States hold foreign governments to a pure market 
standard? It is because the United States recognizes that it cannot call for the elimination 
of governments altogether. Once government begins to protect contract and property rights 
it becomes impossible to distinguish between the state and the market unarbitrarily.
But in establishing a normalcy standard to distinguish between actionable and 
inactionable subsidies, the United States abandons economics as the central issue. At issue 
is the validity, the legitimacy, of foreign acts of state, in particular their economic 
policies. As the countervailing duty law is currently structured, American authorities are 
required to judge the legitimacy of foreign governments' subsidy programs but the CVD 
law does not provide specific criteria or rules by which such judgements should be made. 
The lack of substantive and legal constraints or guidelines provides those who invoke the 
law with wide leeway simply to attack foreign economic policies to which the United 
States objects. On what grounds are such objections levied?
Export subsidies, all agree, are illegitimate means of achieving political or 
economic goals. Domestic subsidies, in contrast, are perceived as a legitimate means of 
achieving such goals within the context of a market economy. In the modern world, given 
that the governments of all the market economies have accepted the broad responsibility 
to manage macroeconomic affairs, legitimacy and efficiency are defined by political 
criteria. To one government its domestic subsidy policy (regional development, income 
transfer, infrastructure support) appears to correct a market failure. To the other it creates 
a market failure. In short, there are no workable competition criteria available to help us 
reasonably decide why a particular domestic subsidy practice is objectionable.
Matthew Marks and Harald Malmgren got the nearest to identifying the central 
political problem at stake. They encapsulated it as the
e
"broad problem of what constitutes a legitimate internal measure.
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No agreement on this question can be reached by way of purely economic logic.
It is not only the specific differences between various internal measures among the 
GATT signatories that causes the problem. After all, the same measures used by the 
United States are often the ones it seeks to countervail when others undertake them.
The problem is more that there is no universal agreement as to the appropriate role 
of government in a modern industrial market economy.^ Everybody agrees that 
government must act to subserve broad political and economic goals through 
macroeconomic management. But the governments of the market economy countries, and 
for that matter all of the economists and politicians within each of these countries, 
disagree about the best means of achieving political and economic goals through 
macroeconomic management. In turn, this divergence arises from the fact that the various 
market economies actually perceive the concept of a market economy differently.
Although this is not the central contention in this study, it would seem that more 
research about the differences between the various models of a market economy needs to 
be done before any agreement can be reached as to what constitutes a legitimate internal 
measure. In the meantime, the ideological and practical differences among the market 
economies will continue to give rise to conflict, particularly if the United States continues 
to penalize foreign actors with the CVD law and, for that matter the AD law, for engaging 
in economic policies which are not perceived by those actors to be illegitimate, abnormal 
or anticompetitive. This problem is bound to become more apparent once the formerly 
Socialist and/or Communist Eastern block countries make the transition to a "market 
economy" and try to enter world markets. Further, this will continue to be a contentious 
issue among the industrialised market economies particularly as competitive advantage is 
seen more and more to be a function of the general economic environment within a nation 
rather than a function of an individual firm’s behaviour.
The United States uses the CVD law as a means of penalizing foreign governments 
for pursuing particular policies not because those policies are inherently anticompetitive, 
and not because those policies exemplify a type of intervention not practised by the
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United States (because they sometimes do), but because the United States objects to the 
practice on what appears to be economic grounds but which are in fact ideological and 
political grounds. By labelling a foreign policy a subsidy the United States can exercise 
power, if not a veto, over foreign governments' political objectives or the means foreign 
governments have chosen to achieve those objectives.
The technical aspects of the law's administration clearly reveals that it has been 
subverted into an anticompetitive measure. The law depends upon the identification of 
foreigners' cost of production; but, no theoretical or workable method exists:
- for accurately determining the overall "normal" or "subsidized" costs of production
(because states and markets cannot be separated)
- for accurately calibrating the differences between states in their cost of production
which arise from the varying ways in which their governments protect contract 
and property rights, not to mention fiscal and infrastructure policy.
- for accurately determining the cost of producing any single item in a multiproduct firm.
- for accurately apportioning the value of the subsidy among the recipient firms, or for
apportioning the value of the subsidy among different factories within a single 
firm all of which are necessary in order to reach a figure for the net subsidy.
- for accurately determining the impact of the subsidy on producing the specific exports
that had trade effects on United States commerce.
In establishing a universal "normal" cost formula, which, we recall, includes a 
minimum of 8% profit, the cost of fabrication and materials (determined by the United 
States without calibrating it for fluctuations in direct and indirect costs, etc.), the United 
States denies that costs should, indeed, must vary from country to country, from firm to 
firm and from factory to factory. Differences in relative costs, or the cost formula, which 
is single most important factor which causes international trade, are penalized under the 
law.
In addition, the exchange rate which is used to calculate any figures resulting from 
the CVD investigation can, by itself, magnify or minimize the amount of the alleged 
subsidy. Similarly, the new Net Present Value (NPV) methodology, with which the 
genuine (nominal) value of a subsidy is determined, inflates the value of the alleged 
subsidy. In NPV calculations, the discount rate reflects judgement and discretion more 
than real economic considerations.
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Any cost or net subsidy figures compiled and employed in CVD petitions bears 
only a tenuous relationship to any economic reality.
Furthermore, the terms "domestic industry" and "like product" have been defined 
under the statute so that the injury is measured for its impact on competitors not 
competition. This standard is absolutely at odds with the maintenance of a competitive 
environment, as the US Courts have consistently insisted in their reviews of domestic 
competition policy.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the criteria used to define what a subsidy is, to assess its impact and 
value and to administer the CVD law against foreign governments' trade practices ignores 
genuine competition policy objectives. In practice, the CVD law relies on inherently 
anticompetitive criteria. By utilizing figures which have been arrived at through doubtful 
methods, the United States penalizes foreign governments for engaging in the apparently 
unfair trade practices. The penalties or remedies are themselves anti-competitive in 
practice. CVD policy cannot be reconciled either with domestic competition policy 
objectives or, more importantly, with the rhetoric which emphasises the United States' 
commitment to the principle of competition in the post-war international economic order.
This would be concern enough. But the CVD policy, more importantly, raises a 
challenge to the post-war concept of sovereign freedom. As an instrument of statecraft 
this economic policy tool is used not only to compel foreign governments on specious 
grounds to change their attitudes, behaviour, propensities to act, and to limit their policy 
options but, in addition, this economic statecraft challenges the freedom of foreign 
governments to choose the macroeconomic goals, or the means of achieving them, which 
are necessary to the maintenance of a modern industrial democracy. As it now stands, 
American CVD law and policy challenge the freedom to determine what a government's 
proper and efficient role is within the context of a market economy.
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CHAPTER TEN - - ECONOMIC STATECRAFT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
The purpose of delving so deeply into the minutiae of the American AD and CVD 
laws has been to demonstrate that remedy policy in practice is utterly at odds with its 
intended and propagated purpose. The technical details which have in the past served to 
conceal meaningful developments in the laws from public scrutiny now, being clearly 
depicted, serve to reveal this deep contradiction. It is always worth pointing out that what 
is actually happening is the opposite of what everybody thinks is happening. But the 
consequences of this particular contradiction are extremely important to both our 
theoretical and practical understanding of international relations.
This dissertation opened with an exercise in critical theory.^ That is, attention 
was drawn to the fact that the traditional paradigms, or frameworks of thinking about 
trade policy, were insufficient because they denied or obscured the role of power in, and 
the inherent political quality of, trade policy. Where the free trade versus protection and 
the non-intervention versus intervention frameworks lead us to the conclusion that the 
remedy laws are now instruments of protection, the economic statecraft framework allows 
us to see that protection can be achieved only by generating a change in the commercial 
behaviour, opinions, policies of foreign governments and foreign firms.
Having adopted a new framework of analysis, David Baldwin'seconomic statecraft 
framework, the dissertation then embarked upon solving the problem at hand. If AD 
and CVD policy are aimed at reducing the play or market forces and limiting competition 
then the US must be undermining and not, as is commonly believed, upholding the Post- 
War international economic order. It is not just that the US is subverting the GATTrules 
by creatively manipulating the definitions of operative terms such as "injury1 or "like 
product". The rules have meaning because they provide a structure which supports the 
internationally agreed-upon legitimacy; it is that legitimacy which gives definition, form 
and purpose to the rules for international trade. The legitimacy of the Post-War
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international economic order holds that in comparison with the known alternatives, 
competition provides the most appropriate, impartial and just mechanism for determining 
the distribution of wealth internationally. Trade policy, especially for Contracting Parties 
to the GATT,is supposed to promote this legitimacy. That legitimacy sets out the methods 
trade policy should employ and the objectives trade policy should aim to achieve. Not only 
is the oblique use of the remedy laws as covert methods of protection illegitimate but the 
aim of the policy is to impede competition, and that is illegitimate.
With the AD and CVD laws, in their current subverted form, the United States 
selectively reneges on the implicit promise made under the Post-war international 
economic order. That promise is that access to wealth is secured by the peoples of the 
world by competitiveness, the ability to produce superior or desirable goods (and services) 
for which others wish to pay. To renege on this promise is to challenge the very economic 
basis of international civil society.
Further, the United States' use of these laws provokes conflict among it's trading 
partners. Granted,even the most virulent conflict between, for example, the US and Japan 
or the US and the EC on dumping and subsidy issues is unlikely to escalate into the kind 
of conflict that traditionally dominates the attention of international relations analysts, i.e. 
war. But conflict is divisive, even if small. One of the most fascinating aspects of US and 
CVD policy is that it has ideological substance, and that that substance is provocative to 
many foreigners. AD and CVD policy is essentially aimed at converting foreigners to the 
economic vision being imposed by the United States. Remedy policy aims to change 
foreigners' beliefs and opinions about the appropriate role and behaviour of firms and 
governments in a market economy. No genuine market standard is enforced with these 
laws. Rather, in the case of the CVD law, the US is imposing a vision of the acceptable 
and appropriate role of governments in managing their market economies. In the case of 
the AD law, the US is imposing a vision of the acceptable and appropriate behaviour of 
firms in managing their commercial affairs in a market economy. But the visions being 
imposed have neither been agreed-upon internationally nor accepted even in the US
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itself.^ By forcing others to change their domestic structures, opinions, perceptions,
policies on this basis, the United States challenges the very political basis of international
civil society, i.e. the freedom to shape and run domestic institutions and policy according
to national inclinations.
The political and the economic questions of international civil society overlap, as
Cordell Hull noted in his memoirs.
"Over and above the economic side of our foreign policy, but closely tied with it, 
I believed, hung the political side. To me it seemed virtually impossible to develop 
friendly relations with other nations in the oolitical sphere so long as we provoked 
their animosity in jhe economic sphere.1"  ’The political line-up followed the 
economic line-up.
Traditionally, analysts of international relations have puzzled over where the line 
should be drawn between the demands of international civil society and national sovereign 
prerogatives. This problem was evident, for example, when the South African Government 
insisted that apartheid was an internal matter beyond the reach of the international 
community. Now attention must be turned to this new source of conflict. It must be 
determined where or whether a line can or should be drawn when it comes to the central 
question which is at stake when remedy policy is exercised - - that question is, what is the 
range of commercial behaviour governments and firms in market economies can pursue 
without being a threat to international civil society?
More work needs to be done on the problem of whether it is really possible (or 
practicable) to make a distinction between genuine and artificial competitive advantage/ 
Further, given that such significant practical and ideological differences among the market 
economies patently exist, there needs to be a much more sophisticated study and 
understanding of the various extant and possible forms "capitalism" or "market-economies" 
can take. For the differences of perception and opinions which create and or arise from 
these different forms of capitalism are what will continue to prevent agreement and make 
negotiation difficult. In addition, such study and understanding may make it possible to 
move beyond the current proclivity to blame others for not being as "market-oriented"
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as those doing the blaming would like. At least one commentator thinks that this is the way
to go on subsidy questions. Jacob Dreyer believes
"...the legitimacy of certain national objectives ought to have a seal of 
international approval, with the aim of limiting the gray areas of differing 
interpretations of this concept (subsidy) by national authorities. An 
international agreement on this subject, though remote at present, could 
be incorporated in principle into the GATT. The range of internationally 
agreed-upon "legitimate" national interests would probably be wider than 
the US government would advocate, but there is no reason to fear that any 
attempt to reach such an understanding would be doomed to failure.
Such a discussion could also be applied to the question of firms and dumping. In short, the
concept of "fair" needs to be examined in greater detail.
It has been the belief that foreigners were engaging in "unfair" commercial 
behaviour which prompted the US authorities to create and actively enforce the AD and 
CVD laws in the first place. As the dynamic sources of commercial advantages have 
become a more pressing issue there has been a tendency to do more than just make 
accusations of unfairness. There has been an increased tendency to try to "level the playing 
field".
William Cline explains that "A "level playing field" .... becomes especially
q
important where comparative advantage is arbitrary. But the playing field, as it were, 
cannot be levelled. The technical differences in national accounting procedures, corporate 
structures, subsidy policies, etc., all arise from differences of opinion as to the appropriate 
nature and role of governments and firms in a market economy. Already we can see, as 
Robert Baldwin points out, 'The need for a "level playing field" or "to make foreign 
markets as open as US markets" have become the basic justification for the greater use of 
trade distorting measures by the US."1® Cameron and Crawford make the point this 
way. 'These amendments (made to the AD and CVD laws)" .... " have further tilted the 
playing field against respondents and foreign enterprises under the guise of levelling that 
field."11
But, study should not be focused on the concept of fairness because it is simply 
untenable in the realm of commercial affairs. It is impossible to measure. Fairness is in the
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eyes of the beholder. Attempts to measure it are economically meaningless exercises in 
fiction.
This is the main problem with United States AD and CVD laws. Unwilling to 
abandon the principle of free trade, the United States has instead modified the statutes so 
that fair trade practices can be made to appear "unfair". Normal trade practices are 
labelled "unfair" not because they are anti-competitive, but because they are genuinely 
competitive. Noel Hemmendinger captures the tension between America's commitment to 
the principles of competition and its need to be seen to be "doing something" about trade 
problems.
"One element of the tendency to treat unwelcome competition as "unfair" is a 
genuine desire, as a matter of principle and international obligations, to avoid 
countermeasures unless a finding of unfairness can be made."
So, the laws have been stretched so that a finding of unfairness is rather easy to
make. The end result is an ideological conviction that the foreigner's behaviour is somehow
wrong. Specific countermeasures are difficult to make against such allegations. This is
especially true because the respondent cannot challenge the decision to make the allegation
until after a final judgement has been rendered in any given case. Nonetheless, the very
unfairness of the allegation is an important problem. Hemmendinger highlights it.
"If, however, the results are capricious, or there is no international consensus on 
the alleged unfair practice, lip service to the principle accomplishes nothing and 
makes trouble internationally." 3
The more aggressively the United States invokes these laws the more trouble will 
appear internationally. The more the US continues to "enhance" these statutes in the 
manner which has been described here, the more it will undermine order when it invokes 
them.
This raises a question which this dissertation has not fully addressed. Why has the 
policy in practice diverged from the intended or propagated policy?
Perhaps Joseph Grunzelwas rig h t.^  Those most ideologically committed to the 
doctrine of "free trade" are the ones most likely to modify the doctrine, not in principle, 
but in its application. Oxymoronic notions abound in the realm of competition policy.
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What is free trade is labelled protectionism. What is protectionism is labelled free trade. 
Fair is said to be unfair. Just as the Queen told Alice in Wonderland that she had to be 
capable of thinking up ten impossible things before breakfast, one must believe many 
impossible things to accept that the AD and CVD laws serve to promote competition. One 
must believe that it is possible to accurately determine the cost of producing one item in 
a multiproduct firm, that the American industry can be constituted by a single company 
or region of the country, that it is possible to draw a line separating states from markets, 
or if not, that an economically sound line can be drawn between good government 
interventions and bad ones. The AD and CVD laws are a fine example of Grunzel's theory.
Perhaps disinterest and misinformation combined have allowed the subversion of 
the statutes. Trade remedy policy is not the sexiest subject in politics, economics or even 
in law. Certainly the prolific technical details inherent in the AD and CVD statutes have 
shielded them from intense scrutiny. But, even those most closely involved in the passage 
of trade legislation often do not have the time to read carefully through the hundreds or 
thousands of pages which make up a trade bill. Members of Congress must rely on their 
staff to interpret and explain the meaning of proposed modifications. Some things may 
be lost in translating the technical terms into plain English. Or, the staff members or the 
Congressmen, accept the judgement of their colleagues who serve on the relevant 
committees.^ Chinese whispers^® usually lead to mistranslation and end up causing 
misunderstanding.
Sometimes, no doubt, propagation of misinformation is intended. There are those 
who know full well that a proposed amendment or an attendant administrative regulation 
is undeniably protectionist. After all, much if not most of the language put forward to be 
considered for inclusion in a trade bill is crafted by the corporate community. Some 
political representatives promote the inclusion of this language because they may confuse 
what is good for the country with what is good for their corporate constituents. Bill 
Boyarsky cleverly captures the manner in which much trade legislation is produced.
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"One of the oldest tricks in the legislative business is mumbling a bill through the 
legislature. You mumble when you want to sneak through something that wouldn't 
stand public scrutiny. You employ technical, sometimes impenetrable language. 
The summary that accompanies the bill is vague and misleading. In explaining the 
bill to fellow lawmakers you mumble that it makes "technical changes" or 
"eliminates obsolete language." Colleagues, with thousands of bills before them, 
usually take the explanation at face value and vote aye."17
Perhaps ignorance accounts for the subversion. Proposed changes are adopted
because no one foresees its ramifications. This might explain why so many critical changes
have been made to the laws without Congressional discussion at all. We remember that
there was absolutely no official debate, for example, with regard to three of the most
consequential innovations ever made. One was the adoption of a sales below cost standard
in 1974 under the AD law. Another was when domestic production subsidies were
included as actionable subsidies in 1922 under the CVD. A third example is found in the
requirement for a specificity test under the CVD law which was adopted in 1979.
It may be that few have a proper understanding of the economics of competition.
The failure to distinguish between injury caused by healthy competition and injury caused
by anticompetitive trade practices is a good example, as is the failure to correctly
distinguish between injury to competition and injury to competitors. Or, it may be that
even a perfect understanding of economic theory would not solve the problem because the
theory is so imperfect. Competition policy theory and international trade theory bear only
ifia tenuous relationship to reality. °
There are those, often the ones who have been closest to the policy-making 
process, who believe that the subversion of these statutes can and should be accounted for 
only by the deliberate and cognizant actions of the authorities who have modified these 
laws in content and in application. Brian Hindley says, "the other, sadder, possibility is 
that ministers' commitment is to a liberal world trading order in rhetoric, but to protection 
in practice."1^  According to this view the many "technical" revisions over the years are 
not accidental. The draft revisions being almost invariably suggested by representatives 
of groups desiring increased protection either in industry, or in the government itself in 
response to protectionist pressures.
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Whether this is true or not, the economic statecraft framework has allowed us to
see that the bureaucratic organizations and officials responsible for applying these laws
have modified their administrative regulations so that the procedure and methodology is
biased, and/or can be manipulated, in favour of petitioners. Our heightened awareness of
the discretion available in the AD and CVD procedure might help us understand this
phenomenon better in future. By focusing on the actual policy content, it has been possible
to clarify the important role played by those who modify the statutes' and those who
interpret and apply them. Once it is accepted that the laws are instruments of statecraft
then it is necessary to accept that attempts to make or change AD and CVD policy
20constitute acts of economic statecraft.
This contrasts with the current popular perception that administered protection is
a better alternative to the more political alternative of protectionist legislation because it
is a low-level technical procedure. For example, Michael Finger says:
T h e  antidumping and countervailing duty mechanisms in the US , for example, 
are technical procedures. There, determinations are defined by hundreds of lines 
of legislation and thousands of lines of administrative regulations.
Similarly, Douglas Nelson argues:
"In the US, with its strong process orientation, the "low politics" aspect of 
administered protection is established by the creation of a large body of technical 
rules (the administrative regulations) which constrain, at a very low level, the 
amount of discretion available to the bureaucrats who handle administered 
protection cases."22
Seen this way, it is easy to agree with the conclusion which is typically reached. Nelson 
puts it best.
"Yet, they are low-visibility mechanisms which attempt to provide incremental 
protection without resource to the more political mechanisms. As a result, this 
administered protection tends to enhance stability in international economic 
relations."22
If we examine these laws as instruments of economic statecraft, however, it 
quickly becomes apparent that the technical procedures are not as innocuous as they 
appear. It is crucial to ask what the United States is compelling foreigners to do. This 
makes it necessary to look closely at the technical details. We see, for example, that the 
central operative terms can be imbued with various meanings at different times. The
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methodology is flexible even within the context of a single investigation. There is great
freedom for the various administering officials to use their discretion within the limits of
the statutes and regulations. For example, Michael Finger says that a technical bureaucrat's
job is to "accumulate technical knowledge and apply it accurately, as the rules and
regulations direct."2^ He does not see the political power wielded by those who write
and administer the statutes. As a result, he undermines his own case. In explaining that:
"Pressure group politics does not come to bear on them [the bureaucrats].1*® he claims,
as the person responsible for calculating the Steel Trigger Prices for the United States, he
could have chosen the figure of $650 or $690 per ton within the limits of the regulations
26but even still he didn't get a single invitation to lunch. That he could have chosen any
figure between these two limits is evidence of the discretion available to him. The freedom
to administrative officials to exercise discretion in their interpretation and application of
these statutes plays an important role in the content of the policy.
Granted,there are more constraints on administering officials now than there were
in the past. There are those, GaryHorlick tells us, who would prefer the "good old days
when margins could be manipulated for the greater good of the country. 1 Perhaps the
margins could have been manipulated but the real question is whether they actually were.
John Jackson recommends,
"... whatever system exists should leave to those government officials as much 
elbow room as possible to make the necessary decisions because those officials 
inherently feel that they will make the best decisions possible ...' 8
But what is the definition of the "best decisions possible"? Before answering this question
we should perhaps look at the bigger picture. By highlighting the political aspects of trade
remedy policy the economic statecraft framework brings us to another conclusion which
is opposite to the popular wisdom. It is commonly accepted that the United States
Governmenthas no political agenda when it comes to trade remedy policy. Alan Wolf, for
example, explains:
"The United States government has no general mandate to structure either 
America's trade or its production of manufactured goods. Instead, the government 
is given the primary role of a neutral referee - - an enforcer and arbiter of the 
laws."29
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But, in reality, as we have seen, the very act of setting the rules, either through 
legislation or interpretation and application of the statutes is an act of statecraft. The 
United States government is neutral neither in setting or enforcing the laws. It has an 
active interest in achieving political objectives: affecting the way in which foreign actors 
conduct themselves in the international trade system. The economic statecraft framework 
brings us to a conclusion which contradicts that reached by many commentators on trade 
remedy policy. Administered protection, as it now occurs, tends not to enhance stability 
in international economic relations, but to undermine it. Yes, the United States has an 
active interest in achieving political objectives via these instruments. But, the objectives 
that have been sought, to reiterate, are inconsistent with the legitimacy established by the 
international community.
Perhaps the best proof of the contradiction between the policies' supposed and
Oft
actual aim, as Harvey Applebaum makes clear , is the fact that American domestic and 
international competition policy are so hopelessly at odds. Rodney Grey captures the 
essential point.
"What is required by [United States] trade policy, what is profitable under trade 
policy, would, under [United States domestic] competition policy, bring substantial 
fines and prison sentences .
If domestic competition policy and international competition policy are so at odds 
that those conducting the international version require special advice from the Justice 
Department about how to avoid liability under the domestic law, special statutory 
immunities from prosecution, and special tools, such as VRA's, by which the foreigner 
appears takes the blame for acting in restraint of trade, then something is clearly awry.
From the foregoing discussion it may be possible to infer that the economic 
statecraft that is in play is exercised by a single, or a single group, of rational actors. But, 
actually, the concept of statecraft does not necessarily require that the policy is created 
or applied by rational actors. Like most policy remedy policy emerges from a variety of 
sources and a variety of influences come to bear upon it. But, the important point is that 
in the end, regardless of the intentions of those exercising the policy, foreigners must
268
abide by whatever the policy actually is. The scope for being subject to the power 
wielded with the AD and CVD laws, whether intentional or not, is very wide. From the 
mere threat of invoking these laws to the application of a settlement order, foreigners must 
submit to the policy if they wish to maintain access to the lucrative United States market 
and/or a good official relationship with the United States. That is why it is so important 
to examine the actual policy content rather in addition to the policy-making process. But, 
it should also be clear that where there is discretion there is susceptibility to political 
pressures.
And so we return to the issue of political objectives. If all those involved in 
modifying the AD and CVD law are doing making what they believe to be the "best 
decisions possible" then it is probably necessary to more closely examine the perceptions
op
which lead to these decisions. The United States has supported the modern trade
system due primarily to its conviction that competition constituted the best mechanism for
international trade. Raymond Aron reminds us,
"one must accept that an international system is established for the same reason 
that ant social or political system is created; actors enter into relations to advance 
particular sets of political, economic or other types of interests."33
There is now a perception in the United States that this mechanism has not always
distributed the gains from international trade as beneficially to the United States as it
might. This brings us back to the initial reason why the AD and CVD laws were brought
into more active use. There was a perception in the United States that unfair foreign trade
practices, not the competitive system itself, have been responsible for the perceived
deterioration of the United States1 position in the world economy.3^
Perhaps, though, unfair trade practices have not been to blame. Perhaps, Robert
Keohane is correct when he concludes that the economic order has ceased sustain the
O C
desired political order. There are no guarantees that American industry will always 
"win" in the game of international trade. Or, it may be that the perception of decline needs 
to be re-examined. Recently some analysts such as Henry Nau33 and John Makim3^
269
have begun to criticize and cast substantial doubt upon this view. George Will is wise to
oo
note that "competitiveness requires as much soulcraft as statecraft".
Certainly this issue of "perception" deserves greater attention. If the United States 
continues to "strengthen" and "enhance the enforceability" of the AD and CVD laws in the 
same manner as this dissertation has described, on the basis of perceptions of decline, or 
unfairness, the United States will be further undermining the foundation of the post-war 
international economic order.
This study of one small set of policies has shown us that trade laws can be applied 
with different severity, contingent upon the circumstances. Thus the economic statecraft 
framework lends credence to the view held by many trade negotiators, which Rodney Grey
O Q
has best articulated. The international trade system has not been as liberalized as the
Common wisdom holds.
The majority view is, he says: that "under the leadership of the US the industrializ­
ed nations have been slowly but systematically reducing barriers to trade; the 
successive GATT negotiations resulting in agreed reductions in tariffs , and the 
increase in world trade, are called in evidence that this is the case. On this view, 
it is urged that the remedies for "unfair" trade, and the "safeguard" or "escape 
clause" mechanisms must be refined, because it is only if these are well designed 
and working effectively that it will be politically possible to negotiate further 
reductions in tariffs. Thus the cause of "free trade" ,or "freer trade", has been 
harnessed in the attack on "unfair" methods of competition in importation."4®
This view has, it seems, been the prevailing view in the US Congress, as evidenced 
in the various hearings over the period say, from 1967 (after the Kennedy Round) 
to 1984 (the passage of the most recent trade legislation)."4^
"However, there has also been a minority view, to the effect that what has been 
happening has been not so much trade liberalization, but rather a widespread 
recourse to discrimination in trade policy and, in parallel, a shift from reliance on 
the tariff, (in the fashion of the early 1950's) to reliance on an armoury of other 
measures, which have been lumped together under the heading of "contingency 
protection"".4^
That the single most important member of the international trade community is 
paradoxically aiming to achieve objectives which are exactly opposite to those which the 
international community has agreed are legitimate poses a danger to the post-war 
international economic order. The danger is all the greater because, as mentioned in 
Chapter One, the United States is not the only country in which this paradox has 
developed. The European Community has been particularly adept in mimicking US
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practice in this a rea .^  Many other nations have seen how useful these laws can be and 
have implemented their own. Brazil has created and employed an AD law in the last few 
years. Australia and Japan too have begun using their remedy laws more than ever before. 
In essence, the United States' practices are being widely emulated, leading to a general 
deterioration in the international economic order. The endless pursuit of "unfairness" is 
perversely bringing about the dissolution of the framework of order, leaving a troubled, 
volatile world ahead of us, characterised by growing unilateralism, the US the teacher and 
others learning fast.
A comprehensive review of United States trade remedy law and policy is urgently
needed. This has never been done. Over the last 100 years, since the creation of these two
statutes, they have been clearly transformed into something which, if examined and
understood, the United States probably does not want. But, a decision as to whether
America wants to uphold the Post-War international economic order or not needs to be
made one way or the other. It is important for the United States to confirm or refute its
commitment to the principles of free trade and competition.
The international rules undoubtedly need to be reassessed as well. Perhaps the rules
need to be strengthened by a more careful, narrower defining of operative terms. As
Horlick, Quick and Vermulst note,
"It is clear that the lack of definition of the term subsidy in the Code and in the 
GATTmay have negative effects: signatories are free to extend their definitions 
of domestic subsidies to include any new practice they find particularly 
disturbing."^
The same is unquestionably true of the terms in the Antidumping Code. In contrast, it is
also argued that the international rules do more harm than good. For example, the
Economist recently argued,
"The anti-dumping Code is already a protectionist's charter. Broadening it would 
be a crippling blow to free trade. Ideally the code should be struck out of the 
GATT;genuine cases of predatory behaviour (which are extremely rare) could be 
handled under existing competition rules."^
To continue along the current path is to hasten the deterioration of orderly 
international commercial relations. As EM Winslow had the prescience to see, the
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breakdown of legitimacy is indicative of a transition not from free trade to protectionism
but from order to its dissolution.*®
By further understanding the role of power in trade policy and the political nature
of trade policy we will be better equipped to prevent the diminution or dissolution of
order. Apparently Keynes said of the kind of behaviour which used to be described as
mercantilism, and which today is described as a new form of mercantilism (that is the way
in which the subverted trade remedy measures are now used),
"We, the faculty of economists prove to have been guilty of presumptuous error 
in treating as a puerile obsession what for centuries has been a prime object of 
practical statecraft."*^
Perhaps, with this new understanding of trade policy the truth in the following apt 
poem can be more greatly appreciated.*®
ANYONE FOR TENNIS?
In the good old days we played.
Like decent chaps, the game o f  trade. 
So, what the umpire said was that. 
According to the rules o f  GA TT, 
Was taken, in the name o f  sport.
As ruling sanctions out o f  court;
And no ungentlemanly shout 
Disputed when the hall was out.
Americans, fo r  whom it's sin 
To play the game unless they win. 
Are most inclined to hedge their bet 
By doubling up the height o f  net; 
This slops the European ball 
From entering their court at all. 
While Europe threatens to retire.
Or raise its own a sanction higher.
But now, alas, the urge to win.
Has brought a breach o f  discipline;
With all the seeded players free 
To denigrate the referee.
And go fo r game, and set, and match 
By any rules their leaders hatch 
Which give their overseas accounts 
The better o f  the trading bounce.
For all the players it is vital 
That no one else should win the title. 
Though, what they can themselves produce, 
May get them, at the best, to deuce;
So beggaring my neighbour's trade 
Is how the winning lobs are made.
While players, point-by-point. dispute 
Who brought the game to disrepute.
But both accuse the Eastern set 
O f dirty play around the net.
And call the Japanese a menace 
Unworthy o f  the game o f  tennis;
Or fight about the repercussions 
O f playing doubles with the Russians, 
In case the Eastern Bloc attack its 
Service game with Western rackets.
The players, to a man, deplore 
The ones who call the game a war; 
Insisting it is only played.
Within the spirit o f  free trade.
By gentlemen who don’t resort 
To cheating in the name o f  sport;
Its  simply not the game fo r foots 
Who keep insisting on the rules!
Bertie Ramsbottom
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